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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-067
Friday
7 April 1995

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-067

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Benefits of C. Asian Leaders' Longer Terms

MM0704095495 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 First Edition p 6

[Article by Mikhail Shchipanov: "Presidents of the Third Millennium. Referendum on Extending Powers of Heads of Post-Soviet Countries By No Means Constitutes Oriental Wiles"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] When the presidential powers of Turkmenbashi Niyazov were extended with the local public's frenzied, sometimes rapturous support, this phenomenon was indeed ascribed to the authoritarian ethic and to the subtle ways of the East. The referendum that extended the powers of another president in what was Soviet Central Asia—Karimov—is explained by the specific fact that, while Uzbekistan is indeed developing a democratic state system in the generally accepted sense of the word, their own particular system has a very eastern face—with a firm authoritarian jaw and a polite smile to hide its true intentions. However, when preparations began for a similar referendum in neighboring Kazakhstan, which on the face of it has come closer than the other states in the region to the standard separation of powers with a legal, noisy opposition and free popular press, the time had come for many supporters of Kipling's well-known saying about East and West never meeting to really stop and think.

Is it a question, in Central Asian political life, of a reversion to totalitarianism—a state pyramid with a father of the people at its apex—and of the creation of a special post-Soviet Asian model for state development, or has a normal process begun from Ashgabat to Almaty, reflecting in condensed form the experience of many quite democratic countries?

To condense the arguments used to account for the past and future referendums, they essentially boil down to a single fundamental idea: In the context of the highly complex transitional period with the bulk of the population's making the extremely difficult adjustment to new living conditions it is simply essential to preserve continuity of leadership, guaranteeing consistency of the chosen path without the traditional election games and digressions. Thus everything is described with supreme clarity by the popular Russian proverb about not changing horses midstream. Especially at such a turbulent point.

Few people would risk openly disputing this idea. The Americans themselves often speak of the irrationality of a four-year presidential mandate, since the new White House incumbent usually spends the first year adjusting to his new position and getting abreast of intricate affairs of state, and the last year of his mandate is spent purely on election matters in order to keep his residence on Pennsylvania Avenue. As a result there are just a couple of years left to efficiently govern the country. Hence people in the United States occasionally wonder: Would it not be simpler to allot the head of state a single term, but much longer and with greater powers?

Something of the sort has also been observed in France where the presidential term is virtually the longest in the West—seven years. Naturally, the advisability of cutting the presidential mandate to, say, five years is discussed but things do not usually go any further than that.

Meanwhile, even after the referendums on the extension of powers (and a referendum is always seen as a kind of election) the first presidents of the post-Soviet Central Asian countries will have spent about eight to 10 years in power in all. One can of course make forecasts as to whether they will leave power even after the year 2000 if the Almighty grants them health and long life, but this is extremely shaky ground which has no bearing on serious analysis. [passage omitted including analogies with Japan and Germany]

However, it has long been known that any comparison is odious. Where is the Cura [reference to proverbially remote seat of government in ancient Rome] and where is my home? Or rather, where is the Rhine [reference to analogy with Germany] and where is Ashgabat? Let us look at another more pragmatic aspect of the process. Of late even politicians who rank themselves in the liberal wing of our economic and political thought have made no secret of their positive views of the so-called "Chinese model." We have stopped hearing objections that China is supposedly a peasant country and therefore can have nothing in common with the overly urbanized Russia in terms of development models. However, the Central Asian states remain peasant states and therefore are a priori more suited to take the well-known Chinese path of development with its typical accelerated economic reforms and some restrictions on certain state-representative rituals.

Naturally, not everyone in a bath is Archimedes. And not every president who does not face the Sword of Damocles of a campaign for voters' fickle sympathies is necessarily leading his country to prosperity by the direct route. Not all preconditions are realized in practice.

One thing is clear, namely that the partners of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and, presumably, Kazakhstan get constant and thus well- proven political interlocutors for years in advance and questions of possible unpredictability and dramatic about-turns in foreign policy are removed. Right now this predictability is valued by the world above all with regard to the post-Soviet states. Debates over what will happen to Kazakhstan after Nazarbayev and to Uzbekistan after Karimov are postponed for years now.

However, free and cyclical elections still remain not only the criterion for society's internal freedom but also a means of resolving pent-up domestic conflicts. That is why the new, clear trends in the Central Asian countries must be approached in our traditional educational style—dialectically.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 7 Apr

LD0704064795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0514 GMT 7 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 7 TASS—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reports that more than 20 out of 62 leaders of foreign states, invited to Moscow to attend the May 9 celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, have already confirmed their consent to arrive.

The newspaper refers to Igor Ivanov, Russian first deputy minister of foreign affairs, who told journalists this on Wednesday at a meeting of the Russian organising committee for the preparation of the celebration of the Victory Day anniversary.

Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, John Major and other foreign leaders will be guests of the Russian capital. "The Balts all together declined to attend the anniversary marking ceremonies. War veterans, who live in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will send their delegations to Moscow, unlike their presidents," the newspaper points out.

Foreign guests did not try to introduce any changes to the Victory Day celebration scenario, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman told journalists. That would be inappropriate from the viewpoit of diplomatic etiquette. Neither the U.S. President nor the German chancellor will be present at a military parade on Poklonnaya Hill, he said.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the situation in the Crimea:

"Kiev's accurate political calculation, it seems, has fully justified itself now: the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea is being brought back to the authority of Ukraine after several months of a criminal revolution, nonsensical squabbles between the president and the parliamentarians, and attempts to divide property, in which local businessmen and politicians were not averse to using political slogans in order to push Moscow or Kiev competitors away from the likely sinecure."

"It seems paradoxical enough that tough decisions with regard to the Crimea have been taken precisely by the president of Ukraine whom the Crimean people fully trusted at the latest elections."

TRUD on Russia's security service:

"There is, at last, light at the end of the tunnel, it seems. A new bill 'On the Agencies of the Federal Security Service' has met with approbation in the Duma and the Federation Council. This will be virtually a new special service with wide powers. It will again have its own investigation subdivisions, isolation wards, special-purpose groups and have the right to conduct intelligence operations outside Russia.

"The service will fight against economic crimes and ensure the protection of Russia's scientific, technological and defence potential. In short, this will be really a structure capable of strengthening the security of both the country and every individual".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) runs an interview with Justice Major-General Stanislav Gaveto, chief military prosecutor, who said that almost 1,000 messages have come in to the military prosecutor's office from servicemen and their parents, mothers, as a rule, over the entire period of combat operations.

Most letters dealt with desertion by soldiers and sergeants from their units in the conflict area or prior to being sent there. The letters request that criminal proceedings be not instituted against deserters, General Gaveto said.

It is significant that all applicants draw up their applications in accordance with the recommendations of the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. On the whole, hundreds of servicemen have come within the field of vision of military prosecutor's offices in connection with their refusal to participate in combat operations, the chief military prosecutor pointed out.

IZVESTIYA on local telephone subscription rates.

The Russian Ministry of Communications intends before the end of 1996 to introduce time rates for the subscribers to local telephone networks—payments will depend on the duration of telephone conversations, just as is done as regards inter-urban telephone calls. The existing monthly subscription rate will remain but it will be partially reduced.

Talks With U.S. Envoy Focus on Asia-Pacific Region

LD0604223195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1255 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 April—The planned Russian-American consultations that were held in Moscow on 5 and 6 April were devoted to an examination of a wide range of Asian-Pacific region [APR] problems. This was stated at a briefing today by Grigoriy Karasin, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's press and information department. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord took part in them.

Considerable attention during the consultations, according to G.Karasin, was paid to analyzing the situation in the APR from the viewpoint of the tasks of strengthening peace, stability, and security in the region. The sides stated that the situation in the APR is now more stable and predictable than before, thanks to mounting positive trends such as the reduced role being played by the military force factor and the establishment of negotiating processes including multilateral ones. The American partners expressed their support for the increased role of Russia in APR affairs as an important and natural participant in the region's political and economic life.

The sides agreed to continue their interaction during the period of preparation for and the holding of the next session of the APR regional forum on security problems, which will be held in Brunei this summer.

There was an in-depth exchange of views on the issues of cooperation in the regional economic sphere. The Russian Foreign Ministry representatives stressed the importance of Russia's "turn to the east" for the purpose of reviving the economic potential of the Asian part of the country. The American side expressed support for Moscow's efforts to become more actively involved in the work of regional economic organizations, including the Asian-Pacific Economic Council.

During the consultations, G.Karasin stated, the sides also considered the situation in the Korean peninsula in the context of the problem of nuclear nonproliferation and the situation connected with a Cambodian settlement. There was an exchange of information on matters concerning bilateral relations with Japan, China and other Asian countries, and ways were outlined to strengthen interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States in tackling the APR's pressing problems.

Perry Visit, Need To Stay Nuclear Power Eyed

MM0604161695 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Kondrashov: "How To Compel Respect According to William Perry and—Aleksandr Pushkin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the extremely polite and professorially mannered Mr. Perry, the U.S. defense secretary who traveled the Kiev-Moscow-Almaty-Tashkent route this week and loomed large on Russian television screens, you would never recognize the demonstratively hard-line person who publicly stated two months ago: "The Soviet nuclear complex is like the Hydra—the many-headed monster from Greek mythology. It is useless to just cut off the warheads, it is necessary to destroy the actual monster, or new warheads will appear."

The Soviet nuclear complex is now Russian. Especially since the Ukrainian and Kazakhstani warheads of the former union "Hydra" are being cut off under an agreement with the United States; and a personal view of how this is being done was an important, albeit not the only, objective of William Perry's semi-inspection trip.

In recalling the mention of a Hydra requiring destruction against the backdrop of the amiable "Moscow" Perry, I would not like to level a banal accusation of hypocrisy at him. He has spent his whole life in state service and knows when to be frank and when to be diplomatic. Usually frank when among his own kind, in his own circle. The Pentagon chief invoked Greek mythology when addressing the convention of the American Legion, which unites service veterans. They know how to—and do—give politicians a hard time, checking out how they are defending America and protecting it from further soldiers' deaths.

In Moscow it was time for Perry to be diplomatic, of course. And in his talks with Chernomyrdin, Grachev, and Kokoshin he emphasized not "raw" American interest but multifaceted American-Russian partnership. Washington sees the crucial factor justifying this partnership for the foreseeable future as various kinds of tactical steps toward the strategic objective of, if not destroying, then maximally neutralizing the "Hydra." If we forget this we lose sight of the essence of the interrelationship and interdependence of the two powers.

Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and President Clinton have spoken and will continue to speak (including at the Victory jubilee in Moscow, evidently) about the inadmissibility of Moscow selling a nuclear reactor to Iran. Moscow, however, is standing firm, and Perry, taking heed of its stubbornness, kind of cleared the way for the success of this sale by stating that American-Russian relations must not be made a "hostage" to even the most acute difference of opinion.

This row and the not yet definite concession mirrors the two states' extremely different concerns. For Russia, which at the beginning senselessly put itself in the position of the junior obedient partner and is now struggling to get out of it, this has been first and foremost a matter of principle. Following the backdown on the Indian, North Korean, and Near East deals, there had to be something on which to withstand American pressure, invoking, among other things, the authority of the IAEA, which rules out the possibility of the Russian nuclear reactor helping Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. For the Russian Government and the once-omnipotent nuclear missile complex victory would also mean "making" around $1 billion, especially since Mr. Perry and the whole of official Washington are allocating only pathetic scraps of millions for the task of Russian nuclear disarmament.

For America, dealing with a different scale of concerns, matters, and tasks a billion here or there is no big deal. To avoid encouraging "terrorist" Tehran, Clinton recently forced the Conoco oil company to abandon a billion-dollar deal with the Iranian oil industry. But the overriding fact is that America, having increased its commodity turnover with Iran ten times over since 1989, has become its biggest trading partner.

Russia has no established concept of state interest and is blindly looking for one, gropingly, empirically, grasping for self-assertion at anything that comes its way—this reactor deal, for example. Here—for the sake of a billion and unthinking principle—we are prepared not to pay due attention to the CIA warning cited by Perry of the danger of the emergence of a new nuclear neighbor.

For America the 100-percent exclusion of any nuclear danger is the foundation of national interest, the alpha and omega of the entire concept of national security. The slightest such danger, from any corner of the world, is regarded as intolerable. Following the disintegration of the USSR Washington has taken on the role of punctilious global curator of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Americans are being exceptionally active right now, setting the tone in the preparation of the world conference on extending the treaty in question which begins 17 April in New York. Their objective is an unlimited-duration extension.

Rational national interest rather than empirical national interest (currently the case in Russia) is typified by a precise system of priorities. Perry's Iranian concession to Chernomyrdin testifies to Washington's reluctance to "pick a fight" with the nuclear heir of the defunct superpower with its heightened inferiority and frustration complexes. The two countries remain nuclear hostages to each other and therefore cannot make their relations a hostage to some reactor. Or, to take another example, a hostage to differences over Chechnya or, in Christopher's expression, "any other single issue."

The U.S. secretary of state, like the defense secretary, speaks more frankly among his own kind. The following is verbatim:

"Some people say that we should punish Russia when it does things we don't like—putting conditions on our aid, for example. I too would like to strengthen the levers we have wherever possible. I have personally looked at our aid programs, one after another, and have concluded that limiting them would damage U.S. interests. This is what it's really all about—hurting ourselves as much or even more than the Russians."

Christopher goes on to cite as a prime illustration aid under the Nunn-Lugar program—that is, for "cutting off" nuclear warheads in the former union republics.

"Among his own kind" William Perry was fantasizing: New nuclear warheads to replace the cut-off ones have not as yet appeared in Russia. The terrifying Hydra image does not stand up to the test of the facts. But the Russian nuclear potential, while shrinking, still remains, and Washington's dream of it being destroyed—while the American one survives—is as yet unachievable.

And we must not hurry this destruction because, in the absence of other arguments making for state strength—like the economy, a national idea, properly formalized borders, national unity—it could prove irreplaceable. In various instances. At least two of these are indicated by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee: In bargaining over the ratification of START II, which we should be in no hurry to do, and in the question of revising the flank restrictions under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which was devised "to fit the USSR" and is manifestly unjust to Russia.

Nuclear potential is like Yevgeniy Onegin's uncle's legacy, which compelled his rascally heir to rush to his bedside: "When he really was on his last legs he compelled respect; he could not think of any better way." Nobody has yet though of or come up with anything more positive to compel respect than this—nuclear—legacy.

Moscow Seen Rejecting U.S. Compromise on NATO Expansion

MK0604112195 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No.14/90 6-12 Apr 95 (Signed to press 5 Apr 95) p 1

[Report by Yuriy Alekseyenko under the "World Community and Us" rubric: "Diplomacy on Groznyy's Ruins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even before his arrival in Moscow, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry hardly cherished any illusions about Russia's attitude to plans for NATO's eastward expansion. Boris Yeltsin, Andrey Kozyrev, Pavel Grachev, the speakers of both parliament chambers, and other Russian politicians have repeatedly stated their sharply negative stances in that regard. To make it even more convincing, the Russian president even pounded his fist on the table of the OSCE leaders' meeting in Budapest.

On the other hand, the uncertainty and lack of stability in the political situation in Russia and the bloody pacification of Chechnya in particular have prompted our former brothers from the socialist camp to knock increasingly louder on the North Atlantic Alliance's door. While initially the NATO leadership was resolutely opposed to the admittance of new members in its organization, recent goings-on have implacably prodded the alliance's Brussels headquarters to soften this stance.

Therefore, a dilemma: The West will apparently have to expand NATO, while Russia is categorically opposed to that. Some time ago an attempt was made to find a way out of the impasse by drawing up the "Partnership for Peace" program, but it is well known that the Russian Federation foreign minister refused to sign the treaty at the last minute.

This time, while in Moscow, William Perry proposed that Moscow "not only join the program, but even become its leader." What he heard in response from his counterpart, Pavel Grachev, however, was: "An expansion of NATO's zone will undoubtedly force us to take counter measures." To all appearances, head-on assaults on Groznyy and other strongholds in Chechnya seem to our military minister—and not to him alone—to be fully appropriate for diplomatic talks. Which is a pity, though. Neither the "gunboat policy" nor "a war with light casualties on other states' territory" have ever achieved success. And if Western democracies have forgiven Moscow (let us call a spade a spade!) for Chechen carnage; if, despite the cannonade still echoing in the North Caucasus, U.S. President Bill Clinton and other Western leaders have accepted Boris Yeltsin's invitation to attend the May festivities in Moscow, should we stubbornly be demanding "all or nothing," even when the issue is so complex a problem as the expansion of NATO? Or, at any rate, to resort to threats?

In the meantime, the Americans have made yet another concession to us. During his talks with Viktor Chernomyrdin, William Perry once again expressed the United States' concern over the planned sale of Russian reactors to Iran, but on hearing assurances that the deal will be carried out strictly in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime he did not stamp his feet or threaten "counter measures." An attempt to use the slightest opportunity for a compromise is evident. Just think what to make of the fact that Washington has shared with Moscow its intelligence data on Iran's desire to become a nuclear power!

The impression is as follows: Everything that is to our liking is being gladly accepted, while everything that "goes against the grain" is being rejected outright. Is it really possible that the tactics that reduced Groznyy to ruins and did immense damage to all of Russia will be adopted by our diplomacy?

Moscow, OSCE Fail To Set Up Permanent Chechnya Mission

LD0604212895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Russian 2100 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, failed to agree on setting up the OSCE's permanent mission in Chechnya. A relevant document should have been signed on 6 April at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, but the Russian delegation said it needed to consult Moscow on a number of issues. Delaying a decision on the OSCE mission threatens the signing of a trade agreement between Russia and the European Union. Earlier, the European Union postponed the signing until such time as the hostilities in Chechnya had been ended.

Coast Guard Fires Warning Shots at Japanese Fishing Boat

LD0604130395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1214 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—A Russian coast guard ship had to fire warning shots overnight to force a Japanese fishing speed boat out of the Russian territorial waters near the South Kuril islands claimed by Japan, first deputy commander of the coast guard service, Rear Admiral Sergey Skalinov told TASS Thursday.

He said nobody was wounded and added it was the eighth violation of the Russian border in the region by Japanese fishing vessels this year and the second time when the coast guards had to open warning fire.

The first time occurred two days ago when Russian coast guards fired warning shots to oust two Japanese fishing boats. Japan protested over the incident Thursday saying it did not recognise Russia's right to use arms in the waters around the islands which Tokyo views as its own territory annexed by Russia.

Skalinov stressed that this year the number of violations had considerably decreased compared to 1994 and attributed it to the "Putina-95" (fishing season) large-scale anti-poaching operation in the Far East.

"Three years ago 50-100 ships daily poached near South Kuriles, today few dare make money at the Russian expense", the admiral said.

Skalinov believes that pure economic interest is the reason for the poaching, rather than political claims to the islands.

Fish delicatessen used to be poached in the region were estimated at 2.5 billion US dollars by Western experts. Some of them are sold at skyrocketing prices on the Japanese, South Korean and Chinese markets and prospects of huge profits forced local fishermen to intrude into Russian waters.

DPRK Envoy Interviewed on DPRK-Japan Talks

SK0704083695 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean 1200 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Respected listeners. This hour, we send you the contents of an interview with DPRK

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Russia, Son Song-pil, by Mikhail Korotkov, reporter of this radio station.

During the interview, the ambassador touched on issues regarding the talks on improving DPRK-Japan relations. He said:

[Begin Son recording] Delegations from both sides held talks and released a joint statement on resuming DPRK-Japan talks.

Since the contents of the joint statement was already announced, I will not repeat them.

Because a number of problems remain to be resolved, it is by all means necessary for Japan and us to hold talks. Moreover, Japan should initiate the talks.

Japan should apologize for numerous misfortunes, enforcement of sacrifice and enormous material and human losses it inflicted on our people while implementing its colonial rule over our country. Japan should also compensate for them.

In the past, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and the Komeito Party of Japan, came to hold talks with our Workers' Party. DPRK-Japan talks were held and the parties issued a joint statement.

However, Japan ruptured the talks artificially by unjustly raising our nuclear problem and even the issue of a certain Japanese woman. Since Japan was supposed to settle post-war problems but suspended DPRK-Japan talks under unreasonable pretexts instead, Japan should now be held responsible for this. Thus, we feel it is quite natural for Japan to respond to the resumption of DPRK-Japan talks.

We hope that during the upcoming talks, Japan will not lay obstacles to the progress in talks under unjust pretexts as it did in the past.

If DPRK-Japan relations improve, it will be in the interests of our two countries, and will contribute to peace in Asia and the world. Therefore, not only the Asian people but also the people in many nations of the world, not to mention our people, will closely watch with great interest as to how DPRK-Japan talks proceed in the future. [end recording]

Government Directive on Burundi 'Partial Evacuation'

MM0704103695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1

["Russian Federation Government Directive No. 428-D," signed by V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and dated 4 April 1995, Moscow]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. Given the emergency situation in Burundi, which puts the lives and safety of Russian citizens in that country at risk, a partial evacuation is to be carried out of the staff of the Embassy and other foreign establishments of the Russian Federation, members of their families, and other Russians, as well as the citizens of other CIS states if they so wish.

2. The Russian Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and the Elimination of Natural Disasters is to ensure the evacuation of the persons mentioned in Paragraph One of this Directive.

3. The Russian Foreign Ministry is instructed to determine specific dates for the start of the evacuation in the light of the development of the situation in Burundi.

4. This Directive enters into force from the day of its signature.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government

Iraq's General Rashid Holds Talks at Foreign Ministry

LD0604150995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1233 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 Apr—Taking into consideration achievements in the field of disarmament and the setting up of a long-term monitoring system in Iraq, Russia, together with a number of other members of the UN Security Council, is determined to get an adequate reaction of the Security Council, including bringing into force Resolution 687, which envisages the lifting of bans on oil exports from Iraq.

This was announced at consultations with General Amir Muhammad Rashid, head of the commission for the Iraqi military industry, held at the Russian Foreign Ministry. He was received by First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. The Iraqi representative also met with Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk.

Grigoriy Karasin, director of the press and information department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, told journalists that Amir Muhammad Rashid had briefed the Russian side on the results of the talks held in Baghdad by Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of the UN special commission to oversee the destruction of Iraqi weapons. According to Rashid, Iraq had provided the special commission with additional information on all the areas of the disarmament file.

Representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed the need for Baghdad to comply with all the requirements by the world community set out in the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, including the speediest possible solution to the problem of missing Kuwaiti subjects. The Russian side believes that this could create a strong basis for ending Baghdad's international isolation and establishing a truly stable atmosphere of peace and security in the Gulf area.

Karasin: Iraq 'Must Continue Full-Scale Cooperation'

LD0604172395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1701 GMT 6 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: By correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, and Yevgeniy Terekhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 6 (Interfax)—Baghdad must continue full-scale cooperation with the UN special commission for disarming Iraq, including providing all the missing information on the previous military programs. This is an essential condition for moving over to a softening of the anti-Iraq sanctions, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin said today.

He said Russia had announced this during its consultations with the leader of the Iraqi military-industrial commission responsible for destruction of mass destruction weapons, General Amer Rashid, in Moscow on April 4.

Karasin said that taking into consideration the achievements in the area of disarmament and creation of the long-term monitoring system in Iraq, Russia and several other members of the UN Security Council would seek that the Security Council adequately react to the new situation, including implementing provision 22 of resolution 678 providing for lifting the prohibition on Iraqi oil export.

Karasin said Russia had stressed during the consultations with Iraq that Baghdad must also fulfill other demands of the world community, including the demand that the problems concerning Kuwaiti missing citizens be resolved urgently.

Karasin said this would create a solid basis for ending the international isolation of Baghdad and ensuring in the Persian Gulf region a true atmosphere of peace and stability.

Ministry Aide: Report of Arms Sales to Iraq 'Unconvincing'

MM0604163595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "Is Russia Selling Arms to Iraq? The Israeli Magazine Laying This Charge Could Be Mistaken"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If you believe the Israeli magazine JERUSALEM REPORT, Moscow is violating the UN sanctions against Iraq by selling it military-purpose spare parts and technology through third countries.

The publication puts the volume of Russian deliveries to Baghdad carried out through the mediation of Iraqi businessmen working legally in Moscow at $250 million. Spare parts for armored vehicles and also technology for modernizing surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile complexes are being passed on to the Iraqis through third countries, in particular Slovakia and Ukraine. The JERUSALEM REPORT claims that Moscow's violation of the sanctions is no secret to Washington, and that Warren Christopher has already tried to persuade Andrey Kozyrev that Moscow ought to wait until the sanctions are lifted.

In response to IZVESTIYA's request to comment on the Israeli magazine's report Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk replied: "I know nothing about deals of this kind, and, to be honest, this report looks fairly unconvincing. At any rate, such actions could not have received government approval. We are committed to stepping up humanitarian aid to the 19 million people living in Iraq, but no way do we intend to violate the sanctions regime.' According to Posuvalyuk, monitoring on the Jordanian-Iraqi border, over which a large proportion of freight travels, is very strict, and it is difficult to imagine that such a volume of deliveries could be "hauled through" unnoticed.

In the opinion of another official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who wished to remain anonymous, it could be a question of an attempt to compromise Russia in the eyes of the Persian Gulf states in connection with a major contract for the delivery of an S-300 air defense system to the United Arab Emirates now being planned.

Dmitriy Trenin, a senior expert at the Carnegie Fund in Moscow, who studies the problems of Russian-U.S. relations, also stated that he knows nothing about contacts between Washington and Moscow on this subject.

Moscow Regrets Baltics Nonparticipation in 9 May Events

LD0604132595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1254 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Russia's Foreign Ministry regrets that the presidents of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have decided not to participate in the May 9 celebration in Moscow, ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said on Thursday.

"The 50th anniversary of victory is a sacred holiday. On the one hand, it is a day of memory of those who fighted with Fascism and defeated it. On the other hand, it symbolises a new stage of international relations when the confrontation is replaced with mutual respect, cooperation and partnership", Karasin said.

As earlier reported, the presidents of the three Baltic states refused to arrive in Moscow to take part in the celebration. They explained their refusal by Russia's not denouncing officially the annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union before World War II.

According to Karasin, the invitation was sent out to the presidents in all sincerity.

"Of course, it is up to the leaders whether to arrive in Moscow or not. However, these decisions characterise the foresight of the politicians", the spokesman noted.

Kinkel Criticizes Grachev Statement on CFE Treaty

LD0604201695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1613 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, April 6 (Interfax)—German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has criticized Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's statement to the effect that Russia may abandon the CFE (Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe) treaty in case NATO expands eastwards by admitting East European countries. Kinkel was speaking at a news conference in Tallinn Thursday [6 April].

Kinkel said: "I do not think that Grachev spoke rationally, and we must not be too sensitive about such statements".

Kinkel said that European countries must cooperate with Russia, and not be against it, because without Russia there would be no peace or stability in Europe.

He believes that the readiness of former socialist countries to participate in trans-Atlantic structures should be the main yardstick of their admission to NATO.

Kinkel said that the Baltic countries must become "an integral part of the European edifice of security".

Germany will help Estonia secure its admission in the European Union. He said that a treaty of Estonia's associate membership of the EU would be signed as early as May.

On the situation in Chechnya Kinkel said it was necessary to resolve the Chechen conflict by political means and give Chechnya autonomy, if the Russian Constitution allowed for that.

Border Guards Chief Talks With Tajikistan's Rakhmanov

OW0704042495 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Apr 95

[Tatyana Logunova video report from Tajikistan; from the "Mir" feature of the "TeleUtro" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service of Russia, held a conference in Dushanbe at which the results of a performance evaluation of the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan and readiness for the forthcoming spring and summer campaign were reviewed. Questions of implementing certain aspects of border policy were also discussed. During the meeting between Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and Andrey Nikolayev several issues of mutual interest to the two states were discussed, in particular the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. On the same day 19 border guards of the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, ranking from soldier to lieutenant colonel, were presented combat awards and medals. They were conferred a decree by Russian President Boris Yeltsin for courage.

[Begin recording] [Logunova] How do you assess the situation on the southern frontiers of the CIS states today?

[Nikolayev] I consider it abnormal. Unfortunately there have been no fundamental changes in this situation. In principle we perceive the continuation and prolongation of the cease fire with satisfaction, but unfortunately the decision on extending the cease fire at the political level is not reinforced by actions on the actual border. Our analysis has shown that on average either hostile fire or an attempt to penetrate the state border takes place every six to eight hours. Besides, the bands and groups of fighters number from two or three people to 30 or 40 people, depending on the location.

If the other side is prepared to ensure the security of citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan and citizens of the Islamic State of Afghanistan on both sides of the border, we are ready to do this. We have corresponding agreements with the Republic of Tajikistan in the (?framework) of fulfilling our obligations in the Commonwealth of Independent States. [end recording]

[Begin Rakhmanov recording] At the last meeting of the Commonwealth countries—which we held in Almaty—respected Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, clearly spelled out the task of border guards and all power structures of the Commonwealth to take all possible measures to render assistance to Tajikistan both in the economic and military spheres, in order to secure the southern borders of the Commonwealth.

It is no secret that this border is not solely the border of Tajikistan. This is the southern frontier of the CIS countries. So I think that such difficult, I would say, [words indistinct] on the border will not be repeated. [end recording]

Political Issues

Yeltsin Continues Vacation in Kislovodsk, Sochi

Devotes Day to Rest

LD0104081795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0754 GMT 1 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kislovodsk (Stavropol territory) April 1 TASS—According to preliminary information, the Russian president, now on his annual leave in Kislovodsk, decided to devote this whole Saturday to rest.

Representatives from the city administration, "rubbing elbows with Yeltsin", say that he prefers, as before, rest with "an edge for sports", including warming-up sessions on the tennis court.

Doctor Assesses Health

LD0204213195 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Sergey Medvedev] This is the seventh day of the Russian president's holiday in Kislovodsk. [passage omitted] His personal doctor Anatoliy Grigoryev gives the following assessment of the president's health.

[Begin Grigoryev recording] From the medical standpoint Boris Nikolayevich is acclimatizing quite well. He does some sport every day, and walks along special fitness routes that is very tiring, of course. But in spite of this, after 5-7 minutes both his arterial pressure and his pulse return to the norm. For the president the [normal] pulse rate is about 55-60 per minute, and the pressure is 120 over 80 or 130 over 80. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Plans To Meet Caucasus Leaders

LD0304090295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0845 GMT 3 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 3 Apr—Although the Russian president will be continuing his holiday from today in Sochi due to very poor weather conditions in Kislovodsk, he still intends to meet the leaders of the north Caucasus region. Only the dates of the meeting are being changed. This is the information ITAR-TASS received from an informed source in the Kremlin.

Denies Plans To Postpone Elections

LD0504182595 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has said that the reports claiming that plans are being drawn up in the Kremlin for the postponement or cancellation of the coming parliamentary and presidential elections are nonsense. An IZVESTIYA correspondent was told this by Sergey Medvedev, the president's press secretary, who also noted that Boris Yeltsin is attentively following developments in Crimea and will probably, within the next few days, express his attitude to the problem.

Examines Documents; May Address Nation

LD0704133595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1223 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 7 (Interfax)—President Yeltsin, vacationing on the Black Sea coast, where he came from Kislovodsk, has examined a host of documents on various aspects of state development. A number of these documents will be published soon, his press secretary Sergey Medvedev reported to Interfax on Friday.

Meanwhile, as circles close to the head of state have revealed to Interfax, the president plans to address his fellow countrymen in several days and focus on the key problems in the life of the country and society. However, the form of this address has not been finally chosen.

According to Medvedev, the president has also been working on major international issues. He has been keen closely following Russian-Ukrainian relations and the situation in Crimea.

To Medvedev's knowledge, Yeltsin "will hardly" visit Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria's capital, although a trip there, made preliminary part of the president's spring holiday itinerary, "has not been taken off the agenda."

Nor does Boris Yeltsin plans to meet with Viktor Chernomyrdin and leaders of separate departments in Sochi this week, Medvedev said.

Communists Collect Signatures for Yeltsin's Resignation

LD3103211295 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1900 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, says it is building a broad coalition of communist and national-patriotic forces for the forthcoming elections [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, the Communist party, according to its leader, has gathered over 3 million signatures for the resignation of President Yeltsin, who, according to Zyuganov, no longer carries out his duties. [passage omitted]

Government Approves Program To Restore Chechen Economy

LD0104105595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1010 GMT 1 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 1 TASS—The state commission on restoration of the Chechen economy chaired by First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets approved on Saturday a federal programme to restore the economy of the Chechen Republic.

First Deputy Economics Minister Andrey Shapovalyants who attended the meeting, noted that the programme covers only 1995 and provides for appropriating 5,300 billion roubles.

According to the deputy minister, the document singles out two main groups of tasks: top priority aid to population (water and electricity supplies as well as sanitary and epidemiological work) and food supplies (96 billion roubles for meat products supplies and 80 billion roubles for the delivery of flour and baking of bread).

The problem of housing in Chechnya is indicated as a priority issue. It is planned to turn over for occupancy 600,000 square meters of housing (private and municipal) by the end of 1995.

Under the item of social maintenance, it is planned to allocate 300 billion roubles to pay out pensions and 120 billion roubles for allowances.

The programme also provides for restoring and financing the fuel-energy and agro-industrial complexes. In this connection, the government intends to conclude an agreement between the Finance Ministry, customers and commercial banks.

Besides, it is planned to establish a fund of donations and resources of commercial structures.

Soskovets Leaves For Groznyy

LD0604124195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1154 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 6 Apr—Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, who heads the state commission for the restoration of the Chechen economy, today left for Chechnya. On 7 April he will take part in an itinerary sitting of the commission in Groznyy, ITAR-TASS has learned at his office.

Yabloko Sets Sights on Winning at Least Half of Duma Seats

MK2803120095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Journal" rubric: "Hi, Apple, Where Are You Rolling?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of last week, the central council of the "Yabloko" electoral association held its plenary meeting behind closed doors at Golitsino to discuss the organization of its electoral campaign. Participants in the meeting resolved that the central party list will include from 20 to 25 people, while regional lists may comprise up to 250 candidates. Therefore, it is easy to calculate that "Yabloko" intends to win at least half the seats in the next State Duma. According to the plenum's delegates, so ambitious claims are absolutely imperative for "Yabloko" if it is to win presidential elections.

Yabloko Official on Party Strategy, Plans

MK2803115095 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 4

[Interview with Vyacheslav Igrunov, chairman of the Yabloko commission for party organization and work with regional chapters, by Karina Musaelyan: "'Yabloko' [Apple] Tree Has Taken Root"—first passage is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The "Yabloko" faction became a party in February, when it registered an electoral bloc of the same name in the run-up to the election campaign. Vyacheslav Igrunov, chairman of the "Yabloko" commission for party organization and work with regional chapters, tells KURANTY correspondent Karina Musaelyan about its prospects. [Article includes following boxed passage]

From the personal file

Vyacheslav Igrunov is a founder of the human rights, historical, enlightenment, and charity society of "Memorial;" State Duma deputy, deputy chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots; director of the Humanitarian and Political Studies Institute (HPSI). A dissident from 1965 and former political prisoner, whose name was mentioned in Andrey Sakharov's Nobel Prize speech, which called for the release of Igrunov and other prisoners jailed for political reasons. [end of boxed passage]

[Musaelyan] "Yabloko" has started setting up its party organization. Is it off to a successful start?

[Igrunov] A total of 4,000 members have been registered in Russian regions, without counting Moscow, where we have 16 chapters. We also have collective members.

Besides the troika of Yavlinskiy, Boldyrev, and Lukin, "Yabloko" includes such well-known people as academician Nikolay Petrakov, Russian Ambassador to London Anatoliy Adamishin, and Ambassador to Mexico Yevgeniy Ambartsumov.

[Musaelyan] Who are your allies and enemies? In other words, who are your "nearest and farthest of kin?"

[Igrunov] Evidently, Svyatoslav Fedorov's People's Self-Government party, the Republican Party, and the Social Democratic Party—many social democrats belong to "Yabloko," which allows dual membership—are closest to us. We do not think the communists are so "far" from us either—in many regions one can reach agreement with them on many issues. Same as with certain chapters of Democratic Russia. In Moscow Oblast a part of

Democratic Russia are "Yabloko" members, and we are also sympathetic to Novosibirsk's Democratic Russia. In Moscow, however, we do not work with them. But this does not mean that we will be in conflict with Democratic Russia; no, we will try to find a common language.

We think that the "farthest" from us are the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] and, naturally, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. And also the fascism-mongering "patriots."

They say that "Russia's Choice" is close to us. This is not so. Too many mistakes have been made by "Russia's Choice" leaders.

We do not have too high an opinion of Boris Fedorov's "Forward, Russia!" party, either. Fedorov has learned even fewer lessons than Yegor Gaydar from social and economic mistakes of the recent past.

[Musaelyan] What lessons has "Yabloko" learned?

[Igrunov] Actually, we sprang up as a party from the dissatisfaction with the results of the evolution that started in 1991. No, we are not going to scale down reform or even to slow down its pace—on the contrary, the pace should be accelerated. But what should be done is precisely REFORM, while it is hard to call what is going on now reform in the full sense of the word. The main feature in the structure of our economy—monopolism—has not changed. Monopolies for power, for the means of production, and for ideology still exist. A small number of people closely knit to the state control nearly the entire life of the country. Monopolistic enterprises simply want to pursue their policy, not to work better. Directors embezzle the money of their own enterprises, resources. A wild privatization has brought about the destruction of productive forces. Large owners continue to dictate their conditions to the state and to buy civil servants. Small and medium-size entrepreneurship is showing no signs of growth, while we are going to support it.

Nothing has been done for the so-called man in the street. Just as before. The main objection to the reform that started in 1991 is that it was launched without taking into account social consequences, the Russian mentality, and Russian historical roots. For this reason, the number of dissatisfied people is growing. As a matter of fact, it is they who make up the bulk of "Yabloko."

Concern about social stability is just as important as concern about economic efficiency.

[Musaelyan] Excuse me, these are just words. He who does not do anything does not make mistakes. It is easy to scold post factum. What mistakes could "Yabloko" have avoided had it been a governing party?

[Igrunov] Now we are acknowledging the disruption of the country's economic potential. But many losses could have been avoided. For instance, while withdrawing our troops from Europe, we could have received something in exchange for our every step home. But we gave up everything.

Or take agriculture. State budget subsidies are being "devoured" instantly and generally are not spent on improving standards of living and work conditions of farmers. Therefore, prices of domestic agricultural produce are going up. Yes, the state is obliged to invest money in agriculture, but not to subsidize it—it should invest in the development of the infrastructure—to build roads, processing plants, storage facilities.

[Musaelyan] If "Yabloko" wins the upcoming elections, what would you do first?

[Igrunov] We will start revising the structure of financing and determining our priorities—not only economic, but also social and moral ones. The economy does not hang in the air—it exists in the context of the people's culture and the capabilities of specific people: they will do what they can, but if they can't, nothing will come of it, however much you might invest. It is essential to restore our national ideals, moral and ethical values. The "Get Rich!" slogan cannot be a single principle—people should realize what they should get rich for and how thus to serve the country whose citizens they happen to be. An individual's pursuit of enrichment by ways suitable for this individual alone is destructive for a society devoid of a universal ideology. With us, deideologization has been the cornerstone. The old idea has now been destroyed, but no new one has been created.

[Musaelyan] Then you think that the American dream—of being free and rich—is not for the Russians?

[Igrunov] Not quite so. The American dream offered freedom to an individual, but the freedom was based on rigid moral standards, responsibility before people around you and the country in general, on traditions, on one's faith after all. Here, however, everything boils down to a lack of the rule of law, anarchy, corruption. We continue to live by Lenin's recipes: the aim (enrichment) justifies the means. One cannot overcome the crisis without national ideals.

[Musaelyan] How do you plan to restore them?

[Igrunov] There are no simple ways. It is culture that tends to give answers to the challenges of time. The holders of such answers are devotees, figures or groups of passion. The Germans had such a fervent personality, Adenauer, who could help the nation rise from its knees after a defeat, in the conditions of an occupation. This is why he could hold on to power for 18 years! Here, too, a fervent personality must emerge...

[Musaelyan] Aren't you fearful? For Lenin and Stalin were also personalities of passion.

[Igrunov] One can create conditions for a positively passioned personality or idea to be born—to place emphasis on culture and education. As a matter of fact, Korea, Japan, or that same Germany made huge investment in culture and education before their take-off. We, however, started our reform with destroying whatever scarce financing we had in these areas. "Yabloko" thinks it to be one of its key objectives to give culture and education full-scale financing.

[Musaelyan] At what expense? The country's budget is scarce...

[Igrunov] Money will be found if investment priorities are defined right.

[Musaelyan] The social portrait of your voter?

[Igrunov] An educated part of the population. Teachers, doctors, engineers. Students and young people who have not yet plunged into business headlong. Small and medium-size entrepreneurs, exhausted by the monopolism of mafia and state structures. And, finally, those who sympathized with "Russia's Choice," but have become disillusioned with it. I think we will take some voters away from it.

[Musaelyan] How many votes do you think "Yabloko" will garner?

[Igrunov] Undoubtedly, we will get our 5 percent of the vote. As a matter of fact, same as "Russia's Choice." I think that together the democratic forces will garner from 25 to 30 percent of the vote. I do not rule out the creation of a single bloc by "Yabloko" and other democrats so as not to split the vote—a candidate from the bloc will certainly poll more votes than a candidate from an isolated party. But a bloc can be set up only with those of whom we will not have to be ashamed later.

Yavlinskiy Seen as 'Serious' Political Figure

MK2903131095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian, No. 21, 26 Mar-2 Apr 95 (Signed to press 28 Mar) p 3

[A.M. report in the "Visit" column, under "Monitor" rubric: "Yabloko in China"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 27 March Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen received a delegation of the Russian public association Yabloko, led by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, which is in Beijing on a working visit.

Consolidating his foreign policy success in the West (prior to this, Yavlinskiy was in Germany), Grigoriy Yavlinskiy has now moved to the opposite side of the world. The Yabloko delegation went to the PRC at the invitation of Wu Xueqian, president of the Chinese Association for International Mutual Understanding and deputy chairman of the PRC People's Political-Consultative Council. The official aim of the trip is to meet and talk with the country's top political leadership, and study the possibilities for expanding Russian-Chinese economic links, and the experience of economic reform in China. During its presence in the PRC, where the delegation has already had meetings at Beijing University and the Institute of European and Asian Economies, the delegation will also go to Shanghai and Shenzhen, where it will be briefed on the experience of free economic zones.

Therefore it can be stated that in the run-up to parliamentary elections in Russia, the Yabloko leader is perceived as a serious and promising political figure not only in the West but also in the East.

Shumeyko Sees No Legal Basis for 1995 Elections

MK2903130095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Vladimir Shumeyko Thinks Parliamentary Elections Not Ready"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia may run into a political impasse by holding the elections for State Duma deputies and forming the Federation Council this year due to the absence of a legal basis for the elections. This opinion was voiced by the chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation at a sitting that took place in Belgorod of the coordination committee on the interaction between Federal Council chambers and the Russian Federation components' bodies of legislative power. In this connection, Mr. Shumeyko thinks, there appears the alternative "either to extend the powers of the current composition of the State Duma and the Federation Council, or to recommend to the State Duma to pass legislative acts on the elections before 30 July 1995.

Rybkin Denies 'Rumored Plans' To Postpone Elections

LD0604155295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (Interfax)—State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin has said in an interview he knows nothing about rumored plans by President Yeltsin's associates to postpone both parliamentary and presidential elections.

Earlier the chairman of the Duma's Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin, of the Communist faction, said in an interview that Yeltsin's "inner circle" was contemplating deliberately destabilizing the situation in two or three regions of Russia in November in order to produce the impression of a 1991-style insurgence there. Ilyukhin said that with that excuse Yeltsin would be able to prolong the powers of both houses of the Federal Assembly, saying he is unable to ensure the free expression of will in those two or three troubled regions.

Rybkin told Interfax no such plans were discussed at the Security Council's session.

At the same time Rybkin said that under the Constitution it was quite possible to hold a referendum on the moratorium on elections and on prolonging the powers of president and parliament. He recalled that such referendums had already been held or were about to be held in a number of Central Asian countries.

Rybkin is uncertain what political forces he will ally with in future parliamentary elections. He said that he had received an invitation to contest a mandate in a single-mandate constituency in the Voronezh region, where he was born and worked for along time. Rybkin also said that the Agrarian Party insists he should participate in the election on its federal ticket.

In December 1993 Rybkin was elected State Duma (lower chamber) member on the federal ticket of the Agrarian Party.

Tumanov: 'Nothing Awful Will Happen' If Elections Postponed

LD0604154895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1631 GMT 5 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chairman of the Constitutional Court Vladimir Tumanov does not see any serious reasons for talk about a possible postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections. On the contrary, there is every juridical reason to state that the elections will be held according to schedule, because the president confirmed his commitment to hold elections on time in his annual message to parliament, Tumanov told Interfax.

"At the same time, nothing awful will happen if the elections are held a little later, possibly for technical reasons," he said. Technical shifts are possible and unimportant, of course if the deputies' term of two years does not increase to three or four years, he added.

He refused to comment on the statements about a possible postponement of the elections, including the statement by Duma deputy Viktor Ilyukhin about two variants of putting elections off, drafted in the presidential circles.

"I don't think the statements on a possible failure or postponement of the elections are reasonable in terms of political stability on the eve of the elections," said Tumanov. He said he would not like to discuss statements by politicians, whose words are usually politically motivated. "There are no juridical reasons for such statements," he said.

Election Committee Head Says Delay 'Blow to Democracy'

LD0604173695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1625 GMT on 6 April carries the "Details" program hosted by Nikolay Svanidze. Svanidze interviews Nikolay Ryabov, chairman of the Central Electoral Committee. Ryabov says that Russia's electoral committees are going to use computers during election campaigns. He tells Svanidze that the Central Electoral Committee will be using the old and new systems during the first stage for processing the electoral papers. Asked about the postponement of the election date, Ryabov replies that it is of a "political nature" and that the committee cannot accept any of the arguments politicians give to justify postponing the election date. Ryabov says that the delay will be "a major blow to democracy."

Gaydar on Elections, Role of Banks in Politics

MK2903120095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 21 26 Mar-4 Apr 95 (Signed to press 28 Mar) p 6

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia's Democratic Choice, by Tatyana Yakhlakova in the "Discussion" column: "Yegor Gaydar: 'Capitalism Without Democracy Rests on Force....'"—place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Yakhlakova] Do you agree that in order to maintain stability, elections should be postponed?

[Gaydar] Many of our associates are now beginning to disagree on this fundamental problem: If a choice has to be made between capitalism and democracy, which is better? Some suppose capitalism is; others, democracy. But I am convinced: Present-day Russia has no such choice. Without developed capitalism there is no democracy anywhere, and there will hardly be any. And capitalism cannot exist without democracy. This is a kind of capitalism based on an authoritarian regime, with corresponding power structures. [passage omitted]

[Yakhlakova] It is hard to reproach bankers with shortsightedness. If they choose "authoritarian capitalism," therefore there must be some commercial interests standing behind this?

[Gaydar] It needs to be understood that this problem is real. People have appeared in Russia who have a business of their own and who want to develop it. What frightens them the most? That reckless adventurists will come to power and that a redivision of property will begin. And, incidentally, this will hit not only property owners but also those tens of thousands of people who are already working in this new sector of the economy.

Meanwhile the risk of such adventurists' coming to power is rather high. Therefore the problem, as far as Russian capital is concerned, is not fanciful. It is another matter that I, for one, do not share the proposals made to deal with this problem.

[Yakhlakova] You headed a government and therefore you ought to know just how real a force is the "group of eight" banks about which Oleg Boyko has spoken.

[Gaydar] To be sure, this is a real force, just like all powerful financial and industrial groups. But it is far from the only one. It has serious rivals in the struggle for economic power and political influence.

[Yakhlakova] Still, if these banks do not abandon their idea, will they be able to implement it?

[Gaydar] Frankly speaking, I do not believe in this. To my mind, it is simply un-technological.

[Yakhlakova] But they can enlist the support of the incumbent authorities, from whose vantage point this idea is not devoid of attraction. Or promise their support if the authorities undertake to translate it into life.

[Gaydar] I do not think that the ruling authority will venture to take this extremely dangerous path. Although this option cannot be fully ruled out. [passage omitted]

[Yakhlakova] Is Russian capital beginning actively to finance politics?

[Gaydar] Not beginning—it has long been financing it. We, for instance, have never had the sort of money that many of our political opponents have....

[Yakhlakova] The voters have a different impression: The Gaydar party is considered to be the richest.

[Gaydar] This relates to the fact that we reflect all our funds in officials accounts. Look at the financial statements in the previous election campaign: The communists and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia showed in their books only the 100 million allocated by the state. Did they not spend a kopeck in excess of that?... I would not be surprised if they proved to be the most economical in the next elections, too. And everything is strictly according to the law because not a single nonstate kopeck will go via their party accounts.

[Yakhlakova] To what extent do you think election returns will depend on the money invested in the participants?

[Gaydar] To a very large extent, I am sure. Only there should be no illusions that money decides everything. Experience has shown that any amount of money invested cannot guarantee against a full fiasco—with not even the 5-percent barrier being cleared. [passage omitted]

Gaydar: Political Stabilization Possible by 1996

LD2803170495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1641 GMT 28 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Trofimov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Volgograd March 28 (TASS)—At the future elections we should not let come to power those who would turn Russia backwards." This is how the main problem of all democratic forces of Russia was determined by Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Democratic Choice of Russia party, who was speaking at a meeting with the public of the city of Volgograd today.

According to the ex-premier of the Russian Government, the greatest part of the difficult road has already been passed. If wish be, it is possible to stabilize the situation in Russia already in 1996.

To achieve this, it is necessary to stop printing banknotes, to protect private investments and conduct a stiffer cadres policy.

Yegor Gaydar met with the Volgograd mayor and spoke on regional television. Tomorrow he plans to meet with students and teachers of the city's higher schools.

Grishin: No Grounds for No Confidence Vote

LD0704133695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1223 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 6 (Interfax)—There are no grounds behind the latest initiative by a group of Russian deputies to bring a vote of no confidence against the government on April 12, a senior government spokesman believes.

In an interview with Interfax on Friday, Valeriy Grishin explained this by overreaction by and vested interests of the deputies at the start of the election campaign.

More importantly, he said, it would not be right to bring the motion following the adoption of the 1995 budget and the newly- emerging businesslike relations between the cabinet and the Federal Assembly.

Grishin said the move may have been caused by a misunderstanding of the debt restructuring deal with Kiev, leading to accusations of the cabinet of a sellout of national interests and a no-confidence motion.

The spokesman hopes that most of the deputies will show common sense by dropping the confrontation with the government in favor of cooperation for the benefit of the country and the electorate they represent.

'Ministerial Scapegoat' Sought as Maritime Miners Strike

MM0604162795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "Miners Starve Themselves and Strike in Maritime Kray While People in Moscow Seek a Ministerial Scapegoat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miners demanding the payment of several months of wage arrears have begun a general strike in Maritime Kray. And a session of the government operational commission to improve the payment and settlement system has been held in Moscow chaired by First Vice Premier A. Chubays, naming the people responsible for the crisis in the coal industry.

The crisis that began with several miners in Maritime Kray going on hunger strike has caused a storm in the capital's ministerial offices where people are traditionally reluctant to discuss personalities. According to IZVESTIYA's information, Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik has been made personally responsible (by the way, he did not attend the session and is currently in Chechnya) along with his deputy Anatoliy Kozyrev, who is in charge of financial and economic matters. The logic is simple: Since the "Rossiya" Integrated Energy System Russian Joint-Stock Company, which is also part of the ministry system, accounts for the bulk of the money that the miners are owed (around 50 percent), its leaders should have taken the requisite preventive measures.

At the commission session the vice premier spoke in very tough terms and warned that, if the crisis is not settled within two weeks, the government will be faced with the question of whether Yu. Shafranik and A. Kozyrev are suitable for their jobs. The following piece of palace intrigue attracts attention: That very same day the premier saw Yu. Shafranik and his First Deputy Aleksandr Yevtushenko, who is in charge of the coal complex, on another matter, but he did not raise the burning issue of cadre reshuffles.

People at the ministry are inclined to think that the stance espoused by power generation personnel is helping to exacerbate the crisis; they are not paying the miners and are at the same time receiving fairly high wages. That is why Far Eastern power generation workers themselves, who are also festooned with payment arrears like a Christmas tree with its decorations, are now hatching plans for a strike. It is quite unclear how this will be put into practice since, according to legislation, power generation personnel do not have the right to disconnect electricity even from the most persistent defaulters.

The total sum currently owed to the Russian fuel and energy complex has now reached 75 trillion rubles [R]—that represents half of the entire national budget. Obviously, the crisis in the Far East represents an isolated exacerbation of a general problem which cannot be resolved in the two weeks allocated. A similar situation may arise at any time anywhere else in Russia. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy apparatus takes an extremely skeptical view of the possibility of performing some kind of managerial miracle. Most likely, money will be taken out of one pocket and placed in another. Therefore it is fairly likely that the question of Ministry of Fuel and Energy leaders being sacked will be raised. Whether the president and the prime minister, who were kindly disposed toward Yuriy Shafranik, will support this suggestion is another matter.

Today the coal complex is 80-percent budget-subsidized. What is more, the miners' invidious economic position is aggravated still further by local machinations involving the small amount of money that does nonetheless trickle down from the treasury. TASS reports that an audit of the Federal Treasury Maritime Kray Administration showed that R17 billion in federal budget funds failed to reach the miners but was stashed away in various commercial structures. Under federal law this activity is illegal since the funds allocated to the "Primorskugol" Joint-Stock Company are considered targeted.

Let us remind you that 15 miners are continuing their hunger strike 230 meters below ground in the Maritime Kray village of Avangard and 12 people have been taken to local hospitals in a very serious condition.

According to the latest reports, the mining-enrichment depot, the truck depot, and the railroad have joined the miners' protest action. Kray duma deputies intend to call on the labor collectives of the Transsiberian Railroad and sea ports to strike.

The view is being voiced that the situation has gotten out of control and that the future is unpredictable. It is quite possible that the strike will degenerate into a spontaneous revolt with arson attacks. Petr Kiryaskov, chairman of the miners' territorial committee, has come to Moscow. He intends to meet with A. Chubays to solve the coal industry's key problems.

Shakhray: 'National Separatism Losing Its Popular Base'

MM2803114995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Andrey Shcherbakov: "The Federation Cannot Be Preserved Without Trust"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Saturday [25 March] a scientific and practical conference entitled the "Problems of Demarcation and Mutual Delegation of Authority Between Federal Organs of State Power and Russian Federation Components' Organs of State Power: Experience and Prospects" was held at the Russian Academy of State Service Under the Russian Federation President. Russian Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray delivered a report and said that he sees the crux of the matter as being the need to compel the center and Federation components to move toward one another. In his view, national separatism is losing its popular base, and the real process of building the Federation "from below, on the basis of the economy," is under way. It is the need to resolve pressing economic problems that is making it necessary to address the center.

Many participants in the conference said that the covert and sometimes even overt opposition from the bureaucratic apparatus poses a great danger to the renewal of the Federation and the whole cause of reform in Russia, to which Russian President Boris Yeltsin pointed quite rightly in his annual message to the Federal Assembly.

Zhirinovskiy: Turn Groznyy Into 'Test-Range for Troops'

LD2903165295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1540 GMT 29 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Vlasov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pskov, 29 Mar—The leader of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party [LDPR], Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, has suggested that money should not be spent on restoring Groznyy, and "the Chechen capital should be turned into a test-range for troops to practice storming techniques for capturing populated centers." Zhirinovskiy stated this today in Pskov at a meeting with the town's voters.

The LDPR leader gave a positive assessment of the entry into Chechnya of Russian troops and their actions in the fight against Dudayev's illegal formations. Expanding on this he particularly noted that there is an airborne division in Pskov and that they could conduct there exercises in Groznyy.

Defense Ministry Confers Lieutenant Colonel's Rank on Zhirinovskiy

LD0104001095 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 2022 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], received his lieutenant colonel's epaulettes this evening at Sheremetyevo-I airport after arriving from a working trip around Russian towns. That lofty officer's title was conferred upon by Order No. 107 of 27 March by the Defense Ministry of Russia.

Colonel Dunets, a friend from Zhirinovskiy's youth, said that the title was for his outstanding contribution to defending the country and to raising the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Vladimir Wolfovich was congratulated by two of his sisters and also by comrades in arms, one of whom recalled the everlasting love he has felt for the LDPR leader since the party's first congress.

Toasts were drunk and some verses were read in honor of the hero of the events, one of which was given to 2x2 news as a keepsake. This is how the work ends:

We are assured about the fate of the motherland.

We have brought you flowers.

You are a great Russian lieutenant colonel

And a Russian genius.

What feelings does the newly fledged lieutenant colonel have?

[Begin Zhirinovskiy recording] A feeling of joy. I always had tender feelings for the Army. I always had the most tender feelings, even for the uniform, the color, the epaulettes, all the traditions of the Russian Army. [end recording]

Grachev Awards Kozyrev Military Title

LD0704111395 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev yesterday signed an order conferring the title of lieutenant colonel on Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. In the near future the deputy prime ministers will also receive titles. This was announced at a news conference by Colonel General Yevgeniy Vysotskiy, head of the chief directorate for personnel and military education of the Defense Ministry, who was appearing before journalists for the first time.

The time for presenting this directive is very well chosen because a large-scale program is being carried out to award new titles to 5,000 officers. The colonel general said that these include Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who bore the title of major for 15 years. Zhirinovskiy was put forward for the post of senior officer in the department of special propaganda, and for the post of lieutenant colonel.

Army service is not at present regarded as an attractive profession. Over 35 percent of the manpower shortage in the army is accounted for by junior officers. But the generals are counting on resuming the practice in 1995 of calling up for military service officers in the reserve. They hope to provide the army with an extra 18,000 citizens who have completed higher education.

Federal Counterintelligence Service Changes Name

LD0604162095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1514 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semyonova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 6 TASS—The Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) has been renamed to the Federal Security Service (FSB), according to a law "On Bodies of Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation" signed by President Boris Yeltsin on April 3, a FSK spokesman said today.

Commenting on the law, head of the FSK Public Relations Centre Maj.-Gen. Aleksandr Mikhailov told TASS that "the counter- intelligence has a narrower definition and means just the opposing foreign secret services".

"We have been gradually commissioned with other tasks, such as fighting organised crime and gangs, contraband and corruption, fascist elements... This is already within the sphere of the national security", Mikhailov went on saying.

The spokesman stressed that the new renaming will not be followed by any restructuring of the agency. "The new law gave us broader rights and possibilities to carry out our duties", he said.

The law reinstated investigation bodies and special task forces within the federal service. According to Mikhailov, it also gave the counter-espionage agency "the right to obtain necessary information, within its competence", from all officials and managers of private companies as well as of state-run enterprises.

This is something new, which is in line with the contemporary public life, Mikhailov noted.

Federal Border Service Head on Tasks Facing Department

LD3103214595 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states on its ruins the Russian border troops have continued to perform service on its boundaries, with the Baltic states being the only exception. In the last two years more than 60 Russian border guards were killed on the Tajik-Afghan border. At the same time, Tajikistan compensated Russia for last year only 15 percent of expenditure required to fulfill this difficult task. Financial relations between various border departments on the western boundaries of the former USSR are hardly better.

In the circumstances, many people in Russia are asking a question: Would it not be better to strengthen the Russian border, to withdraw border troops from Tajikistan, and give other countries an opportunity to protect their borders themselves?

Here is how Andrey Nikolayev, the director of the Federal Border Service, replied to this question.

[Begin Nikolayev recording] We have a very important question here: Are Russian strategic interests involved there? What interests are we protecting? Would we not have to pay a higher price if we started protecting our interests on the Russian- Kazakhstan border, for example? How could we resolve integration issues if we did not have a common border, but each of us had their own borders? What to do with the Russian-Kazakhstan border, for example, which is 7,599 km long, if we decide to strengthen it? Every kilometer of the border does not cost 2 billion rubles today: Every outpost costs 6 billion rubles today. Do you want us to impoverish our people?

The heads of our states realize this and they have reached the conclusion that by mutual efforts we should contribute to the common cause with the relevant funding and facilities and ensure the security of all the states on the borders, which are of strategic interest, inter alia, to the Russian Federation.

At present the peoples of the sovereign states within the Commonwealth—Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia—by signing agreements with us on cooperation in border protection, in fact recognize Russian interests in their regions. Is it not important for us?

The peculiarity of our existence lies in the fact that, unlike a united Europe for example, we do not need to unite: We used to be one state and many ties have not yet been disrupted, inter alia, a single border has been preserved to a large degree. [passage omitted]

Owing to our position within the Commonwealth, of which Russia is chairman, I am also the chairman of the Council of the Border Troops Commanders, a body under the CIS Charter. Since the meeting in Almaty we have continued with our work and hope that 10 states will unequivocally sign in Minsk in May the documents on the system ensuring borders' security—the blueprint and the treaty. This is the main task that has been set.

I would like to stress that this is a system of structures, or measures if you like, which, in the first place, involve special structures.

As for the problems of ensuring the security of borders, our task is not to fight, it is just the opposite of what is taking place in Tajikistan. Our task is to avoid border clashes. And if there are clashes, to resolve them without using the Armed Forces. This is our main task. [end recording]

Media Issues

Director of New TV Service Addresses Viewers

LD0104101195 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0409 GMT 1 Apr 95

[Message to viewers from Sergey Blagovolin, general director of Public Russian Television—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed television viewers! As you know, Public Russian Television begins its work today. Although today is 1 April, I think you understand that it's no joke, that's it's in earnest. We want you to trust us. But we aren't hoping to convince you by words—that's pointless. We are hoping to convince you by what you see on screen.

Here are a few more thoughts: first of all, don't think, please, that everything that you see from today will be completely new. That's not so - in the first place, because we need continuity and we want to preserve everything that you love, that you have got used to already. And in the second place, because the creation of a new style, of a new character for the first channel will really take time. Nevertheless, we think that in a short time you will really be able to see for yourselves that the first channel is better now than it used to be.

We are often asked what our credo is. It is very simple: the stability and prosperity of Russia, our great motherland. We wish happiness to all of you, our dear fellow countrymen. We wish happiness to all television viewers in CIS countries and in all other countries where our programs are watched! All the very best! I hope we will meet again! Thank you for your attention!

Russian Public Television Begins; Official Comments

LD0104104795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1014 GMT 1 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 1 TASS—The Russian Public Television (RPT) starts off today on the Ostankino channel.

Its future development sets unprecedented and large-scale tasks, and requires a kind of a revolution on the national television, ITAR-TASS was told today by Igor Shabdurasulov, a member of the RPT board of directors, head of the governmental culture department.

Shabdurasulov stressed that all interested parties had came to agreement over most of RPT-related issues.

The consensus was generated in progress of two-week consultations which Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held with leaders of the Ostankino Television company and the RPT at the behest of President Yeltsin.

A governmental decree is being drafted to generate a golden mean from proposals of the Federal Television and Radio Service, Russian Public Television and Ostankino company.

Media Officials Discuss Recent Television Developments

LD0204230395 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer Aleksandr Lyubimov] Public Television presents the "One to One" program with our viewers. Today we are in a large studio. We have many guests and viewers and I hope also many TV viewers and stars who will present their own projects. The two main guests in today's program are Sergey Blagovolin, general director of Russian Public Television [ORT], and Grigoriy Shevelev, deputy chairman of Ostankino State Television and Radio Company.

Sergey Yevgenyevich Blagovolin, here is the first question to you. Could you please tell us where did the idea to create ORT to replace Ostankino on Channel One come from? Who was the first to come up with it and how did the idea emerge?

[Blagovolin] You know it is said that it was in the air and that it was caused by the circumstances that had emerged. It would be difficult to pinpoint the day and the hour but it has been claimed that this happened some time in September 1994. [passage omitted]

[Lyubimov] Incidentally, how did you manage to convince the president, the bankers?

[Blagovolin] I think we managed to convince them very easily. [passage omitted] Nobody thinks badly of Ostankino because there is a new first channel which really will be able not simply to maintain itself but also to develop, to keep up with the times and to keep up with the demands of the life of the country—demands which are changing, require dynamism, require immediate reaction. And as experience shows—and not just in television—there are many old and traditional structures that should be preserved but nevertheless simply lose out as far as immediacy of reaction and flexibility are concerned; such is their nature. They were created for completely different tasks, for a completely different time. Therefore, it seems to me, that this is why it happened the way it did.

[Lyubimov] Perhaps it is objectivity, dialectics?

[Shevelev] Perhaps. Perhaps at the same time—at the moment I am experiencing rather complex and mixed feelings. On the one hand, I feel bitter, and on the other there is a feeling of certain hope. There is bitterness because it pains me that the state did not have enough political will on the one hand, and on the other hand the financial resources were lacking, and on yet another hand, it seems to me that the state does not yet have any notion of how the electronic mass media should function in the country. There is a feeling of bitterness because the absence of these three components to a certain extent affected the situation which Ostankino is in today, and the state has not been able to keep in its hands the national, I would say supranational television channel, has not been able to preserve in a fitting way the truly national property which Ostankino and everything created by national television over the years was. And on the other hand, there is a feeling of some hope because I want very much to believe that the financial structures which have come to the support of Ostankino, the political management of ORT, will do everything to ensure that the declarations which they are making in the press now will be backed up by real actions, that Ostankino really will remain, rather the first channel, will remain a national and supranational channel, a channel which people not only in Russia but also beyond will watch with pleasure and that the political part of that channel will not be subordinate to the influence of one political grouping or another.

[Lyubimov] So you were counting on the state but it turned out that one financial group, from Moscow, which supports one political block in the State Duma—I mean Russia's Democratic Choice—was the most concerned about the fate of the state, of the country.

[Blagovolin] Well, in the first instance, I cannot agree with this. But before answering this, I would like to clarify that I cannot agree with Grigoriy Aleksandrovich when he says that the state lacks the political will, that it did not keep the channel in its hands, and so on and so forth. That will is present because that decision undoubtedly demanded political will—that's the first thing. And second—and that's the main thing— and I want everybody to hear that finally because there has been so much talk, strange talk about that. The state retains 51 percent of the company capital. The state, therefore, even formally, under any regulations which we have in Russia and under any regulations throughout the whole world, retains control over the first channel. The second thing I would like to say for all to hear who are interested in one way or another: All the state shareholders, under our rules, are obliged to vote as one. So, even if you imagine that some villains from the non-state shareholders want another two percent or three percent for themselves by one means or another—that won't work because all the state shareholders are obliged to vote as one.

Now for Russia's Choice. There could be nothing further from the truth when it is said that the financial structures which are taking part in that whole process, in setting up the new first channel support Russia's Choice and that I myself have come here as a spokesman of Russia's Choice. I have said already—and thank goodness there is the opportunity to say it again quite publicly—I have ceased all party activity, that's the first thing. Moreover, I think that my appearance as general director of Ostankino will be justified only in one event—and this is why I came here—not to serve any one political party, because I think that now all of us who are concerned about the fate of Russia, of the land we live in—and this is our only land—we really should think about just one thing, about setting up just one party, the party of people of good sense. And I hope that the work of the new first channel will prove to all of us in a very short time that these are not empty declarations, not empty words. There won't be any division into yours and ours. There will be one division only—professional and non-professional. And everybody who accepts our concept—stability and prosperity—which does not at all signify an absence of poignancy, the raising of tough questions—interpreting it like this, everybody will be fully justified in counting on being understood here and on being able to function so as to develop as far as possible his professional qualities here. And there will not be any Russia's Choice in any undiluted form on this channel. [passage omitted]

[Shevelev] I would sincerely like to believe that Sergey Yevgenyevich's words will be backed up by deeds and practice. I think that Ostankino, which remains a major producer of ORT's, will encourage the implementation of that position. [passage omitted] What is important is how all of that will be backed up by deeds. [passage omitted]

[Lyubimov] Elections to the Duma, elections of heads of administrations, presidential elections. How will you manage to withstand [laughs]—and perhaps you will succeed—the pressure?

[Blagovolin] What sort of pressure do you mean?

[Lyubimov] Political—there will probably be pressure.

[Blagovolin] Various political forces will put pressure on us, will try to get things all their own way—is that what you mean?

[Lyubimov] What usually happened on big channels was that everything was possible for those closest to the president, who had the greatest opportunity to dial up automatic telephone station number one [as heard] and call you now.

[Blagovolin] We have already agreed with the prime minister that no such telephone calls will be made and I, of course, I am not so naive as to think that they really won't be made.

[Lyubimov] If there are no elections, there won't be any pressure, will there?

[Blagovolin] No! It would be strange—no! [laughs] I think—and I'm proceeding from that premise—that the elections will be held and phone calls will be made!

[Lyubimov] But what if 49 percent of the joint stock capital is against the elections?

[Blagovolin] No, do you see? I'm very pleased that we have met today because I'm always coming up against some myths which evidently have taken rather firm root even in your consciousness. That's a myth! One article was published in the newspaper KOMMERSANT, if I'm not mistaken, even an interview with Oleg Viktorovich Boyko who, moreover, told me himself—naturally I know him well—that he did not say anything like that conjecture. [passage omitted]

The attitude of the non-state stockholders to the elections has not been formulated in this way, nor can it be. We adhere firmly to the law of our country. And we absolutely do not proceed from the premise that we should carry out some kind of subversive work against the constitution, against legitimate power. God forbid! What do we need that for! Perhaps there are some who don't like us but we are not all that like idiots!

[Lyubimov] Grigoriy Aleksandrovich, what about Ostankino's commitments throughout the CIS? As is known, the first channel broadcasts not only to Russia and, most importantly, it broadcasts to the countries of the former USSR. How will all that happen in future? Will these countries be able to switch off the first channel because it is a semi-state channel, although the state owns the controlling package of shares?

[Shevelev] I think this is one of the most acute questions today, both for Russia and the management of ORT. I already have information, in particular, from Ukraine, and perhaps from several other regions that various political forces in one state or another, are influencing in one way or another the possibility of the First Channel spreading to these states. I think that the ORT leadership is also ready to support Ostankino in this respect, and perhaps everything must be done in the state structure to ensure that the Ostankino channel spreads to a large territory, and to the territory not only of CIS countries, but also of the Baltic, and perhaps beyond the former borders of the Soviet Union where it was always received traditionally. I know that Bulgaria and some other countries that receive Ostankino are taking a great interest in the First Channel. But it will be a tragic mistake here, and perhaps tragic shortsightedness, if that problem was ignored by the management of the ORT and perhaps the government—perhaps interstate agreements are needed.

[Lyubimov] Have you attended any consultations or seen the initial reaction of presidents of other countries?

[Blagovolin] Talks are already under way. I completely agree with Grigoriy Aleksandrovich—broadcasting to CIS countries and even to countries of the Far Abroad that receive the First Channel—must not be stopped for one reason or another. This is a very important task. We recognize—I repeat—that this question must be resolved and we hope to resolve it with the management of the Ostankino Television Company, and with the participation of the state through our government structures. Let me say it again so that it is clear—talks are already underway and we are hoping for a favorable outcome. As concerns the internal political arrangement in one or another CIS country, we are not able to influence this, but we are, nonetheless, acting on the basis that the First Channel is very popular in these places and this should help us to a certain extent with this aspect of the problem too.

[Shevelev] I would just like to add, it is undeniable that the First Channel is very popular, we agree with the ORT management on this, but I would like to somehow pinpoint and look at in more depth the issue of Ostankino's popularity. Having become an independent—rather self-sufficient production structure, Ostankino will seek the most diverse ways and means for taking its products, apart from via the First Channel, to the viewers of regions of Russia and the states of the CIS, Baltics, and so forth.

[Unidentified person in audience] What about the question I tried to put. You have an enormous number of people behind you, it is a big company, truly the country's intellectual property. What would you like to retain from what used to be Ostankino on the ORT channel, what new developments do you want to see on it?

[Shevelev] Perhaps you are asking two questions there. The first—which of the Ostankino traditions do we want to retain on ORT? I think—the cultural values that Ostankino represented, the principled approach to making programs of a high quality, of high cultural value, we very much hoped, hope, that these programs will be on the air. I think in conditions today where a theater's tour of remote areas of Russia is a problem, I think the First Channel should, first and foremost, retain the function of getting theater, music, and art to the provinces. [Shevelev interrupted, but continues] I would like to say again that I... [interrupted again] I do know that today's network does not include transmission of performances, the classics. I think we will sort this out and find...[interrupted], or I should say it is already being regulated, because if you look closer you see that they have the classics, but that they have been locked up somewhere.

[Lyubimov] I would like to give our viewers the opportunity to ask questions. Our guests—Grigoriy Shevelev, the head of Ostankino, and Sergey Blagovolin, the general director of ORT. Stay with us, you are watching the First Channel. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] As far as I understand, Ostankino's experience will be put to good use by the ORT, but my question is this: Will news and information programs be changed in any way, because in comparison with news and information programs carried by other channels, the Vesti and today's Novosti, put out by the first channel today were simply not competitive.

[Blagovolin] It surely falls to me to describe all the changes. Changes in the channel's information service have already taken place. You know that our broadcasting pattern has been altered—I mean, we have gone over to the three-hour pattern [news bulletins every three hours]. The duration of these bulletins has been increased. We intend to be as resolute as possible in ensuring that they contain as much information as can be fitted, because often these information programs fail to carry interesting information and I regard this as our weakness relative, say, to the NTV company. This is already being done and, in a word, this is something we keep sharply in focus. I think that literally over the next few days you will see that our information programs have become, first, informative in essence, second that they have become dynamic, and third, I would say that they have begun to attract viewers.

The road to our goal is fairly lengthy and naturally you cannot accomplish all of this overnight or in a day, or several days, but the process has already begun and we will keep the channel's information service in the sharpest possible focus. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] In theory, TV ought to speak the truth and serve the people. However, a moral problem arises here—the directors of Ostankino politically support President Yeltsin and his group. This in a situation in which everything has already happened, as it were: The country, the USSR, was destroyed; October 1993 happened, and already we have tens of thousands of people dead in the Chechen Republic, in that war. Has not the time come, as it were, for severe criticism and for settling accounts and for heads being knocked together, as it were? Has not the time come? This is a moral problem.

[Blagovolin] You see, I mean I am categorically against the idea of knocking heads together, of settling scores and so on and so forth.

Television ought to tell people the truth. However, I have to tell you, to your face and harshly: Unfortunately some kind of masochist elements have recently appeared in the work of TV. You know, it is like that Khlyst sect, the members of which whipped themselves till they bled [refers to a secret Russian 17th century Christian sect, the members of which used to be known as flagellants].

You know, the issue, essentially, is this: The truth, no matter how unpleasant it is, may be interpreted in various ways. It can be used like a knife that you stick into a still festering wound, only to twist it inside, so that the victim has been completely brutalized and lost consciousness, or can only use such abilities as he still had left to orient himself in time and space, due to pain.

But another way is possible—it is possible to use it for therapeutic purposes, as if it were a bitter pill, as an attempt to explain why things did happen and what is needed so that they never happen again. And if work is already under way to ensure that these things never happen again, and that is also the way it is, then we must say that such work is already underway.

You know, all the time we are persuading ourselves that we are falling into an abyss, that we are all finished and done for.

However, I am convinced that we must persuade ourselves that we live in a great country, that ours is a great nation, with great culture and a great past and, God help us, it is premature to bury us and our country alike—and it is this that we will endeavor to accomplish on the first channel.

[Shevelev] You know, I fully support what Sergey Yevgenyevich has just said. Moreover, I favor this position very much. However, Ostankino's history, its diverse experiences, its complicated past, mean that such statements often lead to censorship against certain journalists and topics, approaches, and comments. I would like to state once more that I fully support the stance taken by the present management of the ORT. It would be really nice if these statements turned out to be true.

[Blagovolin] In a sentence, I hope that very soon—please let me remain vague for the moment, let me have my little professional secrets—you will see that on the first channel there will be no censorship, no ban on any journalist or on the views he may hold. The material he is to present alone will determine everything.

[Female announcer] I would like to know how you are going to deal with advertisements. Will you have any? I have heard that from 1 April there would be no more adverts on Channel 1. Is that the case? [passage omitted]

[Lyubimov] Well, REN TV will start off tomorrow with a project more connected to politics. Sergey Dorenko, to you.

[Dorenko] Well, what can I say? It will be a daily program covering the main event of the day. Simply, I have been thinking for a long time that a person must understand the main event to enable him to make up his mind tonight rather than tomorrow morning, when the papers come.

[Lyubimov] Let's move on to children's games, shall we? [passage omitted]

[Lyubimov] Grigoriy Aleksandrovich, what have you got lined up for us?

[Shevelev] Our art studio is working on a number of humorous entertainment programmes although it's still early to talk about anything specific. Belza is working on a music cycle. Part of the cycle has already gone on the air as a pilot. But there will be more.

One rather big change will be in the educational studio. It also has a lot of plans for creating serials. We hope that we will be able to get the funds together for creating popular scientific serials.

And of course I have to mention a problem which I take to heart—the problem of TV films. First of all I would say that Ostankino cannot develop multi-episode TV films unaided and we are depending to a great extent here on support from colleagues in ORT. And the task of restoring the national film industry and the part of it which works on multi-episode productions is a very important task. We have draft scenarios, we have agreements with directors and actors and now we are looking for the funds to launch these major productions.

[Lyubimov] Thank you, Grigoriy Aleksandrovich. And we now have another question.

[Unidentified man] I have a question for the new director of ORT, Sergey Yevgenyevich. Of course it's nice to see new programs, but can you explain why interesting musical programmes like Hit Conveyor and Muzoboz and the best feature films are put on in the early hours of the morning when there isno one around to watch them?

[Lyubimov] Young people are unhappy, Sergey Grigorovich.

[Blagovolin] Yes, you are quite right. Young people are unhappy with this. But I have to say that we are all in the same boat unfortunately—there are 24 hours in the day and there isnothing you can do about it. Naturally, when we are drafting the schedule we want to make sure that programs for each section of the viewers are shown at a reasonable time. We are going to keep working in that direction but we must not forget about those who want to watch a particular program at two o'clock in the morning. We are going to keep those people in mind. And we will keep you in mind, too, because I can see that you like to keep to a timetable. We will support that in every way. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified female] [passage omitted] My question is this: how do you think the concept of the channel's policy will be elaborated? [passage omitted]

[Lyubimov] Thank you. Evidently it's meant for you! [nodding to Blagovolin]

[Blagovolin] I am prepared to answer that question but it will be a very short answer. Our political concept is spelt out in two words: stability and prosperity. And the third and most important word which should be added here is: Russia. The stability and prosperity of Russia. That is what we will serve. The rest is ...

[Lyubimov, interrupting] Thank you very much. I thank our guests. I thank the audience. I thank the television stars and television producers. I hope you will always watch the first channel. Stay with us always! [brief video clips of Ostankino programs, jingles, ORT jingle and logo]

ORT Director Blagovolin Criticizes Duma Law on TV

OW0704085395 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Remarks by Sergey Blagovolin, general director of Russian Public Television; from the "Daily Chronicle" newscast of the "TeleUtro" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Blagovolin, director-general of Public Russian Television [ORT], is not concerned by the fact the State Duma has adopted the law "on the special order of privatization of organizations of the state television and radio in the Russian Federation."

[Blagovolin] Dear television viewers. As you apparently all know, the State Duma yesterday adopted a law, after its third reading, which essentially contradicts the President's decree on the establishment of ORT. I do not want to talk about how this happened. I was not in the Duma. Others will talk about this. I want to talk about the essence of what happened. All of this, mildly speaking, gives rise to consternation, and here is why.

In the first few days after the establishment of the ORT we proved that we had not violated any one of our promises. We said that there would be no advertising which irritated people, and there is none. We said that we would expand the sphere of social concord and not restrict it, and this we have done. We said that television viewers would see everything they have become accustomed to, what they love, and of which they do not want to be deprived, and you can see for yourselves that this is what we offer—no unnecessary revolutions for the sake of revolution took place here.

We said we wanted to revive respect for the Russian Army and everyone can see that this is so, that this is also happening. Finally, we said that various points of view would be presented on our screen and everyone who saw the appearance of our great compatriot Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn can convince themselves that this is so. I would like to stress that this was a program that we ordered, even though it included many severe words addressed to us. Moreover, in the coming days ORT will begin showing a film prepared by Aleksandr Nevzorov, and as you know he is also a person distinguished by his abrupt and rigid assessments.

I could continue listing various points and positions for a long time, but I would also like to emphasize that we have prepared a general agreement with the Ostankino Television Company under which nearly all sharp issues are smoothed out, or practically all those that concern our mutual relations.

Finally, one more thing. Adoption of this law will not add money to the treasury. Our spending this year is approaching three trillion rubles, and it became clear from our discussions with the chairman of the Russian Government that the government, as a shareholder, will not be paying any part of it. So, dear television viewers, if this law comes into force this trillion rubles [as heard] will be taken from your pocket.

I am honestly trying to understand what is to be gained by all this. Are there no other urgent problems the solution for which Russia, indeed all of you, are waiting? I would like to address myself to the respected Duma deputies, to respected members of the Federation Council, and primarily to you, our dear viewers, on whose general behalf all of this is happening. I think the time has come to receive precise answers to the questions of why, how, for whom, and by whom all of this has been implemented. I cannot find the answers, possibly you can. Thank you for your attention.

Yeltsin 'Likely' To Veto Duma Move Suspending TV Privatization

LD0704104995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1022 GMT 7 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 7 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin is likely to veto the State Duma law suspending the privatisation of the "Ostankino" TV Company which was o'kayed by the head of state, according to presidential spokesman Sergey Medvedev.

"Because of his character Boris Yeltsin does not like to make steps back", he told TASS Friday.

The Duma banned the broadcasts of the Public Russian Television (ORT) Company, created on the basis of the "Ostankino", ordered to stop its financing and suspended its privatisation. It also called on the president to review his decision on the creation of the ORT in which the state possesses 51 per cent of the stock.

The law is yet to be approved by the Federation Council, the upper chamber, and signed by the president.

Until this happens the law has no legal force, presidential legal aide Mikhail Krasnov explained to TASS Friday and made it clear that Yeltsin would veto the law.

"Even if the Duma overrides the possible presidential veto, the law has to pass the same procedure in the upper chamber. The whole process can take quite a few time during which the ORT has to abide in its activities by the presidential decree", Krasnov said.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Grachev on Situation in Chechnya

LD3103230095 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2003 GMT 31 Mar 95

["Exclusive" interview with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] The situation and the opinion both of the citizens of Russia and of the mass media concerning the war in Chechnya is known. I would like you to tell us what the situation is really like there at the moment, what is your assessment of the situation as a defense minister, and it would also be good if you could say what the chances are of this war coming to an end.

[Grachev] Well, before answering your question, I would like to inform both you and the citizens of Russia, and everyone in the media, that in my capacity as a defense minister I receive daily updates in the form of daily combat reports from the fighting area, and this information appears on a map showing the situation for each day of combat operations. Over the past two days, the northern group cut off the town of Gudermes around its entire perimeter, the external circle of blockade, and during the daytime yesterday [30 March] three subunits of the interior troops supported, naturally, by the Armed Forces—mainly by the aviation, artillery, and tanks—entered the town and without any particular effort took full possession of the town.

The fact is, that while blockading Gudermes we ran up against stubborn resistance on the approaches to Gudermes and on the outskirts of Gudermes, where the armed militants set up a sufficiently strong defensive line that we had to take in battle. Yesterday, it is true that in the process of clearing the city and disarming illegal armed formations in the town, neither the Armed Forces nor the interior troops had even a single man killed or wounded. However, during the cutting off of the town of Gudermes by the Armed Forces—this happened the day before yesterday [29 March]—regrettably, three people were killed and seven wounded.

As for Argun, which was seized earlier, the situation there has stabilized completely and peaceful work to restore what has been destroyed is under way.

Although the enemy is now acting in a disorganized manner, at the same time, the fighting is violent and focused around centers of resistance. There are still groups of armed militants ready to become involved in active combat operations and willing to fight—they are the so-called subunits of suicide fighters. We forecast that the situation will develop in the following way: After the capture of the town of Shali all major populated points will be held by the federal troops and all necessary conditions will be created to restore the national economy and to involve other ministries and departments in this work. After the seizure of Shali the enemy is likely to completely abandon active combat operations in populated points and to withdraw the remaining personnel and equipment to the foothills and mountain villages where they will be preparing for the so-called guerrilla war.

What is a partisan war as we see it? First, they will get a certain number of small detachments ready. As a rule, these will be armed only with firearms and grenade-launchers. As a rule, they will operate by night, all over the territory of Chechnya, attempting to penetrate areas where our troops are stationed, areas where interior troops are stationed and, most of all, areas of importance to the state—oil refineries, for instance, or, in the center of a town, government buildings and other state installations, and they will certainly take a great interest in railway lines and bridges, too—in order to carry out acts of sabotage. Therefore, we must be prepared. And as it is, history tells us that such acts will not be short-lived: They could go on for a lengthy period time. For months, if not years.

But everything will depend on how the other, nonmilitary ministries and departments act. If these processes are going to drag on, of course there is the possibility that the population will lose faith in our ability to restore order, and the process will last even longer. Therefore, I think that the time has now come for all-round activity.

[Correspondent] The anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War is now approaching. It is going to be celebrated here in the presence of the leaders of the Western states and, naturally, Chechnya is going to echo constantly. So, how in your opinion, can this all go ahead if active military operations are still being conducted in Chechnya?

[Grachev] The events in Chechnya are local, isolated instances. That is the first thing. And there is no need to make a comparison. That is the first thing [as heard]. Of course, I think that it will be an awful thing if we were to celebrate the 9th of May while the blood of Russian soldiers and officers was being shed a short distance away from the celebrations. We will do our best. By we, I mean the military. We in the military will do our best to accomplish our tasks in full before that celebration. The fact is that, as I have already said, the enemy will continue to make bandit forays or, as they say, partisan military operations or war. Of course, we will do our best to finish all the large-scale operations off in April: Encircling maneuvers, mopping-up, captures, demolition, and so on.

All the opportunities for this are there. There is some worry as to whether the soldiers whose discharge is due in May-June will be discharged. Yes, all the servicemen who have served a year and a half will be discharged, including soldiers from the area of combat actions. They will be discharged in an organized way with the full uniform and benefits due them. That is the first thing.

The period that officers are to serve in the combat area has been set at three months, and during the fourth month a planned change- over is to take place. Not all at once, but, let us say, an [officer] passes on his experience to the next one and then leaves in the course of the fourth month—that is the order set down for doing it. And those subunits that have been in the area of combat actions four months or longer, they are now being exchanged for other, fresh units. The more so as a question may be asked as to whether these are again untrained subunits that have not been under fire. Well, I want to reassure you to some extent. I do not say that everything will go well and smoothly, that there will be no shooting, etc. But to some extent these new subunits, which are less trained, and we are training [servicemen] in all the districts at present, they will be carrying out less active tasks than their predecessors. Mainly this will be, as you can see, guarding functions and helping the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its work.

Those subunits that have actually had a huge experience of combat actions, with losses, unfortunately, they are being taken out, and will continue to be taken out, to the places of their permanent stationing, and some of these subunits will take part in the parade. These are the marines, and the paratroopers of the Tula Division in particular, and the tank crews of the Kantemirovskaya Division. So we will see them in the parade.

Grachev Comments on Chechnya, Talks With Perry

LD0104122895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1208 GMT 1 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Kipkeyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 1 TASS—Continuing hostilities in Chechnya will not interfere with the talks of the Russian and American presidents ahead in May, said Russian Defence Minister General Pavel Grachev.

According to Grachev, the war in Chechnya has entered a final stage. Dudayev's fighters are retreating into mountain areas, with a long guerrilla war in mind.

Grachev said the Russian Army would not pursue operations to exterminate those units if they carry out no terrorist raids. If extremist forces activate the remnants of Dudayev's units into offensive bids, the Russian Army will strike back, Grachev said.

Speaking to reporters during his visit to Moscow's marine school today, Grachev outlined the agenda of his talk with U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry, who is arriving in Russia today. Subjects will include military cooperation, European security and implementation of an anti-air defence agreement. The focus of the talk will be on Russia's joining the "Partnership for Peace" programme and dialogue with NATO, the defence minister said.

Asked about pre-enlistment training of the youth, Grachev said this needed much improvement. He said Cadet and Nakhimov marine schools, which are to be set up in all Russian regions, were expected to bring real remedies to the Army's problems.

Grachev Reportedly Says Chechen War Will Not End in Apr

LD0104165495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1500 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It is to be understood unequivocally that military operations in Chechnya will not cease within this month, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev admitted today. Our correspondent has the details.

[Correspondent] Pavel Grachev claims that all personnel of the Russian Federation troops in Chechnya are in the mood to continue the war to its victorious end. In the view of Pavel Grachev, the resistance of the Chechen formations has been broken and only small mobile groups could be expected to carry out subversive actions in the near future. At the same time, the defense minister considered that it was too early to talk about an end to the military operations.

[Begin Grachev recording] I completely fail to understand those people who say this [war] is a blitzkrieg and that it should be quickly completed. How come? In fact we are only too happy to finish right now. But the opposing side is presumably making a decision of its own and it, let us say, has no wish to finish combat operations today.

According to our information, units of very irreconcilable fighters are moving out into the mountains. If they stay quiet there I do not think we will undertake any strong actions. [end recording]

Kulikov: Chechen 'Solution' Shifts to Political Sphere

LD0104115895 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 1 Apr 95

[Interview with General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of federal troops in Chechnya, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kulikov] With the fall of Shali and Gudermes, nearly 80 percent of the population of the Chechen Republic is now controlled by the federal forces and the new government of the Chechen Republic. This situation allows us to shift the solution of this conflict from the military to sociopolitical sphere. In other words, the federal troops created the conditions for this. This means we can start talking about elections during the next few months. It is now time for political structures, not military ones, to do most of the work.

Ground Forces Commander Refuses To Disclose Losses in Chechnya

LD0504181695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1738 GMT 5 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Belyakov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Samara April 5 TASS—A top Russian military [as received] refused to disclose the Russian losses in four months of the Chechen fighting saying only they were "serious".

The commander-in-chief of the Russian ground forces, Colonel General Vladimir Semenov told reporters Wednesday "the losses were indeed serious in the first days of new year" when Russian troops staged an assault on Groznyy, but failed to seize it and retreated.

Semenov explained it by a lack of combat experience in the troops and by skillful actions of Chechen militants.

They are "well-armed professionals who know their territory very well and can use all types of weapons", he said.

The general admitted that few people had volunteered to fight against the Chechen militants. And a half of those who had volunteered in the Volga Military District could not be sent to fight for various reasons.

Semenov also made it clear that there is no reform in the army despite an intentsive talk about it.

"To hold serious transformations in the army a good material base is needed. And we do not have money for the most necessary thikngs. Even the most important combat exercises are sometimes held according to a shortened programme", he said.

Victory Day Celebrations Previewed

'Best Units' To Participate

LD3103180395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1735 GMT 31 Mar 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow March 31 TASS—Best units of the Russian armed forces will participate in festivities to mark the 50th V-day, sources at the Russian Defence Ministry told ITAR-TASS today.

The parade columns will involve representatives of the arms of the service who have started intensive training in Moscow. A considerable part of privates and sergeants to participate in the parade are newly-drafted and the parade preparations will help their drill and knowledge of traditions.

The ministry staffers stressed that the parade participants were selected on the economic principle. The ministry proceeded from the limited budget approved for 1995.

No other military units but those involved in materiel preparations and training in Moscow since March 10 will attend the may 9 parade, said the ministry officials.

Chechnya Veterans Not To Take Part

LD3103194395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1843 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 31 (Interfax)—Servicemen who participated in the "Chechen events" will not participate in the Victory Parade to be held on May 9 on Moscow's Red Square. However, not only veterans, but also servicemen from the units of the Moscow Garrison will march on Red Square, a top-ranking servicemen in Russia's Defense Ministry, who is in charge of preparations for the parade, reported to Interfax.

In his words, "as many as 4,200 veterans and detachments from the units and military colleges of the Moscow Garrison will participate in the parade." "A total of 13 companies, 64 people in each, which will represent all Moscow military academies, will march on Red Square," the source said.

He specially stressed that no military equipment will be paraded on Red Square. "It will be part of the parade on Poklonnaya Gora," he said.

Diplomat—Only Veterans To Participate

LD3103194495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1843 GMT 31 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Mar 31 (Interfax)—A senior Russian diplomat on Friday slammed a plan by some generals to include Moscow garrison troops among the participants in a parade on Red Square to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War Two.

"Our generals may plan whatever they like, but they'll only do what the supreme commander-in-chief, that is the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, tells them to," the diplomat told Interfax.

He said U.S. President Bill Clinton had agreed to come to Moscow to take part in Victory Day festivities on condition that only war veterans participate in the parade.

"There's a plan that has been drawn up by Deputy Premier Yuriy Yarov and endorsed by the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, which makes provision for only that kind of scheme for the organization of a parade on Red Square. Nobody has altered that plan," the diplomat concluded.

Foreign Ministry Concerned by Parade Plans

LD0104061895 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 0400 GMT 1 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry is planning to use Moscow garrison servicemen in the victory parade on Red Square. In this connection the Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed concern inasmuch as this runs counter to President Yeltsin's instructions and the requests of the heads of state of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.

Moscow Steps Up Preparations for Chemical Arms Destruction

MK2803094095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 3

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk under the "Weapons" rubric: "Russia Embarks on Destruction of Combat Poison Gases. Gas Attack in Tokyo Subway Prompts Russian President To Sign Edict"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Russian president has appointed Mr. Pavel Syutkin chairman of the presidential Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The committee was tasked with submitting to the government for approval within two months a plan of action to accelerate the Russian Federation's preparation for compliance with international chemical disarmament obligations. In addition, an interdepartmental commission on chemical disarmament was set up under Yuriy Baturin, presidential national security adviser.

Lieutenant General Yuriy Tarasevich, deputy chief of the radiation, chemical, and biological protection troops and also in charge of the elimination of chemical weapons, told your SEGODNYA correspondent that the presidential edict has more to do with the Convention on Banning the Development, Production, Accumulation, and Use of Chemical Weapons, which was signed by 159 states 13 January 1993. By now it has been ratified by only 20 "signatories" (the ratification by 65 signatories is required for the convention to come into force). Nonetheless, the Russian leadership is proceeding from the assumption that the convention will garner the requisite number of "Yes" votes even this year. Given that, in two years' time, by 1997, Russia will have to start—and in 10 years' time, by 2005, to finish—the elimination of combat poison substances it has in its arsenals. These, according to Mr. Tarasevich's information, as of today hold 40,000 tonnes of them. Mr. Tarasevich told your SEGODNYA correspondent that the destruction of combat poison gases is planned to take place at two facilities specified by the Russian Federation Government's decrees: at military bases in the village of Gornyy in Saratov Oblast, and in Kambarkskiy Rayon of Udmurtia.

Northern Fleet Ends Barents Sea Exercises

LD0604225795 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Northern Fleet has ended the command and staff exercises in which more than 40 surface ships, nuclear and diesel submarines, aircraft and helicopters of the fleet's air force and also coastal supporting services took part.

Atomic Energy Ministry, Minister Criticized

MK2903103095 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 2

[Interview with Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the interagency commission on ecological security; and Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, Russian Federation ecology minister, by Yelena Subbotina in the "Ecology and Departmental Selfishness" column: "The Ministry of Atomic Energy Poses a Threat to the State"—place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Subbotina] On 25 January the president signed an edict "On State Support for the Restructuring and Conversion of the Atomic Industry in the City of Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray." (Also known as Krasnoyarsk-26.—Ed.). About a month later, however, the Duma sent a query to the Constitutional Court about the constitutionality of the presidential edict. What is the matter here?

[Danilov-Danilyan] I endorsed the draft, making two amendments, but when I saw the text published as a presidential edict, I was greatly surprised: My comments were there but at the same time an absolutely unacceptable passage had emerged: to approve the basic directions of the restructuring worked out by the Ministry of Atomic Energy [MAE] and the Krasnoyarsk Kray administration and coordinated (?) with the ministries and departments concerned, including the continuation of building the RT-2 plant for the regeneration of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power stations. What came next was simply criminal: to allow the mining-chemical combine to accept spent nuclear fuel from foreign nuclear power stations, designed by other countries, for temporary storage and for subsequent processing.

[Subbotina] Does it follow from this that all countries not wishing to spoil their territory with radioactive waste will bring it over here? Will that not be too much, considering that under existing agreements we are obliged to accept waste from those stations that were built on Soviet design in the former socialist countries?

[Yablokov] This is exactly the MAE's intention. A most blatant violation of the law lies in that effectively no one but the Russian Federal Assembly may allow a radiochemical combine to accept nuclear waste from countries with which we have no corresponding agreements. For this to happen, the Federal Assembly should change the Environmental Protection Law, or (a second option) ratify an international treaty specifying a specific country or group of countries. In this event an international agreement will be in effect, not national legislation provisions. As long as there is no such international agreement, it is necessary to adhere to provisions under Article 50 of the Environment Protection Law: importation of radioactive waste and other radioactive materials from other states with the aim of storing or burying them is prohibited.

[Subbotina] Yet the president has allowed this, with his edict?

[Yablokov] The president now knows that he has signed an ill- prepared edict, that it needs to be corrected. A new draft edict on ensuring the ecological safety of processing has been drawn up. But while things are moving along, the MAE is conducting active negotiations on preparing agreements on the importation of waste nuclear fuel from foreign nuclear power stations. I think it is clear what will come of it: The edict will have to be corrected anyway and the agreements concluded will have to be severed and penalties paid. [passage omitted]

[Danilov-Danilyan] It is especially noteworthy, against this background, that a whole number of countries have now renounced nuclear power engineering altogether: Austria and Sweden, for instance.

[Subbotina] Russia, presumably, has other intentions. MAE chief Viktor Mikhaylov, in an interview with the newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 24 February, announced that "a fairly coherent and well-calculated program for the development of nuclear power engineering has been prepared and submitted for government consideration."

[Danilov-Danilyan] When Minister Mikhaylov talks about the program's advantages, he does not mention that not only its ecological but even economic aspects have not been appraised. I shall cite from this issue of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI: "This year federal budget appropriations are planned only for the most urgent radioactive waste operations, whose nonfulfillment threatens catastrophe. At least 144.5 billion rubles are need to finance them." When, however, the MAE starts counting the money it will get from processing foreign radioactive waste, and calculating the effectiveness of nuclear engineering, he ignores this 144.5 billion: How's that for arithmetic! Moreover, mind you, this involves only the most urgent measures. If everything is counted in, without any tricks, it will be hundreds of trillions of rubles. [passage omitted]

[Subbotina] Your considerations obviously disagree with statements by nuclear energy people about the need to build new nuclear power stations, for instance, in the Far East and the South Urals.

[Yablokov] They want to drag the country into the next colossal spiral of expenditures for the development of a so far unacceptably dangerous nuclear industry, which, I think, must not be allowed.

[Subbotina] You are the two most influential men in the sphere of ecological policy. What do you propose to do to limit the impact and omnipotence of the MAE?

[Yablokov] My answer is simple. The MAE is one of the two imperial structures that have come from the Soviet Union intact. When society realized the danger of another monster—the KGB—it was divided into several functional structures. The same must be done with the MAE because it has become dangerous for the country both ecologically and politically.

[Danilov-Danilyan] The division idea is certainly not bad, but it is very difficult to implement because MAE activity is based on a single production process: arms production, the production of nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations, and nuclear waste processing. This, however, does not remove the problem itself, and there is certainly a need to think about how best to divide this department: Its existence in its unchanged, imperial form comes into conflict with state interests. If nothing is changed, the MAE will end up stronger than anything else, including the Defense Ministry.

The most urgent task is honestly to count the "nuclear monies" and to understand how much the MAE earns itself and how much the state spends (or loses because it does not spend) on the consequences of its activity. The bills which will have to be footed by posterity must also be taken into account. When we clear this up, we shall need to decide to which extent nuclear engineering should be developed. [passage omitted]

Federal Assembly

Rybkin Interviewed by Provincial Media

LD0604191595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1323 GMT 6 Apr 95

["Exclusive" report No. 14 of 116]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] This time Interfax Exclusive begins the publication of the answers the Chairman of the Russian State Duma Ivan Rybkin gave to questions from the provincial media. This special form of a news conference was organized along Interfax channels.

[Kaliningradskaya Pravda, Respublika Tatarstan] How fruitful is the process of law-making in the Duma? How could you describe the work of the house in general? What are your greatest failures and stumbling blocks?

[Rybkin] The Duma is functioning in keeping with the program of legislative work approved by deputies. During 1995 we plan to debate 305 draft laws. What we fail to pass in the last reading will remain for the following Dumas to approve.

We are closely cooperating with those who have the right to legislative initiative: the president, the federal government, the Federation Council, top judicial bodies and federation members.

Sometimes we are groundlessly accused of ineffectively cooperating with the president. I can say that out of the 90 bills the president submitted to the Duma at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, 37 were approved and only two rejected. The rest are under work and during the next few months we will discuss them.

Our relationship with the government is much the same.

The Federation Council has not been using its right to legislative initiative very actively so far. Federation members have been more energetic in this respect. Judicial bodies have worked out only a handful of bills. For instance, the Constitutional Court drafted a law on the principles of its operation which as you know the Duma approved and the supreme judicial body could get down to work.

The Duma holds its plenary sessions twice a week, which makes eight times a month. Sometimes at the insistence of deputies sessions are held more frequently.

What has the Duma achieved in 14 months of operation? I think the greatest achievement is the adoption of the first part of the Civic Code which can be described as the Russian economic constitution. Generations to come will live according to this code. Now we are completing work on the second part.

At the end of March the Duma began debating the draft of the Land Code. Work is nearing completion on the Tax Code and the 1996 federal budget will be drafted on its basis.

By the way, we hope that the government is going to submit the draft budget at the end of May in compliance with the federal law.

As for the new tax system, the number of taxes is to be cut to one fourth. I think we will greatly reduce the burden of taxes. Partly this has been done, probably contrary to the will of the government. The Duma argued heatedly with the cabinet on this matter after last July. So far this has concerned only personal taxes.

The Duma approved the new concept of the Criminal Code. The draft was published and the public, primarily lawyers, are actively discussing it. I speak of codes because these are fundamental laws, the basis of emerging Russian legislation. Most of them are ready for discussion: the final versions of the Water, Air and Criminal Codes are waiting to be approved.

The Labor Code is also very important. It should regulate all aspects of relations between the employer and employee. During the past few years the country has been actually functioning in new economic conditions with the private sector expanding while the acting Labor Code implies that the only possible employers are the government, a state or cooperative farm. How can it protect the rights of workers in private and denationalized companies? I think the debate on the new Labor Code will be complicated, still the document must be approved.

The package of laws related to foreign economic activities, the use of off-shore natural resources, oil, gas, coal, grain, the coordination of farming and industry, the operation of joint-stock companies, the functioning of the stock market are under work. Some have been passed, approved by the Federation Council, signed by the president and enforced.

We have passed the law on veterans. Some people are dissatisfied with the fact that it was not enforced immediately. But the financial situation in the country is such that it simply could not be otherwise. Therefore regulations concerning the neediest groups of the population are introduced first. The other provisions of the law will be enforced later stage by stage.

Draft laws on the living wage, pensions, pension indexation, minimal pensions, minimal wages have aroused serious differences with the government and president. The road to agreement is very thorny. The Duma suggested raising the minimal pension to 54,100 rubles (about $11) but the leadership of the Pension Fund claimed the treasury did not have the money to pay them.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of V-E Day all war veterans are to get bonuses amounting to three minimal wages which requires 600 billion rubles. The Pension Fund says it cannot pay the sum and raise minimal pensions.

The president suggests keeping the present minimal pension of 34,400 rubles and add 39,360 rubles as compensation which brings the total sum to 75,000 (around $15).

I agree with this viewpoint because if we insist on our decision, the actual rise will be put off.

As for the international activities of the Duma, they are quite well known. Our attitudes to many issues are known to the Council of Europe, the European parliament, the OSCE parliamentary assembly and the parliamentary assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. As a rule our delegations to those organizations are headed by a deputy speaker: to the Black Sea Cooperation Organization by Gennadiy Seleznyov (Communist), to the Nordic Council by Mikhail Mityukov (Russia's Choice). Artur Chilingarov (New Regional Policy) represents the interests of the Duma in Africa.

The United Nations is familiar with our representatives. The Chairman of the International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin (Yabloko) is very active there.

One can speak of other aspects of Duma activities, its cooperation with federal government bodies in the person of the president, government and judicial bodies. I can say that the working pace of these relations has become steady. As a rule these contacts have the form of constructive, business-like, effective and fruitful opposition to each other in which the truth is often born.

The situation in the Russian economy is very difficult that is why we are trying to cushion the consequences of the change especially for the older generation whose efforts created the wealth of the nation. On the other hand, we want to do so that Russian businessmen would find it profitable to invest their money in the domestic economy instead of taking it thoughtlessly abroad. The exportation of capital is impermissibly great: $2-2.5 billion a month. The total figure for the past four years runs to $100 billion! That is an enormous sum. For the sake of comparison: our revenues this year are estimated at merely 200 trillion rubles.

And of course, it must be said that the 1995 budget was approved by a strong majority of 292, not 289 as the media say. The budget is very tight and therefore unpopular. It is a program for a strong government which must demonstrate strong will in order to keep the country within the budget. It must find new sources of funding. We named some to the government. Then inflation will be stopped and the life of Russians can be seriously improved.

But the main purpose of the budget is to restore production. If the economy does not function, there will be no sources of the revenue.

At the moment 40 percent of the economy is in the shadow—outside of taxation. We have to deal with the sections of the economy driven into the shadow by the heavy tax burden. But in the part of the economy that has been driven into the shadow by dishonest managers we cooperate with prosecutors, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service and even the External Intelligence Service, the president and government.

Together with the president we decided to strip a whole list of companies and concerns of their benefits and privileges. The president issued a decree cancelling benefits and privileges in foreign trade. Now they all function in equal conditions. The distribution of licences which offered a good living to numerous officials was cancelled and that is very important.

As for our fundamental failures, I would say that sometimes we fail to reach agreement on individual key matters. I mentioned one. I would say that in some cases common sense does not prevail. We have to find a compromise with the president and government, not place people in an awkward position. This political stubbornness of the parliament must be overcome.

Maybe at times we fail to make laws legally immaculate which often results in a presidential veto on purely formal grounds.

We have agreed to set up a joint legal section of the Duma and the presidential staff to deal with such matters.

Today the staff of the Duma has many efficient knowledgeable people. And like many of the deputies they work from dawn to dusk. Their working day begins at eight in the morning and often ends at midnight.

So that you would not blame us for violating workers' rights I will say that they are paid for overwork. Through the strenuous efforts of deputies, the staff of the Duma, the Federation Council and its staff, the presidential administration, all ministries, the president, prime-minister, chairman of the Federation Council, leaders of judicial bodies a common legal space is built, a new constitutional field which I believe will serve the country for decades or even longer.

[Orlovskaya Pravda] How would you assess the operation of Duma groups?

[Rybkin] All Duma groups try to function steadily. I cannot name a single lazy group. Their skills do vary though. Some are strong in one sphere, others in another. The most active groups in law- making are of the Agrarian Party, Russia's Choice, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Women of Russia, the People's Party and Democrats.

Liberal Democrats are less active even though in Orel they claimed that 40

of laws discussed by the Duma have been drafted by their group. That is far from the truth. When deputies heard about these claims at a session they recalled the old Russian saying which you in Orel also know:"You must be good at lying!"

I would be unfair, if I overlooked Yabloko group which is also very active in law-making.

I can also say that most of the work of the lower house is done by its committees in which all groups without exception are represented proportionately. So I cannot single out anyone, but I had to mention the question of false reporting.

I want to stress that Liberal Democrats heading parliamentary committees Vladimir Gusev (Industry, Construction and Transportation Committee) and Sergey Kalashnikov (Labor and Social Policy Committee) are working very persistently. They do not share the thoughtless liking for rhetoric often demonstrated by Liberal Democratic leaders who make the Duma resemble Sokolniki Park in Moscow.

For this reason Lieutenant-General Viktor Ustinov, a very intelligent man heading the Geopolitical Committee, the maker of many draft laws, such as amendments to the law on army service, left the group.

Konstantin Panferov and several others also defected. The group is going through hard times. Its leaders claim that Liberal Democrats stand for abolishing all privileges but still they own several country homes and cars which arouses the mistrust of ordinary group members in their leaders, first of all in Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. It is one thing to speak eloquently in Sokolniki and at press conferences, and another to stand by one's promises.

The question was raised at a recent plenary session when deputies started wondering where Mr. Zhirinovskiy got so many foreign limos and so many country villas.

I answered that in keeping with the norms set by the Organizational Committee the Duma provided Mr.

Zhirinovskiy with one car and one country residence. However, he has his own bodyguards, villas and cars. His Mercedes Benzes overturn because God knows who rushes around on them. I think Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has only a vague idea about the number of bodyguards and aides he has.

[Sovetskaya Bashkiria] Is the high death rate among Duma members the result of a criminal atmosphere around or inside it?

[Rybkin] I would want to remind the readers of Sovetskaya Bashkiria that when I was named candidate to the post of the house chairman, a prominent journalist Pavel Gutionov wrote an article in Moskovsky Komsomolets claiming that deputies are dying the get the easy job of pushing buttons.

In a speech to my voters I argued that the buttons are far from simple. And a person loses much energy and health before pushing a button because he puts his heart and mind into every decision. The Duma has lost six persons: three died early—they were between 40 and 50, three others were killed.

I must say that Duma members differ greatly from their predecessors in the Russian Supreme Soviet. There are many gifted, talented people among them. Forty have degrees in science, every tenth is a professor or a member of the Academy of Sciences.

There are many representatives of banking and business, owners of big fortunes among deputies. Under the law on the status of a Duma member a deputy must leave aside his or her business affairs for the term. An exception is made for those who engage in science or teaching.

Unfortunately, not all deputies stick to this rule. They formally surrender their businesses to their wives or children but actually remain in control which often has poor results. Commerce involves big money which results in criminal showdowns.

[Vechernyaya Kazan] A candidate collecting only 7-8 percent of votes can be elected to the Duma under the current election law. Do you think the rule should be changed?

[Rybkin] In 1993 Duma members were elected in keeping with a presidential decree. Now we have approved the law on elections to the Sate Duma in the second reading. The final version will contain somewhat different norms.

Of course, I would be happy, if deputies were elected by a much greater number of voters, the way I was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies. But voters' activeness has dropped and as a result elections fail in some places.

It took a whole year to form legislative assemblies in federation members. By now they have been elected in 85 territories though elections should have been held throughout the federation on one day-December 12, 1993. No doubt a low turnout will greatly complicate elections in December 1995.

The draft law approved in the second reading says that elections shall be valid with a 25 percent of turnout. But what prevents 90 percent of voters from coming to polling stations as it was, for instance, in rural areas of Tatarstan? The time is over when one could remain home and hide one's head in the sand. People must make their choice that will determine the strategic road of Russia's development.

If every time we vote with our feet refusing to go to polling stations, the most active part of voters—10 percent from the extreme left and 10

from the extreme right—will decide the future of the country. The center lazy about choosing its future is doing wrong by letting those people take the initiative—the aggressive minority that can take the majority in the opposite direction to which it wants. So one should get down from bed, so to say, and make one's choice.

[Respublika Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda] How would you describe the relationship between the houses of the Federal Assembly? Do you think it requires improvement? What is your idea of the mechanism of forming the new Federation Council? Do you think a two chamber form of the federal parliament is justified?

[Rybkin] I will begin with the last question. A two chamber parliament is justified which has been proved by life. Under the constitution the Duma is the only legislative body in Russia and it receives all legislative initiatives.

The Federation Council tries to combine the interests of federation members. While in the Duma each territory is represented in proportion to its population, in the Federation Council a district with a population of 20,000 and Moscow with 10 million are represented by two persons each.

Under Article 106 of the constitution the Federation Council controls law-making by the lower house, in particular concerning the budget, finance, taxes, war and peace, the state of emergency. On other matters the Duma can make decisions without control from the Federation Council, directly with the president.

How should the Federation Council be formed? I stress the word "formed"—it is the term used in the constitution. My opinion is that it should be formed of the heads of legislative assemblies and heads of executive bodies of federation members, including the Chechen republic, of course.

That is how a balance of interests can be achieved. The senseless confrontation will disappear. The balance of powers is a very important achievement of this year. It must be cherished. There are groups that would want to destroy this cooperation. We must not permit it.

[Respublika Tatarstan] Do you think the constitution of the Russian Federation requires improvement, in particular as far as the powers of the Federal Assembly are concerned?

[Rybkin] It is my conviction that we should live at least several years, or even decades according to the current constitution approved on December 12, 1993, even though I see many contradictions in it. They should be resolved by verdicts of the Constitutional Court. Work on this has begun.

Maybe there is sense in following the example of the United States. There in over 200 years the constitution was amended only 23 times, if I am not mistaken. One amendment in 10 years is what we need.

So when someone speaks of expanding the powers of the Federal Assembly, I say that it has plenty of powers. The entire process of law-making is concentrated at the Federal Assembly. If the president disagrees with something, he can veto any bill. But then the veto can be overridden by a majority of two thirds in both houses which we do when we find it necessary. Isn't that a great power right of the Federal Assembly?

Now about the control functions which some of my colleagues think we lack. I believe the constitution names practically all key control functions of the two houses. The Duma decided to form a Comptroller Chamber, passed an appropriate law and elected its chairman. The Federation Council elected its deputy chairman. Now we have to elect the comptrollers—six from the Duma and six from the Federation Council. The estimated spending on the commission this year will be 45 billion rubles or almost as much as on the Federation Council.

The Comptroller Chamber shall exercise total control over the execution of the budget, i.e. in all cities and towns, all federation members, by all ministries and government bodies, including federal bodies—the Duma, the Federation Council, the staffs of the government and president. Isn't that enough?

Now as far as human rights are concerned. I believe the Federal Assembly can be criticized for failures in this sphere. We still have not passed the constitutional law on the human rights commissioner. As we failed to pass the law, to name the list of duties and rights of the commissioner whom we elected on January 17, 1994, we were recently forced to cancel point 5 of our own resolution on the election of the human rights commissioner. This is our fault, the fault of all Duma groups that sometimes cannot overlook false principles or personal matters. Similar laws exist in all developed European countries and the United States. I think this form of parliamentary control is very important.

And finally I must mention parliamentary control over the appointment of key officials. The Duma has the right to appoint the prime-minister suggested by the president and dismiss the cabinet. The president also has the right to dismiss the cabinet or dissolve the Duma.

One can also speak of the right of the Duma to form the diplomatic corps—the president appoints top diplomats with the consent of the Duma and its International Affairs Committee.

As for the Federation Council, it appoints the Prosecutor General, the deputy chairman of the Comptroller Chamber, judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.

This is very serious. Just think how long it took to form the Constitutional Court even though the constitutional law was ready just because the Federation Council was very particular about every candidate.

Sometimes I am asked whether the Federal Assembly should be given greater powers to control the composition of the cabinet. I think that with good, reasonable and effective cooperation with the president the Duma and Federation Council can bring a vote of no confidence in one minister or another for certain grave mistakes, but it must be grounded and proved.

Later the president can take the opinion into account and dismiss the minister. This is actually the surrender of part of control functions of legislative power which in this case represents the public opinion.

But for this the legislative power must be sufficiently influential. So far I think we can work under the acting constitution without making any great changes, without haste.

My opinion is that even with this fundamental law we can avoid constitutional, parliamentary, government and other crises.

Kazmin: Kiev Accord Not Reason for Duma No Confidence Move

LD0604141195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1025 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 6 (FIA-Interfax)—The agreement to restructure Ukrainian debts that Russia and Ukraine signed in Kiev in March cannot be the reason for bringing up in the State Duma a motion on no confidence in the Russian government. This was declared in an interview with journalists in Moscow Wednesday by Andrey Kazmin, a federal deputy finance minister.

His statement was prompted by the intention a group of State Duma deputies, led by Konstantin Zatulin, to initiate a vote on mistrust in the cabinet at an early session of the parliament's lower house in view of the accords signed in Kiev.

Kazmin argued that after the signing of these agreements Russia had already received more than $50 million in interest, repaid on earlier credits from Moscow.

"The first quarterly payment from Ukraine on the restructured debt has been received by Russia strictly on time, and the money is already on the Finance Ministry's accounts in the Central Bank of Russia," he said.

Kazmin also refuted Zatulin's contention that because of the Kiev accords, the Russia budget will be short of much revenue. According to the deputy minister, the 1995 budget takes no account of Ukraine's debt since before the debt restructuring agreements were signed, the Russian government was unable to determine the size of upcoming payments.

Kazmin noted that it was in the interest of both states to restructure the Ukrainian debt to Russia. "Settling debt relations is a prerequisite for IMF credits to Russia and Ukraine," Kazmin explained.

Fedorov for Government Resignation, 'Professional' Cabinet

LD0604154695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1250 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Boris Fedorov, leader of the December 12 liberal-democratic union group in the Duma, called for the government's resignation and for forming a professional cabinet of ministers that would not be based on coalitions but would consist of patriots-reformers capable of achieving real changes for the better. This is said in a statement Fedorov circulated in the State Duma on Thursday.

If the State Duma rejects a new candidature for the prime minister proposed by the president, Fedorov urges the president to dissolve the Duma in accordance with the procedure envisaged by the Constitution as being ineffective and to fix new parliamentary elections.

Fedorov notes in his statement that the Russian Government deserves a vote of no-confidence not so much because of the stance assumed by Russian First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets at the talks with Ukraine as because of the domestic policy he conducts. (Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma Committee for Affairs of the CIS and Contacts with Compatriotis, proposed no-confidence in the cabinet because of Soskovets's stance).

Fedorov noted that back on January 11 he proposed that deputies of the Duma put on the Duma's agenda the question of no-confidence in the government "because of massive loss of life in Chechnya and the social-economic situation in the entire country".

He believes that parliamentarians' refusal to do so resulted "in the continuation of an unprofessional barbarous action in Chechnya which threatens Russia's unity, in adopting an unrealistic budget, in the further impoverishment of the people, the growth of strikes, wide-spread crime and massive corruption".

"In these conditions when Russian statehood is deteriorating, to express no confidence in the government because of the situation with Ukraine and Crimea is an outright political speculation bordering on betrayal of the interests of one's own people", Fedorov stated. organization, removed some from their party duties and approved others....

Duma Places No Confidence Issue on 12 Apr Agenda

LD0604173095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1705 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 6 TASS—The Council of the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian legislature) has decided to include the issue of no-confidence in the government into the agenda of a Duma sitting scheduled for April 12.

Duma To Discuss Lifting Sanctions Against Yugoslavia, Iraq

LD0704102995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0943 GMT 7 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Apr—Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation today agreed to discuss the issue of lifting economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and Iraq at a plenary session. The proposal was presented by Yevgeniy Loginov, a deputy from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Parliament declined his proposal to include on the agenda the issue of lifting economic sanctions against Libya.

Duma Agrees to Criminal Proceedings Against Mavrodi

LD0704105895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0945 GMT 7 Apr 95

[Moscow ITAR-TASS Russian at 1010 GMT on 7 April issued a service message killing the following "news flash"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 apr—The State Duma today agreed to allow criminal proceedings to be brought against Sergey Mavrodi, the head of the MMM investment company.

Defense Order Bill Needs Reworking in Committee

MM0604133995 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Petr Karapetyan: "Draft Law Requires Further Work"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is bewildering to say the least to find that the vast majority of Defense Ministry and General Staff observations on the draft law "On the State Defense Order" were simply ignored in the Duma. As a result, the law was given a second reading in its "crude" form.

For example, the document defines the state defense order as "the Russian Federation government's assignment for federal organs of executive authority (state clients), enterprises, institutions, and organizations...." But Article 6 of the existing law "On Defense" states that the Russian Federation government organizes the equipping of the Armed Forces and other forces with weapons and military hardware in accordance with Defense Ministry orders. It clearly contradicts the draft law on the state order. The draft law also contradicts the corresponding provision of the Russian Federation president's 16 February 1995 message to the Federal Assembly, which talks about the need to ensure a coordinated system of orders for armaments and military hardware based on the Defense Ministry and to conduct research and development for the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation forces. Article 8 of the law "On Defense," in its definition of the duties of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, states that they "carry out contract obligations and, in wartime, state orders for the development, production, supply, and repair of weapons and military hardware...." Any attempt to define the defense order as an "assignment" contradicts the principles of the market economy.

There is yet another significant observation. The text of the draft law removes from the targeted armament program the program of "basic and exploratory scientific research on the development of armaments and military hardware," which is an integral part of it.

Finally, the draft law makes it incumbent on the state client to compensate fully for losses incurred by the producer as a result of the nonuse of these capacities unless the client agrees to their elimination or conversion. This means that if a client needs these production capacities in the very near future, but he cannot maintain their workload this year owing to financial constraints, he has to pay for not only their upkeep (as in cases where we are talking about mobilization capacities) but also the lost profit. But the federal budget that has just been adopted not only fails to provide for the allocation of funds to state clients for this kind of compensation, it even fails to allocate sufficient funds to pay off debts on products already supplied under the 1994 state order. In these conditions, compensation for lost profit looks totally unacceptable and unrealistic.

The numerous shortcomings in the draft law "On the State Defense Order," the Defense Ministry and General Staff experts conclude, and the poor critical analysis of it make it inadvisable that the State Duma should examine it without its having been fundamentally reworked at committee level. Given that, the Defense Ministry and General Staff believe that postponement of the Duma's consideration of the question of the need to adopt an additional (additional to the existing law "On Supplies of Products for Federal State Needs") law "On the State Defense Order" and the possibility of its adoption in the form that is currently proposed constitute an unacceptable solution.

Agrarian Party Threatens Strike, Ouster of Cabinet

LD0604185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1257 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 6 (Interfax)—The parliamentary faction of Russia's Agrarian Party will raise the issue on ousting Viktor Chernomyrdin's Cabinet if the Russian government does not start implementing articles of the 1995 federal budget related to financing the agrarian-industrial complex and fulfilling the decree on purchasing agricultural production for state needs, and its resolutions on the functioning of the agrarian-industrial complex before May 10. Leaders of the Agrarian Party of Russia declared this at a press conference in the State Duma on Thursday.

According to the party's leader, Mikhail Lapshin, chairman of the Council of Collective Actions by Agro-Industrial Complex Workers, the All-Russian Assembly of Peasants held the day before passed a decision to hold an All-Russian strike. Leader of the Agro-Industrial Complex Workers Trade Union Central Committee, Anatoliy Biryukov, believes that stoppage of food product supplies would be the best form for a farm-worker strike.

Such a strike will make society, and the government "feel its sores," Biryukov believes.

Regional Issues

Yekaterinburg Poll Shows Drop in Confidence in Yeltsin

LD3003164895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1248 GMT 30 Mar 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEKATERINBURG, Mar 30 (Interfax-Eurasia)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin enjoys the confidence of only 8 percent of Yekaterinburg's residents (Russia's Urals). The data of the public opinion polls held by the firm URAL-POLLS testify to this fact.

As of early December 20.5 percent of the respondents in Yekaterinburg declared about their confidence in Boris Yeltsin whereas in mid-January this number dropped to 13 percent and by late March - to 8 percent.

Practically every second respondent (48 percent) declared that he does not trust in any Russian politician.

Despite such a sharp lowering of his popularity Yeltsin, nevertheless, heads the March list of the Russian politicians along with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leader of the YABloko group in the State Duma (lower house of parliament), in whom residents of Yekaterinburg have the greatest confidence. A total of 8 percent of respondents trust in them. Yegor Gaydar (3.3 percent), Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (3.0 percent), Boris Fedorov (2.3 percent), Gennadiy Zyuganov (1.8 percent), and Vladimir Shumeyko (1.3 percent) follow them.

Gaydar Reception in Volgograd Described

MM0304105495 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Gaydar Did Not Capture Mamayev Kurgan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The patriotic stronghold of Volgograd greeted Gaydar with light infantry salvos. The former premier had barely stepped down from the aircraft when three old women and an old man—probably some of the active opponents of reform—unfurled a computer printout saying "Gaydar, get out of sacred territory!"

Yegor Timurovich just smiled sweetly in response to this greeting and got into the vehicle provided by local members of "Russia's Choice." At the guest's hotel the heavy artillery awaited, comprising two dozen pensioners with more offensive slogans. The market economy ideologist was put in the room where Zhirinovskiy stayed during his recent Volgograd voyage.

The top oblast leadership took either an indifferent or a deliberately aloof view of Yegor Timurovich's election visit. Gaydar was even forced to begin his news conference for journalists in the corridor of the oblast duma, which by no means pleased his bodyguards.

Nevertheless Yeltsin's former darling was able to keep a brave face notwithstanding the foul play of those around him. His predictions for the coming summer were quite optimistic: "The level of inflation will drop sharply and those who hope to buy hard currency at an advantageous rate and who have concluded futures contracts will most likely stand to lose. In signing the edict to eliminate concessions for special exporters, the president dealt a most significant blow to organized crime but he made a major mistake by getting embroiled in the Chechen conflict."

It is hard to tell whether the people of Volgograd will give the democrats their vote during the coming elections but, although eggs and tomatoes were not thrown at Gaydar, neopatriots like Sterligov, Rutskoy, and Zhirinovskiy receive a somewhat warmer reception here. Particularly from the local authorities.

No Plans To Deploy More Border Guards on Kuril Islands

LD0404204595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1751 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 4 (Interfax)—The Russian Border Service press secretary, Colonel Aleksandr Suvorov, has dismissed the reports by a number of members of the Russian media on the border guards' intention to deploy up to a whole division on the South Kuril islands. He told Interfax Tuesday that the troops already stationed in the area "properly ensure the guard of the border."

At the same time, Suvorov remarked that "in principle a slight increase in the border troops on the South Kurils cannot be ruled out" due to the growing need to protect Russia's natural resources from poaching.

However, such plans do not even exist today, the officer noted. Russia's activities in the area will depend on the situation, he added.

St. Petersburg Protestors Will Demand Pay, Election

MM0404142395 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Along Nevskiy Prospekt to Palace Square"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to trade union estimates around 100,000 people will take part in a procession along Nevskiy Prospekt and a rally on Palace Square in St. Petersburg 12 April. The northern capital has not seen a mass protest on this scale since 9 January 1905.

An intersectoral strike committee has formulated slogans for the protest march to be held:

Repay the city and oblast workers the wage arrears of 63 billion rubles, eliminate unemployment, and ensure the population's employment!

The federal government must resign for failing to fulfill the trade unions' demands put forward during the mass protest action 27 October last year!

An early presidential election this year!

Bryansk Oblast 'Coup' Story Ridiculed

MM0404133395 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 Apr 95 pp 1,3

[Article by Eduard Mokhorov: "Putsch in Bryansk Thwarted, Gallant Police Major Reports to Kremlin and Lubyanka. It Actually Transpires That Governor Karpov Is Sharing Power With His Deputies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bryansk— Few people could have imagined that the article published in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 11 and 14 February this year entitled "The Time and Authority of Mr. Kibalchich" would be the cause of an all-out purge of cadres within the Bryansk Oblast administration apparatus. Right after the local independent press and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published documents compromising officials for unworthy activity, in-house wrangling began within the local power structures. All the Bryansk deputy governor posts were abolished in a flash. There was no room in the new establishment for many of those who had been sacked, who had formed the chief's immediate entourage.

The local semiofficial newspaper BRYANSKIYE IZVESTIYA [Bryansk News] explained the situation 21 March by hinting that the cadre purge was directly linked with a leak of confidential information from inside the oblast administration. "V. Karpov's 18-month rule," this newspaper wrote, "has been accompanied by powerful opposition not only from the 'external' opposition but also 'in-house.' You only have to recall the case whereby official correspondence ended up by obscure means in the hands of people who had nothing to do with the administration."

Well, a more than frank admission. It turns that this is what was worrying gentlemen in Bryansk who are involved in the wide-ranging redistribution of former national property in favor of the emerging bourgeoisie. The rich, strong "new Russians," ignoring the rules and regulations which they themselves imposed on society, are acquiring fat incomes for free in the form of kindergartens, an airport, and the billions in investment designed to eliminate the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. Meanwhile some journalists and writers are using obscure means to discover the secret directives issued by the governor and his confederates, learn the content of confidential discussions, and make all this public. In a word, major deals worth whole fortunes are being wrecked.

During a fine meal the lion—the strong and noble victor—is not read sermons over the unlawfulness of his actions toward the antelope. The enraged king of the beasts might take revenge for his ruined meal. He has mighty paws and sharp teeth—the law and right are on his side.

Whereas previously the governor fought the independent press, this time a powerful blow was dealt to his own immediate entourage.

First Deputy A. Semernev, who until yesterday was considered V. Karpov's right-hand man, fell into particular disgrace with the governor. During the wrangling Semernev, on whom one of the local influential financial and industrial groupings competing with the notorious Mr. Kibalchich pinned all its hopes, was appointed leader of the industry department. Vladimir Danilovich Leonov, who until recently led the "Kodeks" Private Investigation Bureau, became the governor's right-hand man. He had previously been a major in the police and was known as a man of determination, having headed the administration staff and now received special authority from the governor.

And he used that authority immediately. Bryansk Radio carried a sensational statement by this all-powerful new man 17 March.

"At 0900 hours Thursday," V.D. Leonov told residents, "an attempt was made to oust the head of the oblast administration. This was in fact an attempted coup, an attempt to seize political power in the very real sense. A group of extremists led by Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Semernev, former first deputy head of the oblast administration, tried to telephone round the leadership of the rayons and the heads of rayon administrations. They were ordered to remain in their localities, wait for emergency announcements, etc.

"At the same time Deputy Lodkin's group was simultaneously galvanized, a Committee for the Emergency Situation was created, etc. ...This constitutes a very real attempt to seize political power in our oblast, which utterly violates our Constitution. I believe that the culprits will be punished."

You cannot deny that the former police major and "Kodeks" chief investigator is firm and determined. According to him, he immediately informed the Kremlin leadership and Federal Counterintelligence chief Stepashin about the attempted coup d'etat. The main putschist Semernev and the other plotters were searched at work. Semernev's office was sealed and he himself was discharged from the service altogether 20 March. The material regarding this person, who has done "considerable harm to state interests," as the governor's directive says, has been handed over to the prosecutor's office. In a word, the machinations of hostile forces, both internal and external, were resolutely suppressed and so on and so forth.

For a whole week radio, television, and the official press fueled the fears over the coup d'etat and plotters.

But once the tremendous propaganda furor had died down there was total confusion. First, Mr. Leonov publicly and extremely awkwardly repudiated his own attacks on and insinuations regarding specific persons and political parties whom he had accused of attempting a coup d'etat. He said that there had been an attempted coup d'etat but that the plotters could not be named prior to the court ruling, etc.

Then there was a press conference. And here Vladimir Danilovich, our gallant major and investigator, once again tried to demonstrate that there had been a conspiracy aimed at seizing power. But journalists are meticulous people and they want facts. Who, for instance, had set up the Committee for the Emergency Situation, where, and when, etc? How did this committee designate and manifest itself and by what means, etc? Which troop subunits and commanders took part in the coup? Which forces and mass media proclaimed their decision to overthrow the authorities?

The administration was unable to present any facts to confirm the story of a plot. And it found itself in an extremely ambiguous position through its own initiative and excessive imagination. There had evidently been some in-house office squabble between people who would not share posts and a place in the sun. But is it respectable to wash one's linen in public, sullied as it is by the wrangling, set-tos, and intrigue aimed at forcing out colleagues and besides embroil in this squabble the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Kremlin, the Prosecutor's Office, and the world public?

Needless to say, the communist opposition immediately made skillful use of all this. Officials' actions were viewed as flagrant and dangerous political provocation, which discredited less Mr. Leonov than the Russian authorities as a whole.

They also recalled the well-known view that the young Russian democracy must prevent the legitimate accession to power of so- called revanchist forces. But whereas previously this idea was voiced in the abstract, are the Bryansk authorities' current actions not rehearsing a practical plan of action? And on the eve of the Russian presidential election will the story formulated by the gallant Bryansk investigator not become the standard model for other parts of the country? But we have already seen that in 1934 and 1937.

The recent troubles in Bryansk can, of course, be regarded as petty tyranny on the part of certain officials whose heads were turned by being close to power. But everything that happened has inner, deeper implications. A blatant, ruthless struggle is taking place before our eyes between the groups and clans of burgeoning Russian capital. A struggle is beginning over the division of property, for spheres of influence and for power, which will provide the key to wealth and economic domination of the other contenders. At this stage the local entrepreneur Kibalchich's financial and industrial structure has, with the administration's support, gone a considerable way toward ousting its main competitors. P. Kuznetsov, one of Bryansk's rich and influential businessmen and general director of the "Bryanskmyaso" Joint-Stock Company, around whom forces that resolutely back President Yeltsin have hitherto rallied, ended up in disgrace along with former first deputy head Semernev. And it is no coincidence that the official press has made Mr. Kuznetsov the object of its attacks today.

But there is life in the old dog yet. I can let readers into the secret that we have not lost our sources of information as a result of the purge and that we have more documents regarding the administration's shady activity in contravention of the laws. But more about that in a forthcoming article.

Maritime Kray Strike Turns Political; Violence Feared

MK0704105395 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1

[Yevgeniy Krasnikov report in the "Strike" column: "A Miners' Strike Has Begun in the Maritime Kray. The Protest Action May Turn Violent"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A regional miners strike, for which no ending date has been set, began yesterday in Maritime Kray. [passage omitted]

The strikers' main demand is the payment of the multibillion-ruble back wages owed to them by the state. A distinguishing feature of this protest action is that for the first time many collectives have added political demands to their economic claims: the resignation of the government and early presidential elections.

This is the first anti-presidential ("anti-Yeltsin") strike in Russia on such a mass scale. The last political strikes took place in the spring of 1991, when miners in a number of regions downed their tools and demanded the resignation of Valentin Pavlov's government and early elections for USSR president. [passage omitted]

The demand for early presidential elections was first made in the spring of 1994, initially as a threat contained in ultimatums adopted by workers' rallies: If our demands are not met, we shall demand the resignation of the president.

Until quite recently trade union bosses had managed at the last moment to persuade strike committees not to carry out their threat, and strikes proceeded under purely economic slogans. Clearly, this should be understood not only as Russian trade unions' traditional opportunism, but also as common sense: If presidential elections are held in the proper manner, then, clearly, their procedure will be defined by Yeltsin himself.

Now, however, according to representatives of the joint stock company Primorskugol, the situation in the Maritime Kray is out of control. Mine administration officials do not rule out the possibility that the strikes can develop into a violent uprising with arson. The Maritime Kray Duma intends to call for the Trans- Siberian Railway and seaports to be closed unless the strikers' demands are met.

Yesterday Petr Kiryasov, chairman of the Maritime Kray Territorial Miners Committee, arrived in Moscow; he is expected to discuss the situation in the kray with Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays.

Kalmykiya Opposition People's Party Viewed

954F1986A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 17, 12-19 Mar 95 p 10

[Article by Olga Senatova: "An Alternative to Ilyumzhinov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constituent Congress of the People's Party of Kalmykiya [NPK], an opposition party to the government of Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, was held 25 February in Elista. Some 104 delegates attended the congress, representing over 3,000 members—a decent number in view of the 300,000 population of the republic. Speakers during the event emphasized that the party's objective was not simply to win the presidential elections and thrive, but to serve as a political pillar for the republic. Russian Duma Deputy Khulkhachiyev, leader of the NPK, stated: "We are not striving for confrontation. We are opposing libertarianism and authoritarianism," with President Ilyumzhinov's regime in mind.

As we know, young and successful businessman Kirsan Ilyumzhinov won the 1993 election, promising to turn Kalmykiya into a new Kuwait. Citizens of the republic were promised an enticing future—incomes two or three time greater than the country average, an offshore zone, international airport, and much more. But alas!—Ilyumzhinov's preelection rhetoric turned out to be just that.

The economy of this agrarian republic remains over 90 percent subsidized, as before. "Classical" offshore status, where registered enterprises are exempted from federal taxes, was not confirmed by the Russian Government. The so-called "local offshore status" was therefore introduced, where enterprises from other Federation entities are exempted from local taxes, paying registration fees only. Kalmykiya's State Committee for Statistics asserted that agricultural production (there is virtually no industry in the republic) showed a 52 percent drop in 1994 from the previous year's level. Some 14 percent of the populace live below the subsistence minimum and 15 percent are unemployed.

Opponents of Kirsan Ilyumzhinov blame him for the adopted Law on Elections to the People's Khural (Parliament), according to which the president himself has the right to appoint a third of the deputies. The law also permits no-opposition elections in the districts.

Great reaction was elicited in the republic by the president's replacement of the constitution with the "Code of the Steppe," drawn up on his birthday in April 1994. This document in fact formalizes an authoritarian style of rule—the president may be elected without any limitation in number of terms, no impeachment procedure is envisaged, etc. Those who do not agree with the president are not imprisoned—this is prohibited by the Procuracy and Supreme Court, but they can be denied work. The one and only nonstate newspaper, SOVETSKAYA KALMYKIYA, is forced to publish in Volgograd. It lacks its own premises and equipment, and therefore has a meager circulation.

Unambiguous comparisons were made at the congress of the People's Party of Kalmykiya with Chechnya's President Dzhokhar Dudayev, especially since Kirsan Ilyumzhinov paid a friendly visit to Groznyy in autumn of last year and gave a press conference with Dudayev. Ilyumzhinov explained this by virtue of his desire to avert bloodshed. At the same time, those speaking at the congress resolutely rejected any comparison with the Chechen opposition, emphasizing that they were striving to resolve all issues exclusively through legal means and that the party had no armed formations. Congress delegates believe their party provides an example to Moscow politicians—an example of civilized political conduct and readiness to forget discord for the sake of a common goal.

In the opinion of members of the new association, their party documents do not proclaim political slogans, but set as their main objective the return of Kalmykiya to within the framework of Russian legislation. Party leader Khulkhachiyev stated at the congress: "A package of economic programs will be implemented under the aegis of the entire party. The NPK will actively participate in the political life of the republic and that of Russia."

Congress delegates emphasized their loyalty to the federal authority in every possible way and even requested that a representative of the Russian president to the republic be appointed—something Kirsan Ilyumzhinov refused to do.

In the meantime, speaking recently in the Moscow Movie House, the president of Kalmykiya stated that all political parties were abolished by the "Code of the Steppe" and that the NPK had in fact put itself outside the law. Kirsan Ilyumzhinov noted in this regard that there can be no opposition in Kalmykiya since the required structures are absent. "But this does not mean that citizens are prohibited from organizing social movements," he added.

Murmansk Deputy on Federal Relations

954F1995A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Mar 95 p 2

[Interview with V.V. Kalayda, chairman of the deputy commission of the Murmansk Oblast Duma, by V. Sidorin; place and date not given: "The Individual and Policy: The Deputy Makes a Decision, But What Stands Behind It, and How Will It Be Heard?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In the middle of February a group of deputies of the legislative organs of components of the Russian Federation, at the invitation of the Federation Council, examined questions in Moscow on new legislation in the sphere of socioeconomic policy and budget-tax federalism. At the end of its work some of the group (11 persons) signed an appeal to the deputies of the Federal Assembly, the president, and the Government of Russia.**

We quote an excerpt from the appeal:

"We think that President B.N. Yeltsin, having concentrated practically unlimited power in his hands, is not using it in the interests of Russia. The legislative and control powers of the Federal Assembly and the legislative organs of authority of the components of the Federation are being curtailed, restricted to the maximum, as a result of which the executive authority from top to bottom is uncontrolledly disposing of national property and is conducting a policy of pilfering, selling, and distributing it for a song. State enterprises, including those with defense significance, are falling into the hands of shady elements, foreign operators, and even dummy firms of foreign special services."

The document further says that Russia is withdrawing as a serious competitor in the domestic and world markets and an uncontrolled export of material wealth is going on, that regions of the country are becoming degraded and many elements of the population are in poverty, that a substantial number of workers and technical specialists have been dismissed from their work, and their civil rights are being grossly violated, etc.

One other name besides that of the president is mentioned in the appeal: It is necessary to bring A.B. Chubays to account "for the irreparable damage done to the country by his actions in the post of chairman of the State Committee for Management of State Property."

In general, on the one hand the document seems earnest, but on the other hand it resembles rally slogans. The first signature under it is that of V. Kalayda, deputy of the Murmansk Oblast Duma, and the second is that of V. Tyurin, who is also from our area. Therefore, after receiving the appeal we wanted to meet with V.V. Kalayda, chairman of the deputy commission of the oblast Duma.

[Sidorin] Vasiliy Vladimirovich, how did this document come into being?

[Kalayda] For several days we listened to Minister of Economics Yasin, Acting Chairman of the Central Bank Paramonov, Acting Chairman of the State Committee for Management of State Property Mostov, Deputy Minister of Finance Korolkov, and Minister of Labor Melikyan. Knowing who was lecturing us, we raised the appropriate questions.

For example, what is the government's attitude toward the fact that the Duma made a decision to increase the minimum wage to 54,000 rubles [R]? Answer: If the president had signed this law, there would have been a full crisis in the economy. Clarification from the hall: Respected ministers and members of the government and the Central Bank, can a person who receives even R54,000 live on it in today's situation? Answer: No, without comment.

Everyone knows that pilfering of property and natural raw material resources is going on. Property has moved into the hands of all possible kinds of commercial structures, including unscrupulous hands. Allegedly on a legal basis. But people with vouchers of a 10,000 denomination did not acquire any kind of property. So, the question arises: Is the government undertaking measures for the return of property, for its return on a legal basis, or does this all belong to the people? There was one answer: There will be no kind of return, the owners have already been determined.

Finally, one more question: How do the government and the Central Bank plan to improve the financial-credit and tax system in order to provide an opportunity for domestic commodity producers to come into being, restore plants and factories, lower unemployment, reduce mortality, and improve the well-being of Russia? Answer: Production will fall, and we think that the financial-credit and tax policy has been developed correctly.

The bank credit rate in the world amounts to 7-8 percent. But in Russia in 1993-1994 the credit rate got up to 400 percent, and in our oblast it reached 320 percent. Thus, no enterprise and no kind of technology will be able to increase labor productivity and production volumes, inasmuch as it is necessary to pay off enslaving credits. And quite naturally, a concentration and division of property is going on through banking structures.

There were already precedents last year of cities freezing, particularly in the Kolyma-Seymchan center. Whole families are dying there because of a shortage of fuel, pipelines, etc. The city was frozen in December and was not unfrozen until July. This year about 150 cities—mainly in Siberia and the northern rayons—have a potential for freezing. The reason—squandering of resources and the formation of all kinds of corporate organizations for gas, oil, etc. In addition to all this, the government issued quotas and licenses for the extraction and sale of these strategic resources. From which they profited.

[Sidorin] All this prompted you to undertake the appeal?

[Kalayda] Yes. We met with sound people in the government and realized that there is no economic policy, there is no social protection. So we decided not to let the present situation go unnoticed. On my initiative, a group of deputies worked on the appeal. But some scientists, deputies, and workers of the Federation Council staff joined in the final editing.

[Sidorin] How many of the deputies of the regions who gathered in Moscow signed the appeal?

[Kalayda] We represented 53 components of the Federation. But there were more deputies—there were two persons each from some of the regions. Practically everyone was present when the appeal was being discussed. But the document was approved on the last day of work by which time, quite naturally, many had left, and only 18 persons remained. Eleven signed the appeal, seven did not for the reason that when they heard the name Chubays, they said that it was unnecessary to get into personalities.

[Sidorin] Did you sign it in your own name, or as a spokesman of your constituents?

[Kalayda] I am confident that this paper reflects the interests of my constituents in the Olenegorsk electoral district. But naturally I signed it not as the chairman of the commission, and what is more, not from the oblast Duma, but rather expressed my own opinion.

[Sidorin] The appeal notes that you support the demands of the public to denounce or stop the action of treaties with foreign states, including secret ones, that permit territorial concessions and encroachments on the interests of Russia and its citizens. Excuse my being ill-informed, but I do not know the demands of the public on this question. Explain what you had in mind.

[Kalayda] A number of political parties support the territorial borders that from time immemorial and historically have been Russian. This includes the redivision according to the Belovezha agreement, and the transfer of part of the land to China, which, in particular, causes considerable alarm to Far Easterners. The public in Maritime Kray is against the demarcation of the border.

My point of view is this: Today we return 1,500-2,000 hectares of land, Damanskiy Island, and next the problem will move to the Kuril Islands, and Kaliningrad Oblast, and so on.

[Sidorin] But what about the secret documents?

[Kalayda] How is demarcation conducted today? Why is there no clarity or publications on this subject. On what grounds is redivision being conducted? Why is the question of redivision of borders not discussed in the legislative organs? Why does the Russian-speaking population today remain abroad, outside the borders, moreover, on land that has been theirs since time immemorial? They have turned out to be foreigners on their own territory.

[Sidorin] Will it not happen that another group of deputies of the legislative organs, while in Moscow, will adopt a directly opposite document?

[Kalayda] If you judge by those deputies who were there, anxiety could be seen in each of the speakers. Starting with the economy and ending with questions of domestic and foreign policy.

Of course, specific groups will probably have different opinions. The representatives of Nizhniy Novgorod and one other oblast did not agree with the appeal.

[Sidorin] What do you think, if this question were discussed in the Oblast Duma, would such an appeal be approved?

[Kalayda] I think so. Perhaps with an insignificant preponderance of votes. Of course, I am getting ahead of events, but I am setting forth my own point of view.

[Sidorin] I want to explain why I am asking such questions. The fact is that we frequently hear sensible words regarding changes and the reorganization of the first, second, or the third thing. But we see that even the legislators cannot resolve anything for a number of reasons (incidentally, your appeal also talks about this), not to mention individual comments, indignation, etc.

It is probably necessary to shift all wishes to a legislative basis and resolve all questions the way they are resolved in a normal state. Such appeals (more or less strong) simply arouse the people, nothing more. Such documents do not enter the legislative channel. They only show what we are like, nothing more. In other words, many are able to excite the citizens, but they are unable, unfortunately, to resolve questions as they should be resolved. This is my point of view.

[Kalayda] This was practically the first meeting of rank and file deputies of the components of the Federation. What do we see on television and hear on the radio?—peace and quiet. By appealing to the president and the highest organs of authority, we want to sound an alarm in their brain—in the sense that it is not as quiet on the periphery as they believe. The policy they are conducting is absolutely unacceptable. We are not stirring up society, but are turning the attention of the legislative and executive organs to what is going on as a matter of fact, and we are trying to prevent serious social shocks, including civil war.

It is written in the last paragraph of the appeal: "We appeal to the deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council with a proposal to hold an all-Russian congress of deputies and organs of legislative authority of the Russian Federation in May-June, with discussion of the questions of consolidating Russian statehood and the strategy of economic reform.

[Sidorin] I hope that you will be consistent and, in particular, that you examine this appeal at a meeting of the oblast Duma.

[Kalayda] Basically this appeal has already been disseminated among our deputies and, as we were guaranteed, it will be brought to the attention of the deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council.

[Sidorin] Thank you for the interview.

Local Novosibirsk Firm Disappoints Investors

954F2001A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 7

[Interview with Yuriy Koropachinskiy, general director of the Zolotaya Dolina public joint-stock company, by Arkadiy Antonov, with a comment by Yuriy Zyabkin, director of the Novosibirsk branch of Zolotaya Dolina; place and date not given: "Place of Birth—'Zolotaya Dolina.' Siberians' Money Should Work in Siberia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **When the poor Russian hears about the billions flowing into foreign safes, he simply does not react. Because he is convinced that this is the way it should be. What businessman would invest capital in a serious business in a country where politicians are not**

worried about anything but their own ambitions. This is why the rank-and-file "market player," hoping at least to save his "personal" rubles from inflation, has invested them not in Sberbank, which is being robbed by its own government, but in "investment funds" and "excellent companies," with their generous promises.

And more deception. The investor on the street is all ready to go into battle, one hopes not a "bloody" one, but a "holy and righteous" one. And in the city suddenly there has appeared a firm that calls itself "Valley of Gold" ["Zolotaya Dolina"]. And it is putting tempting ideas in the heads of Siberians.

What is this "Valley"? And what kind of "Gold" lies deep within it?

The secrets of the "gold field" are shared by the general director of the public joint-stock company Zolotaya Dolina, Yuriy Koropachinskiy.

[Koropachinskiy] Our story is typical of the times of the beginning of privatization. Young VUZ [higher educational institution] graduates, not without ambitious plans, inspired by the freedom granted by perestroyka, we decided to organize our firm in Krasnoyarsk, placing our bets on production.

But entrepreneurship and business mean risk, and especially in Russia. And we wanted to faithfully defend our ideas, which require considerable amounts of money. Which, I think, we managed to do—the Zolotaya Dolina joint-stock company now includes an independent insurance company SibAstroVAZ, the Zolotaya Dolina production firm, and two banks—Yarbank and Stromkombank.

[Antonov] What were your ideas?

[Koropachinskiy] The main one, and it is not even an idea but a policy, and the point of our activity, is concentrated in the slogan: "Siberians' money should work in Siberia and for Siberians." I get along well with Moscow and Muscovites, but as a Siberian I do not think that it is a very good idea to have immense financial resources concentrated in the capital, and Moscow, like a pump, is sucking everything of any value out of the provinces. Is it any secret that branches of Moscow banks, with powerful support, are swallowing up their local cousins? And what an "appetite" they have for buying up shares in enterprises! And who turns out to be the owner? Who is in charge of the "parade"?

We have decided to counteract these tendencies for slipping away. We created the Zolotaya Dolina company, which now owns a network of stores, a meat processing production, and a winery, which produces seven types of various beverages based on medicinal herbs of Siberia. Zolotaya Dolina is the co-owner of the Irkutsk tea packaging factory, the only one beyond the Urals. We have a representative on its board of directors. We are now trying to arrange production properly here and are planning to modernize the factory on a contemporary basis.

Is there any need to explain that all these enterprises are highly profitable and are producing an appreciable profit? But, I repeat, we have extensive plans, and what is important to us now is the "process,"—I am not afraid of the big word—of building up Siberia. Thus, we are issuing shares in our ideas and inviting serious people, mainly patriots of their "small homeland," to cooperate.

[Antonov] It sounds tempting. But why should the "investors," after losing with all kinds of check investment funds and other "pyramids," believe you? Incidentally, where do Novosibirsk and its Zolotaya Dolina fit in here?

[Koropachinskiy] As for "belief in our firm"—this is a natural question but, for us, a simple one. Before answering it, I will ask a question. The loudly advertised check investment funds and similar companies—who specifically was behind them? Where and for what were they using the money of their "investors"? What kind of real estate was behind them? And so forth. If a Russian knows the answers to these questions, I do not worry about him—he has invested his money almost reliably, and he has a chance of saving his investment in the event that the "firm" goes bankrupt.

We have solid principles—no secrets from our stockholders. We do not send all of our capital to Swiss banks, we invest it in the business. Our projects are not a lottery, they are open. As the reader will have guessed, we have something to lose, and on our card we place our names which, we hope, are known to our numerous partners. We do not intend to move from Siberia even to the Canary Islands.

About "expansion of Novosibirsk." This could not happen. We are tied here by many things. And it would be strange if such a city, with its colossal potential, did not attract business people. We have long been cooperating with scholars of Akademgorodok. And one of our branches is operating there, in Akademgorodok. But the director can do a better job of telling you about it.

Yuriy Zyabkin, director of the Novosibirsk branch of Zolotaya Dolina:

Our branch has a technological laboratory, where we have gathered, I think, some of the best specialists in Novosibirsk, who are working on the creation of original recipes for drinks and new kinds of products. As usual, we provide raw material for the Zolotaya Dolina company. In conjunction with scholars of the Central Siberian Botanical Garden of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, we have developed technology for producing "Siberian tea," which has a number of unique qualities. Incidentally, at the beginning of March we participated in the Leipzig trade fair, "Innovative Forum '95," where we exhibited our tea, which evoked a great deal of interest not only from the "rank-and-file" visitors, but also from entrepreneurs of Germany.

We have large problems to solve at this stage. They include the issuance and distribution of securities, work with stockholders, attraction of investments, modernization of existing equipment in our productions, and the construction of profitable new enterprises. That is, we must realize our motto more actively. The money of the people of Novosibirsk, our stockholders, must and will work specifically in Novosibirsk. It will not go to Krasnoyarsk, and certainly not to Moscow or Zurich. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk Zolotaya Dolina is covering significant costs for the creation of our infrastructure and the implementation of our plans. At first there are three of these plans.

Obviously, there is no special need to prove that our packaging of perhaps any domestic commodity, even those that are quite capable of competing in terms of their consumer parameters, is hopelessly behind the imports. Effective, bright, multi-colored and, as a rule, very convenient for transportation—alas, it seems we were a long way from such "heights." We were. Now we are not. A number of problems related to the creation in Novosibirsk of a modern printing enterprise for manufacturing super packaging have been solved. The market for such goods is practically endless.

Our second plan is to organize packing production. A question of taste: Which of the generally known teas is the best? The answer, obviously, is Indian. This is only partially true. The very best tea is still English or German. Rather, it is packaged and processed for the tea lover with various useful supplements in these countries where there are long-standing traditions and an art of this precise and complicated production.

What naturally follows is a "merging" of the first two ideas—the construction of a packaging plant in Novosibirsk, for which we have studied many commercial proposals from world leaders in this area.

I will answer a potential question right away: Has everything been well studied with respect to the profitability and feasibility of such intentions—everyone has his own idea about good tea, including in England itself.... I will answer: We are oriented toward the production, I emphasize, of a domestic product; we are creating new jobs, and we hope that the economic policy of our statesmen sooner or later will be directed toward these same ends. And do not forget, "transportation costs can eat up profit." We are bringing in an expensive raw material directly from the countries that produce it and we will sell the prepared products locally. And, naturally, we will produce our "Siberian tea." Obviously, the "overhead" costs will be lower and, consequently, the price of the "commodity" will be, too.

And, finally, in order to make it easier to achieve the designated strategic tasks, we are devoting extremely serious attention to "tactics"—trade and commerce. This is an eternal thing; we must not be unprofitable. Following the example of our Krasnoyarsk "center," we are planning to create our own trading house and a network of stores where the capital of our stockholders will not only work in trade turnover, but will also produce certain discounts for the stockholders themselves.

For them, our stockholders, Lomonosov's famous statement, "Russian power will grow with Siberia" will have a special, completely concrete and palpable result. This is their "Zolotaya Dolina."

From the editors The plans and also the actual work of the Zolotaya Dolina company are very promising. VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK will try to inform our readers of how the plans of Siberian entrepreneurs are being implemented in the future.

V. Likhachev Elected Head of Tatarstan Parliament

MK3103071095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 1

[POSTFACTUM report in the "In Brief" column: "Likhachev Elected Speaker"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vasiliy Likhachev, Tatarstan vice president, was elected chairman of the republic's State Council (parliament) yesterday [30 March]. Out of 120 votes in the secret ballot at the State Council session, there were 99 votes for his candidature and 21 against.

Tatarstan, Kazan Council Sessions Detailed

954F1993A Kazan KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 1 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by unidentified KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI correspondent: "Two Sessions in Detail; What Was Said"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **In yesterday's issue we briefly talked about the first sessions of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Kazan City Council of People's Deputies. Today we can report some details.**

First of all, I do not think it will be uninteresting for readers to learn about the elected deputies. The chairmen of the electoral commissions—Central and city—provided exhaustive information on this score. Four hundred and sixty-seven persons contended for 130 deputy seats in the city council of people's deputies, including 151 according to administrative-territorial okrugs and 316 according to territorial okrugs. Public organizations nominated candidates for the first time. On the whole, the breakdown of aspirants to office was as follows: Thirty candidates came from trade unions, 51—from the Communist Party of Tatarstan, 24 from the Unity and Progress Party, 44 from the Equality of Rights and Legality electoral block, 27 from the Ittifak

Party, 23 from the Republican Party of Tatarstan, and 20 from the Protection of Motherhood and Children Fund.

In the first round of voting on 5 March, 69 deputies were elected, and of these, 49 according to administrative-territorial okrugs, and 20 according to territorial okrugs. Revoting was conducted in 55 districts. Thus, a total of 124 deputies were registered. Of these, 91 were Tatars, 31 were Russians, and two were of other nationalities; 119 were men and five were women. In the main, the deputies are over 50 years of age. Practically all of them have a higher education, 43—technical, 81—pertaining to the humanities. Forty-four persons were deputies of the Supreme Council of the last convocation, and 80 received a deputy seat for the first time.

The following social strata are represented in the State Council: seventeen directors of industrial and agricultural enterprises, joint-stock associations, and building and transport organizations, eight journalists and writers (we will note in parentheses that in the first round many Kazan journalists withdrew. The campaign was continued by two KAZANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI journalists—I. Kotov and V. Kurnosov—and both were defeated), five envoys of the law enforcement organs, three teachers, three representatives of science and culture, seven doctors, 70 council and administration workers, and six entrepreneurs. There were only two workers, and one is a veteran of labor.

In the Kazan City Council of People's Deputies, 199 candidates vied for 21 deputy seats. Every fourth person was nominated at a meeting of the voters at the place of residence, every third—by a public organization, and every second—by a labor collective. The most successful was the campaign for the seat of those who were nominated by labor collectives.

There is only one rank and file person in the city council—V. Fayzullin, a teacher in School No. 91—all the rest are directors at various levels; moreover, two are deputies of the chiefs of rayon administrations.

The chairmen of the electoral commissions talked about the fact that after the elections there were complaints from candidates for deputy and their proxies and from observers from public organizations. As A. Zhadobov reported, all the complaints were checked and no violations of the law that brought into question the results of the voting were established. M. Sirayev talked about this in more detail. He said that 150 complaints from 27 okrugs were submitted to the Central Electoral Commission, and measures have already been taken with respect to some of them. For example, one chairman of an okrug commission and one member of another commission who displayed their political sympathies were dismissed from work on the commissions. The complaints in general boil down to cases of a different reading of Russian and Tatarstan laws and bribery of voters, and in 50 okrugs the results of the voting were not publicized. As was noted by the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, this was not provided for in the law on elections of people's deputies of Tatarstan. As could be expected, work on verification of the complaints has not been completed yet.

The general conclusion of the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission is that people showed through their activeness that they support the policy being conducted by the leadership of the republic, but the results of the voting show a certain alignment of forces. It is difficult not to agree with this conclusion. We observed that there was a real fight for people's votes. It is regrettable that at times this was simple bribery. Many are convinced that cases of falsification of the results of the voting also occurred. The authors of articles in the Moscow press, in particular the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, assert this with a great deal of confidence. Evidently it would not be a bad idea in this regard to familiarize voters with the work that has been conducted on verification of complaints. Were there no facts, or were they simply not established? In each specific case the answer should be unambiguous. This is not the kind of information that has to be concealed from voters. If, of course, we want the next elections to be held. K. Iskhakov, chairman of the Kazan Council, is right. He noted that this is perhaps the last vote of confidence in the people in authority.

Now some details about the first sessions.

We noted practically everything about the session of the city council.

It must be noted that this time it was prepared impeccably. The necessary documents were submitted not only to the deputies, but also to guests. Among the business papers was a long list of the decisions of the 20 sessions of the city council of the 21st convocation.

Present at the session were G. Zertsalov, the first chairman of the city council of the 21st convocation, and V. Leontyev, deputy chairman, and also the chiefs of the rayon administrations (some of them have already become chairmen of rayon councils), deputy chiefs of the city administration, and other city-level officials. For some reason the republic level was not represented.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that there was a festive atmosphere in the meeting hall this time .

K. Iskhakov mentioned in his speech that the deputies of the last convocation had made a decision concerning unification of the city and rayon councils. For this to happen, appropriate proposals were prepared for the Supreme Council. The city council will now review them. It is not ruled out that the rayon councils will return to this decision. Some of the now former deputies predicted that they will possibly not want to unite. In any case, the headline to a report on a session of the city council which was prepared by the municipal agency EKO-inform—"The Councils of Kazan Should Unite?"—is indicative. Look at the question mark at the end of the sentence.

In K. Iskhakov's speech, the fact of unification of the councils was not called into question.

We have mentioned three leaders of the city council. We will add that N. Abdrashintova was elected the secretary of the council. Besides V. Likhachev, the city council was joined by: R. Kharisov, Z. Valeyeva, S. Kirilov, M. Akhmetov, A. Galiakhmetov, B. Zakharov, G. Kobelev, Kh. Nizamov, A. Semin, M. Sabirov, and R. Vagizov.

The council adopted a decree on the formation of permanent deputy commissions and on the question of the Parliamentary Control Committee of the city council (S. Kirilov was elected its chairman). A law was passed on making changes to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan concerning the deputies of territorial okrugs.

Deputies from these okrugs were supposed to hand in resignation statements. After arriving at the first plenary session, they found out that it was possible for them not to leave their work. It was proposed to the deputies that they return to the previous arrangement.

During a discussion it turned out that not all of them want to do this. But the facts that were reported convinced many of them. Maintenance of each parliamentarian who works on a professional basis would cost the republic's treasury almost 40 million rubles per month. The pay of an elected representative would not be that high—a total of R378,000. The rest of the resources would go to pay for equipment and various expenditures. Just four deputies would use up as much money in a year as would be enough for a small hospital for the same length of time.

Discussion of this subject was halted by a comment by President M. Shaymiyev, who proposed a compromise. There will be professionals, but apparently few of them, and the rest, as a rule, will work in the city council while holding more than one position.

The deputies passed a law concerning implementation of the designation of parliament in legislative acts of the republic in consonance with the Constitution; that is, the words "Supreme Council" will be replaced everywhere by the phrase "State Council." A decree was also passed on the apparatus of the State Council.

M. Shaymiyev, the president of the republic, who presented an important report at the conclusion of the session, took part in the work of the session. We will familiarize you with its main provisions in Tuesday's issue.

The session examined all its questions in one day.

Many predicted that the membership of the city council would be homogeneous, and that no one would abstain during voting. Life is always full of surprises. There were deputies who voted against, there were speeches at the microphone, and they did not immediately agree with all the proposals of the session. But on the whole this was different from what used to happen at sessions of the Supreme Council. It is possible that it will be this way only at the first plenary session...

Tatarstan Opposition To Create Shadow Parliament

LD0404195295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1853 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kazan April 4 (INTERFAX)—A total of 17 opposition parties and movements of Tatarstan decided Tuesday to create a shadow parliament in the republic, Communist Party of Tatarstan First Secretary Aleksandr Saliy told INTERFAX.

The shadow parliament will include parties and movements defeated at the March elections to the republic's State Council (parliament) and is expected to make parallel decisions on all issues discussed by the State Council.

Tatarstan Economy Needs Policy Rethink

MM0404092595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Viktor Minin: "Tatarstan's Experience of Economic Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are still arguing about how to get Russia "up and running." We try on the Chilean, the Chinese, and the American "kaftan" and are ready to use any experience—provided it is not our own. Then we watch it split at the seams. We do not want to see that some regions of Russia have positive experience of reform. Tatarstan has probably accumulated more experience than most.

The period when M. Shaymiyev came to power in Tatarstan was very complex. The extreme separatist and nationalist movements were growing stronger, relations with Moscow were strained, and the political and economic situation was unstable. Shaymiyev's achievement is that he has managed to overcome all these difficult contradictions and channel their energy into something constructive, having first created a real economic basis for this. That is why Tatarstan's obvious political and economic successes are now quite rightly linked to the name of its leader: President Shaymiyev.

He has managed to deal with the threat of separatism and nationalism and smoothly channel this destructive energy into the peaceful direction of struggling to broaden the republic's economic independence. The result of this struggle has been an agreement with Moscow and the right to dispose of Tatarstan's resources with relative independence.

Shaymiyev's economic policy has also proved to be successful. Now he can independently dispose of Tatarstan's oil resources, he has used a large proportion of the revenue from the sale of oil to support agricultural producers and specific social progams. There are mixed views on his decision not to dismantle, but to artificially maintain the old system of agricultural distribution and subsidy. However, a fact is a fact. Precisely this has allowed the population of Tatarstan to weather the storms of the first stage of the all-Russian economic reforms far more painlessly than other regions of Russia and preserve political stability. We can confidently say that any other version of distributing resources in this period would not have produced such a positive effect. Artificially supporting industry to the detriment of agriculture and social policy would have caused the collapse of agricultural production and held back the processes of privatizing and restructuring industry, which could have led to a general collapse of the republic's entire economy and serious political unrest.

Now, however, the possibilities of Shaymiyev's economic policy have been totally exhausted. The dramatic rise in domestic oil prices has greatly reduced the subsidy potential of the republic's budget. Extreme overwork and the need to divert such essential investments are exhausting the possibilities of Tatarstan's petroleum refining complex. Now oil workers themselves need investments to develop and maintain their efficiency. Having made such a substantial contribution to Tatarstan's success, they now need real, effective help. First and foremost, this should be help in setting up competitive, legal forms of organization (holdings, corporations, and financial-industrial groups), whose property is protected. Likewise, long-term projects to develop the petroleum complex should be adopted.

In industry, the first stage of selling shares and implementing privatization has come to an end; investments are now a vital necessity for restructuring and maintaining competitiveness. Without state support, entire promising sectors will be lost.

In agriculture, the preconditions have been formed for reorganizing large agricultural units and gradually reducing the proportion of centralized subsidies.

Consequently, in view of the current economic realities, the president of Tatarstan will be forced to shift the focus of his economic policy in the next period of his presidency. He will have to support the petroleum complex and industry and simultaneously begin the gradual reorganization of agriculture. There is no alternative, because otherwise Tatarstan and its leader will lose everything they have worked so hard to achieve.

M. Shaymiyev's recent statements show that he clearly understands these tasks and is seeking specific ways to implement his future policy.

The need to change the course of reform could prompt opposition to Shaymiyev in the forthcoming presidential elections. Organized opposition is mainly possible from the narrow group of conservative members of the nomenklatura in agriculture, who are used to having a free hand in the allocation of "free oil money" and are reluctant to give up this privilege. They could be supported by extreme nationalists, who suffered a crushing defeat in the recent elections to the republic's State Council.

The elaboration of a new economic program of reform begun last spring on the president's initiative is the economic strategy which the president needs in the future. However, there is now a real danger that this program, drawn up under the direct leadership of First Vice Premier Muratov, could become the arena of a political power struggle. Particularly important in this respect is the role played by newly appointed Premier Mukhametshin, one of the most brilliant and capable leaders in Shaymiyev's entourage. It is on him that internal stability, the efficiency of Shaymiyev's team, and therefore the future of the president himself most depend. The premier must not forget that the main burden of the first stage of reform has been borne by Tatarstan's oil workers; now, since the abolition of the institution of special exporters, without realizing it, they have perhaps become one of the most main political forces in the republic. So a very great deal also depends on their support.

N. Ossetian President Seeks Caucasian Leaders' Meeting

LD0404105595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1024 GMT 4 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladikavkaz April 4 TASS—North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov today went on record for a meeting of all the leaders of the Caucasus. He moved to hold it in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia [punctuation as received]

"I believe the Caucasus should not be divided. This region has always been regarded as a single economic, political and cultural entity," Galazov said on the North Ossetian television. It is necessary to restore everything that was created in the course of centuries. All the peoples will stand to gain from this," he stressed.

The North Ossetian president said that the meeting of the leaders of the Caucasian region, which could also be attended by President Boris Yeltsin, should discuss problems linked with the situation in the Caucasus and cooperation in the social and economic spheres. "But the most important question, which the meeting must discuss, is that of inter-ethnic relations in the region," Galazov noted. "The problems, now confronting the Caucasus, can be resolved only through the united wisdom and will of all the politicians," he added.

The North Ossetian president believes that the problem of recarving the Caucasian borders should not be raised at all, because territorial claims may trigger a new tragedy in the southern part of Russia.

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Dudayev Denies Russian Army Successes

MK0704060295 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Natalya Pachegina under the "Chechen Republic" rubric: "Dudayev Has Finally Specified His

War Strategy. He Advises Against Trusting Statements Made by Russian Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Surprisingly, the military successes of the Russian Army in Chechnya over the past few days have been completely denied by President Dudayev's press service. According to the Chechen side, Gudermes and Shali—which have been taken by the Russian Army with minimal losses—are now in fact a vast battlefield, and, as a CHECHEN-PRESS representative said in Moscow, "it is yet uncertain who will have the last word." The Russian Army made eight unsuccessful attacks of Gudermes, where it was mostly interested in the railway station and depot. As for the Shali sector, there were ten attacks; therefore, Chechens say that operations "to liquidate the Chechen National Guard's last deployment areas" could not have been inexpensive for Russia, and figures on personnel and equipment losses, in their opinion, need to be adjusted. According to information from the areas of Gudermes and Shali—where the Chechen president, his inner circle, and the chief defense staff command are located—the Russian troops are seven to nine kilometers from these cities. Judging by the movements of the Russian troops on Chechen territory, their enemies are well aware that the army's main targets army are the tank testing range and the former tank training regiment with its logistic facilities near the village of Agishta, and the former Soviet air defense base in the Bamuta area, which is, according to the Chechens, in working condition even today.

An official representative of Groznyy in Moscow informed NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev has deciphered the "evil plan of the Russian army," aimed, as he understands it, at splitting Chechnya into northern and southern parts. In connection with this practical task, the president determined the strategy for his army—to prevent the creation of a single front line by the Russian troops. Therefore, General Dudayev believes, the tactically correct decision would be to retain control over Gudermes and Shali. The president intends to continue fighting along the Argun-Dzhalka-Mesker-Yurt line and the Kurchaloy-Bachi-Yurt-Avtury line, and in the Atagi-Belgatoy-Goyty "triangle." These tactical moves, in the Chechen Chief Defense Staff's opinion, would prevent the implementation of the "vicious" plans of the Russian command.

In the opinion of Dudayev's supporters, "Moscow's plan" will also fail because information, coming to the positions of Chechen defenders from the sites, where the Russian Army, Internal Affairs Ministry, and Internal Troops units have already been stationed, is producing a very definite effect.... According to the CHECHEN-PRESS Moscow office, there is an orgy of looting in Chechen-aul, which has been taken by the Russian troops: Cattle is being driven away from the villages, furniture and utensils are being stolen from houses, and even more terrible things are happening. When asked by the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent where a soldier could hide a stolen carpet, mirror, or armchair, Chechens noted that Russian officers prefer to lead an operation with maximal personal comfort—often sitting in an armchair and enjoying the home-like warmth of an expensive carpet. Equally, Chechens from Dudayev's trenches do not believe that some Ryazan boy could bring to the war his own double-decker cassette recorder.

According to the Chechen Chief Defense Staff's intelligence service, the Russian Army command in Chechnya is actively searching for ways to persuade Russian President Yeltsin to approve the use of assault aircraft and helicopters, since otherwise the servicemen will be unable to fulfill their tasks within the time limits set by the plan.

Pain Says 'Guerrilla Warfare' Likely To Develop

MM0604100295 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Emil Pain, leader of the interethnic relations and conflict forecasting unit in the Russian Federation President's Analysis Center and member of the Presidential Council: "Whom Will Chechnya's Population Follow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even before the capture of Argun, Shali, and Gudermes, I sensed during my March trip to Chechnya that the population was becoming increasingly convinced of the inevitability of military defeat for Dzhokhar Dudayev. Recent events have only strengthened people in this opinion.

Dudayev was never a universal national hero, and this impression is profoundly mistaken. He was a military leader, and so his defeat as a military leader makes this figure one of little political moment. However, today it is still too early to say that he has totally lost his political credibility.

A considerable proportion of people still support him, but so far as the majority is concerned he is not a universal favorite and national hero. That is self-evident.

With every passing day it is increasingly clear that the main problem and chief question is whether people will become involved in the political and economic process of restoring normal life in Chechnya and how active this process will be. Will they choose to cooperate with the Russian authorities and with representatives of the Chechen Government? That is becoming the key question. It is more topical now than it was in March.

A great deal in the development of future events in Chechnya will depend on how vigorous the actions of the so-called third force are. I am referring to the politically active strata of the population that took part in neither the civil war nor the hostilities since December 1994. It is only with them that waverers will be able to find a common language.

If such people emerge and display a degree of activeness, if they are not impeded but, on the contrary, only helped, it will be possible to consider that a normal process of restoring Chechnya's life and economy has begun. Moreover, the likelihood of a continuation of hostilities by Dudayev will also depend on this. This will be determined not so much by the possibility of obtaining weapons, not so much by the possibility of the appearance of the many geographically well located bases to which Dudayev's men are probably already intending to move, as by the population's support. If this support is lacking, there will be no protracted war in Chechnya.

However, a form of guerrilla warfare [abrechestvo], that is, actions by small armed groups of a terrorist nature, will be established for many years to come. Guerrilla warfare is a traditional historical form of political protest and resistance very characteristic of the Caucasus, including Chechnya. But many countries have been living for decades with guerrilla warfare, and this is not a factor that radically changes their political course.

Nevertheless, the main question is: Whom will Chechnya's population follow? Because political fatigue or recognition that military defeat for Dudayev is inevitable still by no means signify that people will support the present authorities.

Khadzhiyev Promises Amnesty for Voluntary Surrender

LD0604145895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1253 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy April 6 TASS—Salambek Khadzhiyev, head of the national revival government of Chechnya, promises not to institute criminal proceedings against members of illegal armed groups, if they voluntarily lay down arms. In an interview, broadcast today by Groznyy TV, he said that guaranteed amnesty to everyone, who stops fighting and lays down arms.

However, in the current situation one can hardly expect a massive response to the appeal. First, there are very few people who can see TV programmes in Chechnya today, where electricity supply has been disrupted. Second, many Chechen fighters bought submachineguns some time ago on the money they got from selling their last cow. Naturally, they are in no hurry to hand them in.

"Weapons should be bought out from those people," Lecha Magomadov, another Chechen leader and deputy chairman of the national accord committee of Chechnya, believes. He told ITAR-TASS that only the weapons, given free by the previous Chechen authorities of the opposition, should be handed in unconditionally.

In his opinion, only a reasonable and differentiated approach to the problem may speed up its solution.

Achkoy-Martan Recognizes Committee of National Revival

LD0604155395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1259 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy April 6 TASS—Residents of a big town in western Chechnya, Achkhoy-Martan, decided to recognise on their territory the authority of the Committee of National Revival, the Moscow-backed government of the republic.

TASS learned from sources in Groznyy Thursday that a multi-thousand rally of Achkhoy-Martan residents decided to order Chechen militants out of the town and agreed that order would be ensured by local administration bodies.

They also called on the Russian military command to stop artillery shelling and air raids.

Stepashin: Dudayev's Army 'Has Ceased To Exist'

LD0604135795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1336 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, April 6 TASS—Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] counter-espionage agency, said on Thursday that active combat actions are over in Chechnya and "(Dzhokhar) Dudayev's army has ceased to exist as such".

Stepashin told reporters that before the end of April, "peace would be installed" in western Chechnya, which is still under rebels' control.

The FSK chief confirmed that groups of separatists, ousted from Gudermes and Shali, concentrated on the Dagestani border "trying to resist federal troops".

Ingushetia Has Nearly 139,000 Chechen Refugees

LD0604214495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1808 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran, April 6 (INTERFAX)—The territorial migration service in Ingushetia has registered a total of 138,900 refugees from Chechnya. Accommodating them is a very difficult problem, and many people are living with relatives and friends.

The Ingush government told Interfax Thursday that it planned to build 29 barracks in different parts of the republic to accommodate the refugees by April 25. When they return to their permanent locations, the facilities will be used for local needs.

A mission of the U.N. high commissioner for refugees opened in Nazran in late March to build six refugee camps.

Ingush Deputy Prime Minister Magomed Uzhakhov said feeding the refugees remained a critical issue. To feed refugees from Chechnya and over 60,000 Ingush deported from North Ossetia in late 1992, a total of 40 tonnes of food is needed daily.

The Emergency Situations Ministry and the Federal Migration Service together can cover only one third of the demand. Another quarter is supplied by international charity funds and Russia's regions.

Avturkhanov: Ministries 'Dodge' Chechnya Problems

LD0604214195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1914 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, April 6 TASS—Umar Avturkhanov, chairman of the Chechen committee for national accord (Moscow-backed government operating in regions liberated from separatists), blamed federal ministries for dodging problems of local economy restoration.

"With the exception of Ministries of Health, Emergency Situations, Communications, Interior and Agriculture, all the rest practically dodge the Chechen problems by the talking", Avturkhanov told TASS on thursday.

The premier is deeply concerned over the sanitary situation in Groznyy. He fears that summer might bring epidemics to the Chechen capital with its ruined municipal services and deprived of drinking water.

"The number of deaths during the fighting might seam meagre in comparison with a death toll which could be caused by epidemics", Avturkhanov said adding that he would emphasize Groznyy's problems at the visiting session of the state commission on Chechnya's restoration, scheduled for Friday here.

Chechnya Peace Talks May Be Held in St. Petersburg

LD0604201495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1940 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It is possible that talks on a peaceful settlement in Chechnya will be held in St. Petersburg. Our correspondent, alluding to official sources, reported on a telephone conversation between Boris Yeltsin and Anatoliy Sobchak, the mayor of the northern capital. Judging by information on hand, the president agreed to hold a meeting in St. Petersburg. However, the question of the subject of the talks and who will take part in them has not yet been decided.

Dudayev Replaces Chechen Security Department

LD0704102395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0853 GMT 7 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Chaikova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 7 TASS—A special department within Dudayev's defence ministry has been assigned to the task of identification and extermination of Russian security officers active in Chechnya, and Chechens collaborating with federal authorities.

ITAR-TASS was told so today by a Moscow-based representative of CHECHEN-PRESS news agency who quoted the tip from Movladi Udugov, director of the Chechen information department.

The source said the special department had been set up instead of the Chechen security department, now wound up.

The special department is headed by Sultan Geliskhanov, previously director of Chechnya's security service.

Moscow-assigned reporters of the CHECHEN-PRESS news agency maintain regular contacts with Dudayev's entourage.

Former Chechnya State Security Chief Dies of Wounds

LD0704154095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1236 GMT 7 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 7 Apr—One of Dudayev's closest comrades-in-arms, Sultan Geliskhanov, former chief of Chechnya's State Security Department, was gravely wounded several days ago, and later died.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this from reliable sources. Geliskhanov personally took part in execution by firing squad of more than 20 Chechnya inhabitants—Russians, Chechens and members of other ethnic groups.

Russian Attacks on Western Chechnya 'Intensified'

LD0704161395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1259 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAZRAN, April 7 (Interfax)—The meeting between the commander of the federal troops contingent in Chechnya, Colonel-general Anatoliy Kulikov and Chechen prosecutor General Usman Imayev, reportedly was planned for this week, has not taken place. The statement was made for Interfax by the Chechen parliament deputy, Mate Tsikheshvili, who is currently in Nazran.

He believes Imayev is staying in the Urus-Martan District of Chechnya.

Tsikheshvili said that at 4 o'clock in the morning on Friday "Russian jets intensified their bombing of settlements in western Chechnya, including Samashki. The railway station and Achkhoy-Martan were particularly heavily bombed."

The Chechen side claims that nine Russian helicopters and three assault planes took part in the raid.

The Chechen military believe that strikes on Samashki are aimed at pushing back Dudayev formations from the border with Ingushetia to exclude the likelihood of their penetration into Ingush territory.

Dudayev Threatens Terrorism Against Russians, Elders

LD0704164295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1605 GMT 7 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Chaykova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 7 Apr (TASS)—A sitting of [Dzhokhar] Dudayev's defense council was held during at night on 6 April in the village of Beni-Kotar, several kilometers south-east of Shali. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this from sources in Moscow that maintain constant links with Dudayev's entourage.

According to this report, the participants in the conference included Dudayev, his chief of staff [Aslan] Maskhadov and a number of field commanders. Dudayev declared the beginning of "a new stage in the war in Chechnya, which will involve mass terror actions against Russian soldiers and officers."

Chechen sources also say that Dudayev called for "using force" to make local population help the armed militants and for "neutralizing disobedient old men".

Dudayev's Forces Shoot at Group of Elders

LD0704164895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1608 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 7 (INTERFAX)—On Friday Dudayev fighters shot at a group of Elders, who were in the role of parliamentarians, from the village of Samashki (Chechnya's west near the border with Ingushetia), well-informed Russian military sources reported to Interfax.

According to preliminary information, the tragedy occurred about 14:00 Moscow time [1000 GMT] when, after successful talks with representatives of the federation forces concerning ways to stop bloodshed, a group of Elders approached the fighters as parliamentarians. The precise number of casualties is still unknown.

According to an Interfax source, those Elders who survived addressed the leadership of the federal forces with a request to render assistance in evacuating the civil population from Samashki.

Economic Issues

Budget Offers 'Real Chance' of Upturn

MM0704114995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1

[Commentary by Vyacheslav Goncharov: "Time To Collect Money. The 1995 Budget Is the First Stage in Recovery from the Crisis. The Remedy for the Economy Is Tough Financial Discipline"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1995 draft State Budget adopted by the State Duma and published in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA today has at last acquired the status of Russia's fundamental financial law. We can now use it not just to correlate our revenue and expenditure for the whole year but also to build our plans for the future. After all, the 1995 budget is the cement in the foundation of the government's medium-term program of economic stabilization and the start of the upturn in production for 1995-1997. The essential question has been posed directly: Either we adapt our whole lives to this tough and in many respects uncomfortable financial plan and start to set things right, as it were, or else we undermine the economy once and for all, with all the consequences that will ensue. Deputies chose the former course. The budget has been adopted, albeit a whole quarter late.

Yet initially it seemed that it would be rejected outright. I recall the fierce attacks mounted on the government in the State Duma at the very beginning of the discussion of the draft. All sorts of accusations were leveled at it! Accusations of an ignorance of Russians' sufferings. Of a dangerous lack of realism. And of betrayal of the nation's interests. There were comments even harsher than that.

But common sense prevailed over factional ambitions. A coordinating commission was set up. And painstaking work on the draft itself got underway. There was lobbying, of course. There was a battle for literally every ruble. But there was also a businesslike debate. On the essence of the problems under discussion. Many of the deputies' amendments were included in the budget. Amendments were also made to some of Russia's economic and social development indicators. The inflation ceiling was changed too. The plan indicators for GDP and for the reduction in industrial and agricultural production were made more realistic.

The main aim now is to achieve macroeconmomic stabilization. But that will not begin until everyone begins playing according to firm and clear rules and begins living, working, making a profit, and paying taxes according to written laws which regulate the balance of interests. In this sense the budget which has been adopted is largely innovative and represents a turning point in our entire budget policy.

First and foremost it is based on a rigorous tax system. In this regard, as was said at the recent enlarged government session in the Kremlin, the time really has come for the Finance Ministry to deal with its direct duty—not to squander money in the form of various tax deferrals and benefits and customs exemptions and concessions but to collect money instead. A standard minimum import duty will be introduced and all import duties will be reviewed on that basis. The aim is to increase privatization revenue. Liability will also be stepped up even to the point of legal penalties for tax evasion, with the application of tax arrears to the property of corporate entities. Incidentally, in June the government is going to submit for the Federal Assembly's examination a new Tax Code which will reinforce the taxation system's legislative base. At the same time, the direct tax pressure on enterprises will be eased.

The system of monitoring of and accountability for the expenditure of budget resources is also being tightened up. The relevant appropriations will now reach specific recipients exclusively via the federal treasury system, which should prevent their non-targeted use. At the same time many subsidies to enterprises are being abolished and state support to them will be provided only in the form of investments for effective projects with rapid cost recovery.

The government has also switched to a new system of financing the budget deficit, which remains very considerable this year too. The use of Central Bank credits to cover the budget deficit is being stopped. The main method is to be a reliance on state securities which, together with shares in privatized enterprises, are to be the driving force of the stock market. A significant move has been made toward budget federalism which, it is expected, will eliminate many of the conflicts between the federal government and the regions. All these changes to the budget system are aimed at curbing inflation before this year is out and stabilizing the economy.

If the budget is implemented strictly according to plan Russia will indeed have a real chance to leave the dangerous crisis zone behind and begin the ascent toward prosperity. Fingers crossed, as they say! After all, there are parliamentary elections in the offing, and many of the present deputies will try to inflame the social atmosphere for purely populist purposes and seek to extract additional government resources for all kinds of "most urgent" aims.

Stand firm. Do not yield to temptation. Then things will start to get easier.

Results of Privatization Efforts Hit

MM0704080595 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Bykovskiy under "From Tuesday to Tuesday: View of Events" rubric: "Privateers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At last week's session the Russian Government adopted a monetary privatization program as a basis. In this context I recalled the almost daily television appearances of A. Chubays in 1992. Then, as I recall, the country's chief "privatizer" predicted that every voucher owner could eventually become the owner of a "Volga" [car], and not only of that. Three years have passed since then. But in Russia today you would probably not find in a month of Sundays a person who could make Chubays' promises come true.

Of course, in numerical terms the results of check privatization, which ended 30 June 1994, look entirely favorable. Thus, according to official data over 30 percent of the population have become owners of shares in privatized enterprises and investment check funds. The following figure is also indisputably impressive: Over one-half of gross national product has started to be produced in the nonstate sector. It would probably be possible to agree with the claims of privatization's initiators of its complete and obvious success, if the Russian economy's current catastrophic situation were ignored.

Judge for yourselves. During 1994 Russia's gross domestic product decreased 15 percent and industrial production decreased 21 percent, while the number of people unemployed increased 29 percent. The criminalization of the economy and Western firms' inroads into Russian natural resources are taking place at an accelerated rate. According to specialists' estimates, up to 50-60 percent of Russian capital and 80-85 percent of shares with voting rights are in the hands of criminal and foreign structures.

Of course, it cannot be said that privatization is to blame for the country's current catastrophic situation. Ultimately all this is a result of the so-called reforms being carried out by the current authorities. But there is no doubt that the redivision of ownership has adversely affected the socioeconomic face of Russia. After all, privatization was conceived primarily as a political act which was supposed to delude Russians into thinking that they are involved in ownership. Therefore economic expediency was by no means a crucial factor when all sorts of flotation programs were being carried out.

So we have arrived at a situation whereby privatized enterprises make up 47 percent of the total number of state and private enterprises, and there is still no end in sight to the current economic crisis. Just as, in general, there is no sign of any particular material advantages which former voucher owners should apparently have enjoyed. On the contrary there are innumerable examples whereby the most inveterate swindlers, to whom many Russians, to their misfortune, entrusted their ill-fated vouchers, have masqueraded as entirely reputable joint-stock companies.

But life shows that the authorities still believe in the miraculous power of privatization. Since 1 July 1994 their main hopes have been pinned on the sale of formerly universally owned facilities at prices determined by the market. This year's state budget even envisages income of 9.1 trillion rubles [R] which the government intends to receive from privatization. That is, the state's financial position is so bad that, if the current privatization program is not implemented, this could jeopardize the implementation of the state budget for this year.

I do not want to appear in readers' eyes as some sort of reactionary speaking out against any innovations in the economic sphere. Moreover, I believe that in many cases the destatization of ownership is indeed necessary. But I protest strongly against a situation whereby a considerable proportion of state ownership is being usurped by financial giants on the pretext of talking about the need to inculcate in the Russian citizen the feeling of being a master. Incidentally, last week they offered the government the same lacking R9.1 trillion in exchange for the transfer to their control of a state block of shares in a number of nationally important and potentially costly enterprises for five years. I would like to hope that this deal will not go ahead, because even now it is clear that the state will not be in a position to settle its debts in one year or even in five.

It is no accident that a movement demanding an end to the process of the state's destruction is growing in Russia. Thus, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia [FITUR] has decided to support the initiative of defense sector trade unions to hold a Russian National Day of Collective Action 12 April, when they will again demand in tougher terms that the authorities turn the helm of the state ship toward common sense.

Defense industry workers intend to make 12 April the funeral day of space rocket technology. So Russians will have the bitter opportunity to compare it with memories of the truly universal rejoicing when on 12 April 1961 the unforgettable Yu. Gagarin paved the way to space for mankind.

Therefore, in my view every support should be given to FITUR's appeal to the Agrarian Party of Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Social Democratic Alliance, and other political parties and public movements of a left-wing or centrist orientation suggesting that immediate consultations on joint participation in elections be begun. I deeply believe that if this preelection bloc is formed, in future elections it would be able to obtain a mandate of trust from the millions of Russians deceived by the false promises of the pathetic privatizers.

Official Says Income Differentiation Becomes More Marked

LD0604155995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1252 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Liliya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—Income differentiation becomes more marked in Russia, Vyacheslav Bobkov, director of the All-Russia Centre for Living Standards at the Russian Labour Ministry, told ITAR-TASS. Per capita monetary incomes of ten per-cent of the richest people in Russia were around 15 times larger than the per capita income of the same percentage of the poorest in Russia in the first quarter of 1995. The gap in incomes in the same period last year was nine times. It should be noted, however, that five per cent of the superrich are not taken into account. Their incomes result from the shadow economy, and official statistics have no data about them.

Bobkov said the gap in incomes also differs according to regions of the country. It is the highest (17-16 times) in the Far-Eastern, West Siberian and East-Siberian regions. While monetary incomes of the population in those districts are relatively high, there is a large share of the poor in these regions. Income differentiation is somewhat lower (approximately ten times) in the Volga-Vyatka, Central-Black Soil districts, in the Volga reaches.

Income differentiation is particularly marked in the capital. A year ago the richest Muscovites had the incomes seven times as large as those of the poorest. Now this ratio increased to 18 times, Bobkov said. He believes this is connected with the fact that banks, structures of the stock market and middleman centres concentrate in Moscow, and this leads to a rapid growth of incomes in the upper strata of society. Unless the order of indexing the population's income and the tax system are altered, the further growth in income differentiation is inevitable, Bobkov said.

Central Bank Official Sees No Obstacles to Foreign Banks

LD0604194595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 6 (FIA-Interfax)—The Russian Central Bank does not intend to create obstacles to the operation of foreign banking institutions in the Russian market. The statement was made in an exclusive interview with Interfax's Financial Information Agency by the First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Aleksandr Khandruyev Thursday [6 April].

On Wednesday during a visit to Yekaterinburg (Urals) the U.S. ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering claimed that American bankers willing to work in Russia are facing discrimination and that preference is given to European banks.

Khandruyev said he does not see reasons for such claims. According to him, two banks with 100 percent U.S. capital are functioning in Russia—Citibank Moscow and Chase Manhattan Bank International. There are also scores of joint lending institutions with the American share approaching 50 percent. Besides, Khandruyev said, the Central Bank has given permission to open six bureaux of U.S. commercial banks.

"However, not a single Russian bank, even the biggest ones, has been allowed to begin functioning in the American market or even register its office there," the official stressed.

In his opinion many Russian banks have passed the stage of babyhood and are capable of competing on equal grounds with renown Western counterparts without building insurmountable protectionist barriers. "Sweeping accusations of all Russian bankers being connected with the underworld in the western press and even CIA reports do not make our relations civilized and greatly resemble political attacks of the past", he said.

Meanwhile, the President of Chase Manhattan Bank International Sergey Boboshko has told the FIA that the Russian government has not placed all foreign banks in equal conditions. For instance, thanks to the agreement on the protection of investments between the EU and Russia signed last June in Corfu European banks are allowed to work with Russian residents. A similar agreement with the USA signed back in 1992 still has not been ratified by Moscow, Boboshko said.

Rival Banking Groups Seek Special Role With Government

MK0604083195 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Dmitriy Volkov under the "Club" rubric: "Major Russian Banks Warn Government. 'Consortium' Asked To Share"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Close ties with the government are apparently becoming the object of an open competition between Russia's more powerful financial groups. The proposal made to the Cabinet of Ministers by a so-called "consortium of banks" that it be entrusted with the management of the more attractive enterprises targeted for privatization caused some confusion in the mind and, yesterday, drew a veiled warning on the part of financiers. The Agroprombank, Vneshtorgbank of Russia, the "Vozrozhdeniye" bank, the Promstroybank of Russia, the Sberbank of Russia, and "Tokobank," which formed in December 1994 the "Nadezhnost Club," expressed readiness, according to an INTERFAX report, to "actively cooperate with government structures in the realization of investment programs," in particular, "in providing special purpose financing and keeping tabs on effective use of financial resources." The banks are apparently talking about lending money to the state budget and about the impending sale of state blocks of shares in oil companies, "Gazprom," RAO YeS of Russia [United Energy Systems of Russia Joint-Stock Company], and the other "tempting morsels"—the very same things offered by the ONEKSIMbank chairman to Mr. Chernomyrdin on behalf of the "consortium" whose composition is vague.

The banks also agree serve as government agents in financing projects by international financial organizations. They, however, in turn "expect the Russian Federation government to take concrete steps aimed at widening the banks' participation in the process of modernizing the Russian economy." The terms put forward by the "Club" include "renunciation of all sorts of confiscatory measures" in regard to commercial banks, as well as government guarantees that investment credits will be repaid.

The seven banks that made the statement advised the government that they hold "one-third of all the assets of the country's commercial banks and account for nearly half the credit investments in the national economy."

The "consortium's" activism seems to have worried the "Nadezhnost Club" which fears the appearance of a circle of financial groups especially close to the government, excluding banks which belong to the "Club." This sort of signal points to the fact that even a lack of sufficient liquid assets for commercial banks to use to make loans to the state budget is no obstacle for them to strike what is essentially a political deal involving both the division of property and the election campaign.

It would be strange to expect such big sectoral banks as Agroprombank and Promstroybank, or such a giant as Sberbank, to stay indifferent to the possibility of a potential alliance of the "consortium" with the government. At the same time, one may presume that the government is going to look for a compromise in this area by broadening the number of banks who may aspire to the status of "court bank," rather than by cooperating with the entire Russian banking community.

LUKoil To Explore Fields in Timano-Pechora Region

LD0504215195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1824 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 5 (PIA-Interfax)—The leading Russian oil company LUKoil said it was ready to participate in exploring oil and gas fields in the Timano-Pechora Region in North Russia within the Timan Pechora Company (TPC) international consortium, LUKoil President Vagit Alekperov told a special news conference in Moscow.

He said that LUKoil was interested in receiving a 10 percent share in the TPC which the consortium was ready to give to a Russian oil structure.

A source in the Arkhangelsk Region administration told Interfax's Petroleum Information Agency that during the recently completed round of talks Russia said it would like a Russian enterprise to have a 20 percent share in the consortium.

Experts said that if Russia insisted on the 20 percent share it would have to invest at least $800 million because the total expenditure on the project during seven years was $4.4 billion.

The Russian state enterprise, Rosneft, is also willing to join the consortium. In accordance with the Russian president's decree on prior measures for improving performance of oil companies, the Rosneft enterprises will be transformed into an oil company.

Some Russian experts said LUKoil was seeking to participate in exploring the Timano-Pechora oil and gas fields in order to create "a zone of influence" from Kaliningrad to the northern regions.

The Timan Pechora Company L.L.C. international oil consortium was created in April 1994. It includes the U.S. Texaco, Exxon and Amoco companies and Norway's Norsk Hydro company. The TPC is going to participate in extracting hydrocarbons in the Timano-Pechora Region to the north-east of Arkhangelsk. Experts said the oil resources in Timano-Pechora were 400 million tonnes.

Magadan Oblast To Up Gold Production

MK0604102995 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Magadan Oblast Plans To Increase Gold Production"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Viktor Mikhaylov, Magadan Oblast administration head, has announced plans to attract nearly $300 million in investments to develop, over the course of a three year period, gold ore deposits. Remarkably, one-fourth of this sum will come from Russian sources without government guarantees. The governor noted that the administration expects these investments to boost gold production in Magadan Oblast to six tonnes in 1997 and to 15 tonnes in 1999.

Moscow To Cut Special Tax on Certain Goods

LD0604193895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1610 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 6 TASS—The Russian State Customs Committee has ruled to reduce a rate of a special tax on goods which will be submitted for a customs clearance from April 1 through December 31, 1995, a source at the committee's press service told TASS on Thursday [6 April].

From April 1, the tax will be collected in the amount of 1.5 per cent of the taxable price base in order to support and provide for stable functioning of major Russian industries. From January 1, 1996, goods submitted for customs clearance will not be taxed at all.

March Food, Consumer Price Hikes Reported

MM0704082695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report "based on materials of the Prices Analysis and Forecasting Administration of the Russian Federation Government's Economic Situation Center": "Wake Up in Samara, Breakfast in Voronezh. March Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The overall inflation index in March was 108.9 percent, an increase of 40 percent since the beginning of the year. The increase in charges for consumer services again outstripped the change in prices of food and nonfood commodities.

The level of inflation in March was 8.9 percent, which is the lowest it has been in the past six months. The rate has tended to fall gradually and steadily since the beginning of this year. The rate at which prices of food and consumer services change has fallen significantly. During January food prices rose by 21.1 percent and prices of services by 22.7 percent; in March they rose by 8.5 and 10.2 percent. Nonfood commodity prices rose by 9.1 percent during the month.

In March the biggest consumer price increases were in the North Caucasus region— 11.4 percent; the smallest were in the Volga- Vyatka and Central Chernozem regions—7.8 percent.

The Egg—Symbol of Hope

Last month food prices rose by 8.5 percent. Baked goods and vegetables, fruit, and some types of canned fruit and vegetables saw the biggest price increases—11-12 percent. Moreover, dairy and fish products, cheese, flour, groats, pasta, salt, and some types of liquor saw price increases of 9-10 percent. At the same time, it should be noted that prices of butter and vegetable oil stabilized somewhat and egg prices fell by six percent.

The biggest food price increases were in the North Caucasus and Volga regions (11 percent) and also in the West Siberia region (10 percent).

The average cost of the shopping basket of 19 major food products increased by 3.9 percent compared with the previous month. At the end of March it stood at 157,000 rubles [R] for one month's supply. Since the beginning of the year the cost of the basket has risen 50 percent. Cities in the Far East region continue to lead the field in terms of the cost of the shopping basket. Magadan (R305,000), Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy (R304,000), and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (R208,000) are still among the most "expensive" cities among the Russian republic, kray, and oblast centers. Cities in the Volga region are still the cheapest. The basket cost R94,000 in Ulyanovsk at the end of March.

The Miniskirt Will Be in Fashion

Prices of nonfood commodities rose at a slightly slower rate in March compared with February—9.1 instead of 9.8 percent. Fabric prices accelerated and by the end of March the increase was 14 percent. Moreover, prices of gasoline, medicines, tobacco, perfume, and cosmetics rose by 13 percent and prices of clothes, bed linen, clocks and watches, and detergents increased by 10-11 percent. Prices of knitted goods, electrical goods, printed matter, and matches changed least.

Since the beginning of the year prices of nonfood goods have increased 30 percent, including price rises of 70 percent for gasoline and 50 percent for fabrics, printed matter, medicines, and dressings.

In the economic regions prices of industrial goods changed most in West Siberia (13 percent) and least in the North-West (8.2 percent).

The monthly increase (at the end of the period, compared with the previous month, in rubles per person) in the cost of the shopping basket of 19 major foods, constituting the basis of people's weekly purchases, was R37,734 in January, R16,517 in February, and R5,945 in March.

"Conveniences" in the Street for the Needy

Consumer services charges rose by 10.2 percent in March, a 60 percent increase since the beginning of the year. Mains gas, passenger and transport services, and certain types of tourist excursion services saw the biggest increases.

Since the beginning of the year the housing and utilities sphere has seen the biggest price rises: The price of mains gas has risen 3.8 times; the price of the hot water supply, water supply and drains, and maintenance services in houses belonging to housing construction cooperatives and in private apartments has risen 2.3 times; apartment rents and heating costs have risen 2.2 times. Charges for legal and banking services have remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the year.

The biggest increases in charges for consumer services were in the North Caucasus and Northern regions (16 and 14 percent) and the smallest were in the Volga and East Siberia regions (6.6 and 6.9 percent).

International Affairs

U.S. To Use 'Zenit' Carrier Rockets in Satellite Program

LD0604183295 Moscow ECONOMIC NEWS AGENCY in Russian 1300 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine has broken through onto the world space market. Ukraine's national space agency reports that the United States will use Ukrainian "Zenit" carrier rockets in its program for launching "Global Star" low-orbit communications satellites. Within the framework of this program, the carrier rockets will put 24 satellites into orbit. Ukraine's national space agency will be paid over $50 million for this. And for the work force of "Yuzhmash" in Dnepropetrovsk this is more proof of world recognition.

Possible U.S. Mediation Seen on Fleet Talks

LD0604174095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1430 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Odessa—"I cannot rule out possible U.S. mediation in concluding the three-year-long negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the division of the Black Sea Fleet," Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, said in an interview with UNIAN, commenting on the latest round of fleet talks.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said during his recent visit to Ukraine that Washington might participate in the settlement of the Black Sea Fleet issue. He said this could be done along the same lines as the solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in Ukraine—on the basis of a trilateral statement by Ukraine, Russia, and the United States.

OSCE High Commissioner Arrives in Crimea

LD0604202295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1637 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol April 6 TASS—Max Van Der Stoel, high commissioner for national minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), came to Crimean capital Simferopol on Thursday [6 April] to study the situation in the Ukrainian peninsular semi-autonomy. Until Thursday, he was on official visit to Kiev.

Crimean authorities hope to get support from the OSCE official in their antagonism with Ukraine. However, before leaving Kiev he said he "understood" the decisions by the Ukrainian parliament and a recent presidential decree concerning the "Crimean issue". He said he repeatedly visited Crimea and witnessed that the autonomy was in a legal chaos and evaded observing Ukrainian laws.

Kiev-Simferopol relations have further aggravated after Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a decree to gain full control over the Crimean executive. Earlier, the Crimean Government reported to the autonomy's legislature.

Foreign Minister Udovenko Meets WEU Delegation

LD0604170695 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1150 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 6 Apr—A delegation of the Western European Union [WEU] Assembly, led by its president, Dudley Smith, has been visiting the Ukraine since 3 April.

Members of the delegation, which are visiting Ukraine for the first time, met Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko. The minister expressed hope that this visit would promote closer ties between Ukraine and the WEU. Ukraine has a considerable interest in such ties, since the Western European Union was an important part of the European security system. Ukraine and the WEU have been engaged in a dialogue for several years, which resulted in a number of decisions on cooperation. Now is the time to follow up these decisions with practical action, the minister said.

Agreement on Crime, Terrorism Initialed With Hungary

LD0604202795 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 6 Apr—Ukraine and Hungary initialed an agreement on cooperation in combating organized crime and international terrorism. At the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the document between the Governments of Hungary and Ukraine was signed—on behalf of the Ukrainian side by Yuriy Vahdin, deputy chief of the anti-organized crime main directorate, and on behalf of Hungary, by Karoly Nagy, head of the public order maintenance directorate in the Interior Ministry of Hungary. Karoly Nagy is in charge of a group of ministry representatives in Ukraine to sign the agreement.

This concluded four days of fruitful talks at the Internal Affairs Ministry of Ukraine, where the sides outlined specific areas of cooperation between Ukrainian and Hungarian law enforcement agencies in fighting crime, a news conference on the occasion heard. The work done is just the beginning of joint crime fighting activity by Ukraine and Hungary, Oleksandr Ishchenko, Ukrainian internal affairs first deputy minister, told the news conference.

While in Kiev, Hungarian officials concentrated on familiarization with the work of the departments and units within the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Ministry.

Foreign Minister To Visit Iran Despite Firing

LD0604212095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1751 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 6 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—Despite the recent vote of no confidence in the Ukrainian government, its delegation will soon visit Iran as planned earlier. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told Interfax-Ukraine that he will head the delegation.

The Ukrainian parliament sacked Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol and voted for no confidence in the entire government on April 4. So far, the ministers will act as such.

According to Udovenko, the final decision was made after consultations with the Iranian side which "confirmed its interest in the visit."

Udovenko said the visit will involve both bilateral and trilateral talks also attended by the Turkmen foreign minister.

The delegation includes officials from the Industry and Energy Production Ministries and State Oil Committee who will discuss bilateral cooperation in specific areas within five working groups.

Udovenko said the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Iran and Turkey "is a new issue for us; we will also discuss it at the talks." The delegation includes experts in relevant areas, he added.

Udovenko emphasized his visit to Tehran had nothing to do with Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. He declined to comment on the issue saying it was an issue concerning Russia, Iran and the U.S.

Report on Removal of Strategic Bombers to Russia

MK0604125595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 3

[Leonid Kostrov report in the "Aviation" column: "Strategic Bombers From Ukraine Can Still Be Repaired. Or at Least Dismantled and Used for Spare Parts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Only 15 percent of the strategic Tu-160 "Black Jack" and Tu-95MS "Black Bear" missile carrying aircraft which belong to the Ukrainian Air Force are capable of flying today. This conclusion was made by a commission from the Russian Federation Air Force Long Range Aviation Headquarters which has been working at the airfields of Priluki and Uzin, where these heavy aircraft are based. Last year many more aircraft were in good service condition; for instance, of 19 Tu-160's seven were operational, as against four now. Of 25 Tu-95MS's, based in Uzin, only four can take off without first being repaired.

SEGODNYA has already written about the technical condition of the aircraft which stayed in Ukraine after the breakup of the USSR. Most of them are grounded: There is no fuel or spare parts. [passage omitted]

By 1992 the most advanced Long Range Aviation aircraft were based in Ukraine, including the supersonic Tu-160's and Tu-95MS's, which entered service in 1988 and some of which were built as late as 1991. Naturally, years spent without flying have told on their technical condition but after some maintenance work these machines, still with a long remaining service life, can fly, replacing some of their earlier, obsolete modifications, for instance, the Tu-95 K22 "Kama."

There is a schedule for the evacuation of strategic bombers to Russia. Ukrainian Air Force technicians will do all the maintenance work, whereupon the machine, if it is accepted by Russian military specialists, will be allowed into the sky. Some spare parts and assemblies, which are in short supply, will be removed from aircraft once they arrive in Russia and be sent back to Ukraine, where they will be mounted on the next group of aircraft being prepared for departure. In any event, the shortages will not affect flight safety: The aircraft can make brief flights with their missile launch control systems or in-flight refueling systems disconnected. Naturally, upon arrival in Russia—most likely at the air base in Engels—all machines will be fully rigged equipped and tested. If the technical condition of a particular aircraft causes doubts, it will be dismantled and used for spare parts.

Foreign Minister on Russia, Budget, Government

LD0604200995 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 6 Apr—"My task is to avert having words, be they verbally or in the language of notes. We must now make an effort to improve relations between our two states. We must rise above emotions, calmly analyze the situation and do our best to normalize the relationship with our neighbor," Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has said, commenting on the action by Nikolay Lysenko, Russian Federation State Duma deputy.

Asked by a UNIAR correspondent whether revisions in the state budget, to be made by the Supreme Council shortly, would affect financial aid from the International Monetary Fund, Hennadiy Udovenko said: "What is most important is to keep to the 7.3 percent deficit, within which limit we must find a way to implement the budget. Conditions placed by international financial organizations should be accepted because we cannot pull our country out of the economic crisis on our own. We must somehow finance restructuring in the national economy. The International Monetary Fund wishes us no evil by imposing these conditions. It is imperative to meet the IMF requirement on the budget deficit. It will then be up to our financiers to put that into practice. Having said that, we must think about feeding our people, which is why ways should be found to support agriculture."

As for the formation of a new government, Hennadiy Udovenko said: "It would be logical first for the parliament to pass the law on power and then for the president to decide on the government. The government, at least at present, is functioning normally. So is the Foreign Affairs Ministry working energetically and at full capacity."

Closer Relations Urged Despite Incident

LD0604211095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1751 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 6 (INTERFAX-Ukraine)—Despite the recent incidents in the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments, the two countries must seek closer cooperation, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said Thursday [6 April].

Commenting on the incident in the Ukrainian parliament when radical deputies tore into pieces a Russian flag in response to a similar action by Russian deputy Nikolay Lysenko, Udovenko described the action as "improper." "This should not have been done," he added.

Both Russia and Ukraine should seek better relations, accomplish the talks on a treaty on friendship and proceed from the need for positive contacts, he said.

At the same time, Udovenko regarded the Russian parliament's consideration of the Crimea issue as "intervention in our affairs to some extent."

"Imagine our parliament considering the situation in any of Russia's regions," he added.

According to Udovenko, Ukraine understood that Russia had interests in Crimea and that is why it maintained permanent talks on the issue.

Udovenko called the fact that the Russian parliament had made a resolution Wednesday "vexing."

"Another way could have been followed," he noted.

The Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) decided to invite a delegation of the Crimean Supreme Soviet headed by Parliamentary Chairman Sergey Tsekov to its session.

Lysenko Deprived of Right To Enter Country

LD0604184995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1257 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 6 (Interfax - Ukraine)—At its Thursday sitting, the Ukrainian parliament deprived State Duma Deputy Nikolay Lysenko of the right to enter Ukraine.

A total of 264 out of 340 deputies voted for this move, eight against.

At the April 5 sitting of Russia's lower chamber of parliament, while discussing the situation in Crimea, State Duma deputy Nikolay Lysenko demonstratively tore up the Ukrainian flag.

Council Reprimands Deputies for Mocking Russian Flag

LD0604221695 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1830 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 6 Apr—At the evening session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, the people's deputies passed a resolution that was drafted by the Commission for Procedures, Deputy Ethics, and Safeguards of Deputy Activities in connection with the violation of the Supreme Council's rules of procedure by People's Deputies Oleh Vitovych and Yuriy Tyma. The resolution reads as follows: "Having considered the conclusion reached by the Commission for Procedures, Deputy Ethics, and Safeguards of Deputy Activities, the Supreme Council of Ukraine resolves:

"1. To condemn the actions by People's Deputies Oleh Vitovych and Yuriy Tyma, which was during the plenary sitting of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 6 April in mockery of a foreign state's flag.

"2. To give a severe reprimand to People's Deputies Oleh Vitovych and Yuriy Tyma for actions incompatible with the rules of deputy ethics and subsequently publish it in the HOLOS UKRAYINY newspaper.

"3. To instruct the Ministry of Justice and the prosecutor general to consider the issue of compliance of the actions by the UNA-UNSD [National Assembly-National Defense] leadership with the requirements of Ukrainian law on citizens' associations."

Proceeding from a written representation from the Commission for Financial Affairs and Banking and the Commission for Economic Policy and Management of National Economy; and a report by Viktor Suslov, chairman of the Commission for Financial Affairs and Banking, the people's deputies passed a resolution on introducing amendments to the Supreme Council of Ukraine resolution "On Putting Into Effect the Law of Ukraine on Levying Taxes on Enterprises' Profits."

The deputies will continue their work tomorrow. They will hear a report by the prosecutor general of Ukraine, a report by the State Property Fund, a state program for privatization and a report by the presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

National Affairs

OSCE Official Notes 'Legal Chaos' in Crimea

WS0704091195 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0715 GMT 7 Apr 95

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma met in Kiev on Thursday, April 6 with Max van der Stoel, OSCE supreme commissary for matters of ethnic minorities, who is on a fact-finding mission to Ukraine and its Crimean Autonomous Republic.

The OSCE officer voiced his appreciation of Mr. Kuchma's stance on the Crimean dispute. As Mr. Stoel noted, he repeatedly visited Crimea and could personally testify legal chaos there caused by the republican [Crimean] legislature's stubborn reluctance to adjust Crimea's legislation to that of Ukraine.

Max van der Stoel voiced his support for Crimea's retained autonomous status and civilized ways to overcome the power crisis there.

The OSCE supreme commissary pledged OSCE's support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and local ubiquity.

Mr. Stoel informed the Ukrainian president about his intention to meet with Russia's leaders with a view of recommending them to stick to their so far reserved stance on the Crimean issue.

Mr. Kuchma expressed his personal and Ukraine's satisfaction with OSCE's position and stressed the influential international organization's important and constructive role.

Crimea Adopts Appeal to OSCE on Ukraine Relations

LD0604170795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1215 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol—On 6 April the Crimean Supreme Council approved an appeal to Max van der Stoel, high commissioner on national minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], in connection with the legislative acts adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on 17 and 31 March.

"Contempt for democratic ideals and the principles of human rights casts doubt on the proposition that Ukraine is building a lawful state," reads the document.

The Crimean Supreme Council requests that the OSCE should actively promote future relations between Kiev and Simferopol as well as monitor the preparations and conduct of the local council elections on 25 June.

Supreme Soviet Adopts Law on 1995 Budget

LD0604161495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1501 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev April 6 TASS—The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on Thursday [6 April] adopted on a law on the state budget for 1995. Although it recorded half the requirements, it reached a fabulous sum, over two quadrillion karbovantsy. The budget deficit made up 7.3 per cent which is within recommendations of the International Monetary Fund. If the deficit were larger, Ukraine may have lost an IMF credit of 1.8 billion U.S. dollars in the current year.

The endorsement of the budget proceeded in a complex situation. Virtually every speaker noted that the budget is based on "old ideology" as those who compiled it had not fully discarded the principle of financing separate branches.

Speakers noted that competition between ministries and the departments will continue, that the budget proposed by the president largely runs counter to his own course at economic reform. Under the law on the budget local councils will now have more rights and opportunities to decide on the use of the local budget.

Parliamentarians came out against the government's proposal to introduce a stabilisation tax. They also objected to increasing the value-added tax from 20 to 28 per cent. Acting First Deputy Premier Viktor Pinzenik said that this is an enforced measure as the budget is short of 160,000 billion karbovantsy. To protect producers, the deputies dropped the stabilisation tax and cut by four per cent the expenditures under the budget except for financing the social sphere. Thus the lacking sum has been provided.

The session decreed that indexes of the budget are to be re-endorsed by the parliament after analysing the consequences of its implementation in each quarter of the year. Organs of state executive power in Ukraine are prohibited to re-distribute the allocations envisaged by the state budget.

More on Adopting 1995 Budget

LD0604212395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1825 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 6 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Ukrainian parliament adopted a resolution on enacting the law "On Ukraine's State Budget for 1995" Thursday [6 April].

According to the resolution, the main budget parameters are subject to quarterly reconsideration taking into account the budget performance over each quarter.

The resolution instructed the republic's government and parliamentary commissions to develop a mechanism for adjusting the privileges that people enjoy while paying for electricity, communal utilities and public transport and moving to targeted assistance for those with low incomes until May 15.

The document also stipulated the Ukrainian government reconsider excise duties on imported goods and impose excise duties on coal and non-critical imports and a collateral duty for transiting imported goods through the republic.

The government will adjust taxes on barter operations, including those involving non-critical imports.

The resolution proposes a survey of all credits and privileged banking loans granted earlier for expediency of servicing them at the state's expense.

The document stipulated that taxes and duties, earlier calculated from the minimum wage, will be calculated from people's minimum income not liable to taxation.

The Ukrainian government will develop a plan of activities for commercial enterprises to finance their corresponding ministries and bodies.

Every case of granting a centralized credit will be preliminarily agreed on with the parliamentary budget commission.

The parliamentary commission for social issues and labor will develop a draft law on the poverty line together with the government.

The government proposed the National Bank of Ukraine grant the Finance Ministry a credit of up to 10 percent of the quarterly expenditures every quarter of the year.

The parliament will continue discussing the resolution article by article Thursday evening.

Moroz Comments on Passage of Budget

LD0604215195 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The state budget of Ukraine for 1995 was passed today. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Supreme Council Speaker Oleksandr Moroz's exclusive interview with our program follows:

[Begin Moroz recording] There are plans to increase expenditure on funding production and the economy as a whole, and ensure growth in social spending. Preliminary estimates suggest that we can achieve changes for the better without violating the fundamental norm in the budget, that is a budget deficit limit.

It seems to me that today we could pass no other version and, in this particular case, I fully agree with the president's proposal, since for a long time this has also been my position, that now is the time for us to get down to putting together a budget for next year.

Another aspect of this decision is that it has proved that the Supreme Council wants to work in contact with the executive authorities. The imperfection of the budget will in the near, and perhaps longer, future affect the budgets of families. No matter how difficult this is, however, we have to go through this very hard time and keep our society stable.

Today, stability becomes an economic notion and a factor of survival. I very much hope that the people will understand the difficulties today are of an objective nature and cannot be sidestepped. Of course, all those problems that now concern the people, such as improvements in the pensions law, changes in the law... [pauses] preparation of a law on savings compensation, declaration of the population's incomes as the basis of budget revenue, and much else should be dealt with at the same time, because the troubles of our economy today and everyday life of the people have been aggravated by the consequences of the population's catastrophic stratification in property terms, which in a way helps destabilize the social situation. I hope that together we will be able to craft changes for the better to guarantee a better life for our nation. [end recording]

Moroz on Discord With Executive Branch, NPT

WS0504141595 Kiev ZERKALO NEDELI in Russian 18 Mar 95 pp 1-2

["Exclusive" interview with Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz by Yuliya Mostovaya; place and date not given: "Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz: 'I Will Not Make Subservient Moves...'"—first two paragraphs are ZERKALO NEDELI introduction]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **Oleksandr Moroz is the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. He does not like to be called the speaker. This is a matter of formality, but as a matter of fact one can call him differently—a conservative, a live target, a romantic, an obstinate man, or the pink banner of left-wing forces. That is to say that there are many options. Certain people believe that, during his term of office, Oleksandr Moroz has risen, and has learned to think on the scale of a state much better than others. Some people are convinced that Oleksandr Moroz has not risen but, just the opposite, has fallen, and moreover, has gone beyond the line of the law. Other people categorically refuse to believe in this, fairly providing the argument that "in the former parliament, only two people did not accept handouts in the form of apartments—Khmara [leader of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party] and Moroz."**

My impression is that Oleksandr Oleksandrovych [Moroz] is simply very tired. This does not mean, however, that he is ready to surrender—Moroz is a man who can maneuver, entrench himself, attack, retreat, or make enveloping movements while keeping a sharp eye on the target at the same time. He has made many concessions, perhaps too many and in areas in which this should not have been done. Still, he has never surrendered totally. What gives him this strength? I think that it is not enough to say that this is a belief in his rightfulness or political vanity. There is an impression that messianic inclinations are characteristic of Moroz. Perhaps even he is unaware of this. Time will show whether this will help him or bring him to ruin. Meanwhile, let us return to current issues.

[Mostovaya] Oleksandr Oleksandrovych, how would you comment on [Kazakh President] Nursultan Nazarbayev's decision to dissolve the Kazakh parliament?

[Moroz] To put it frankly, I have not yet thoroughly analyzed the rationale behind this move. In general, if the Constitution gives the president the right to take such steps, and if there were violations during the parliamentary elections, there is no doubt that this step was required. I cannot say anything else, because I have not had time to penetrate this issue due to the huge load of our domestic political problems.

[Mostovaya] **So let us turn to your problems. Do you think that the Supreme Council will pass the Law on Power as drafted by the Conciliatory Commission?**

[Moroz] A certain version of this law will, of course, be passed. I would like to say, however, that my stance is that the Constitution will not be abrogated by virtue of any insignificant legislation validated by this law. The Law on Power itself, which consists of 170 pages, was apparently drafted in a democratic way, and wishes and legislative initiatives of all sides were taken into account. Yet, there is also another law, which rescinds the Constitution and opens a path for the Law on Power. You know, we can be clever and even cunning (in the positive sense of this word), but we must not outsmart ourselves. If the Law on Power is to be introduced as a foundation of a constitution, then each article should also be constitutional, and passed by the constitutional majority of votes. Only then will one be able to consider this law as a yardstick to measure the Constitution, and only then will the law be efficient. In such a case, however, the following logical question arises: Is it not simpler to adopt a new constitution, all the more so, since it is virtually ready? I think that the second option is better. I would like to emphasize, however, that I do not deny that there are possibilities, and I will do everything to see that the Law on Power is passed, and powers of specific branches are divided. We must do that!

[Mostovaya] **To put it another way, you are not going to put to a vote the amendment to the Law on Power envisioning the abrogation of 60 articles of the current Constitution?**

[Moroz] No, we will undoubtedly try to put this issue on the agenda, but first the Law on Power will be discussed separately. The law has just been sent to commissions, and it must be examined.

[Mostovaya] **When may a plenary debate on this law be held?**

[Moroz] It may be held no earlier than in a week. The point is that we are currently working on the budget bill—a very complicated and controversial document. We must first cope with this task.

[Mostovaya] **Is it possible that the budget will not be approved by parliament?**

[Moroz] In principle, as you recall, we have lived without approved budgets for three years. Theoretically, this sad tradition could be continued, though I would not like this to occur. I hope that a budget will be approved, but what budget will be passed is another question.

[Mostovaya] **Behind the scenes, one can increasingly often hear talk about the need to hold a parliamentary debate on the issue of replacing the Supreme Council Presidium and leadership. Is it possible to discuss this issue in March?**

[Moroz] The agenda does not include this issue, though it does include the Presidium's report. I think that there will be no complications here, all the more so since, as early as three weeks ago, if not earlier, I delivered the Presidium's report to commissions, and all commissions have already expressed their opinions on this issue. In general, their assessments are positive. Another point is that certain deputies or even factions are using the Presidium's report as an opportunity to dismiss the Supreme Council Presidium and leadership. I have my own opinion on this issue: As a matter of fact, certain commission chairmen should be replaced, and certain commissions should be merged. Additionally, it is essential to introduce new commissions, for example, we should set up a control commission, which would oversee the budget. We also need a commission for issues of regional policy. This commission would relieve the Supreme Council of functions overlapping with those performed by the executive branch. Furthermore, our budgetary and financial commissions are operating separately. It would not be an impediment if they were merged, since they are separately dealing with two sides of the same coin.

One can thus speak about the Presidium's rotation. However, I do not like this principle, because it implies a temporary term of office. So, if the issue of replacing anybody arises, it should be a replacement, and not a rotation.

[Mostovaya] **Oleksandr Oleksandrovych, what are your chances of winning during this purge?**

[Moroz] Do you have in mind my chances of not losing? My changes are quite good. I am self-confident in this regard, and not because I overestimate myself, but because, while objectively analyzing the situation, I come to the conclusion that my candidacy is optimal for the current parliament and the current period. I thus think that deputies who are exerting pressure by demanding the chairman's dismissal are behaving in a very careless manner. They should have thought well whether one should yell if one does not yet know what will be the results of this yelling, for both him and parliament. I already have a considerable life and political experience. I will not end up without a job. Therefore, the parliament's dismissal, which may take place if they achieve their goal, is less dangerous for me than for them. Sometimes I want to ask them: Have you already found another job? I, as chairman, know what jobs former deputies, including former Presidium members, have. Many of them are still up in the air.

[Mostovaya] **Do you think that there are real chances or possibilities to dissolve parliament?**

[Moroz] The Constitution treats this issue very precisely—there is no such possibility. As of today, there is neither a legal basis nor a reason to do that. There is the wish of certain politicians from various branches of power, but this is not enough.

[Mostovaya] **What will happen if the Law on Power is not passed?**

[Moroz] What can happen? I regard this law as an object of the Supreme Council's activities. The law is being drafted and studied. I do not know which version will be adopted, but I think that the bill will be passed anyway. I think that the opinion that the adoption of the law is a path to a shining future and a failure to adopt it is a path to grave consequences is not well- considered....

[Mostovaya] **There are other opinions. For instance, there is the opinion that a failure to adopt the bill will escalate the war between branches of power, and that its adoption means a dictatorship with precisely defined responsibilities.**

[Moroz] The point is that I respect the Constitution more than the Law on Power. In any event, this law will not replace the Constitution. In any event! Moreover, much depends on how one sees this law—as a reason or a must. If one selects the first option, the concept you presented must be taken into account. In this case, even an opinion that I have an asymmetrical face may be considered a reason for dissolving parliament. If it is a must, one should look at who does not have enough power and who is harassed by the parliament. How could the Supreme Council manage to limit the powers of oblast council chairmen—who are executive chairmen at the same time—or how could it hamper the implementation of their powers? The same thing can be said about the Cabinet of Ministers. Virtually the entire cabinet has been appointed by the president.

[Mostovaya] **However, [Ukrainian President] Leonid Danylovych [Kuchma] today said at a news conference that he only replaced power ministers, and the rest of the government was appointed by the parliament, moreover, by its left-wing majority.**

[Moroz] To make it clear, the Supreme Council did not replace the cabinet. We elected the prime minister, and approved of candidates for power ministers presented by the president. The rest, including deputy ministers, were appointed by the president by virtue of his edicts. Let us look, for example, at the three first prime ministers—what did the parliament have to do with their appointments? [passage omitted]

[Mostovaya] **As the Supreme Council chairman, you often have to maneuver between personal convictions and the parliament's interests, which often brings about discontent of the left-wing bloc, meaning that one cannot say that you are unconditionally supported by your allies. Judging from all signs, you do not have enough money to feel self-confident, and your relations with the executive branch are not strong enough to make you feel sure about your future. Why, in this—to put it frankly—uncertain situation, are you allowing yourself to enjoy the luxury of supporting your deputies— Tkachenko and Dyomin?**

[Moroz] Perhaps I am self-confident because I do not have money. I behave in accordance with my status. I do not have anything to conceal. I can say what I think, forecast developments, and defend my convictions. If someone has not joined me, or has left me, he will assess this later. If I commit errors, I treat them very emotionally, whether I commit them in my personnel policy or with regard to other issues. Since I am a human being, I can err. I defend Dyomin and Tkachenko, because, according to the Constitution, I am obliged to defend the honor of the Supreme Council. On the other hand, however, nobody has so far proven their guilt. So far there are only suppositions and nothing else. This is a way of defaming parliament. This is exactly why I should defend these people even more. I cannot say that I do not have grievances against both of them. But it is my business—the chairman's business—to defend them. After all, they are not Moroz's deputies, but the Supreme Council chairman's deputies. Every Monday we held heated briefings, at which we express grievances against one another in our narrow circle. But I am not going, and I will not make any subservient moves simply because someone wants to pin a label on the Supreme Council! I will thus rebuff anything that encroaches upon the honor of these people, in accordance with my rights,

[Mostovaya] **Are we facing a threat of a war of compromising materials between the executive and legislative branches?**

[Moroz] Neither the Supreme Council nor I personally have taken any step aimed at using this dangerous weapon. I believe that we will have enough dignity to not use it. As for the other side, everything which is taking place is not initiated by representatives of the legislative branch, except for individuals trying to create the image of a scandalous person for themselves. You should know, however, that decent people do not need subservient individuals....

[Mostovaya] **What is your attitude toward U.S. Vice President Al Gore's suggestion that Ukraine could come forward with an initiative to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]?**

[Moroz] You should understand that we have already done so much for the world community, that I would like the United States to present this initiative. Why should that be done by Ukraine, whose capabilities have already been trampled down seriously, and which was forgotten immediately after we had signed the required documents on nuclear disarmament? Have they recently recalled that they have not yet taken everything away from us, and decided to promise us another $100 million? Since this situation cannot satisfy us, my attitude toward this proposal is critical.

Supreme Council's Moroz on Flag-Tearing Episodes

LD0604143995 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0945 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Remarks by Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz at a meeting of the Supreme Council in Kiev—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed deputies: I have unpleasant news for you. As you know, insulting the official symbol of another state, particularly its flag, in the chamber of the Supreme Council is classified as gross misconduct according to Article 385 [as heard] of the Supreme Council Rules of Procedure. If this happens during the proceedings, a break is announced or the session is adjourned. I was informed rather late that Deputies Oleh Vitovych and Yuriy Tyma committed this gross misconduct which is classified as a crime in the Penal Code. If such acts contain a criminal element, proceedings are interrupted and the speaker informs the Supreme Council of the fact— and the fact is that the abovementioned deputies tore up the flag of a neighboring state in the session chamber—and asks the prosecutor general to take urgent action envisaged by the legislation, which I am about to do. I officially request the Prosecutor General's Office to provide legal assessment of this fact under Article 97 of the Penal Code.

If these acts are committed before the opening of the session, during a break or after the closure of proceedings, the speaker informs deputies after the break or at the opening of the next sitting, which I am now doing. The person guilty of misconduct will, at the discretion of the parliamentary commission for deputy ethics, face liability under Article 419 [as heard] of the Rules of Procedure.

Publicly insulting a flag officially established by a foreign state as its national flag contains the elements of a crime described in Part 2 of Article 187.2 of Ukraine's Penal Code. The article stipulates: Public insult of a state flag, state symbol, or national anthem of Ukraine incurs a sentence of imprisonment for up to two years, or corrective labor for the same period, or a fine of up to 30 times the officially established minimum wage. Public insult of an officially established or raised flag of a foreign state incurs a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years or corrective labor for the same period, or a fine of up to 30 times the officially established minimum wage. [passage omitted]

Yesterday, at the evening session, you were informed about the same act in the Russian Duma in respect of the Ukrainian state symbol. I was hoping that our deputies would show more intelligence. But that is how it is. The Rukh faction has proposed a resolution to protest to the Russian State Duma in connection with the insult to the Ukrainian state flag by Deputy Lysenko, and, second, to ban citizen Lysenko from entering Ukrainian territory for an indefinite period of time.

I have doubts as to the first part, because the Duma has denounced this act, and our claim is not against the Duma but against this deputy. As far as citizen Lysenko is concerned, I think it is a valid proposal. So if you have no objections, I call for a vote on the proposal to ban Nikolay Lysenko, citizen of the Russian Federation, from entering the territory of Ukraine. [passage omitted]

The vote is in favor. Thank you.

Parliament Adopts Law on Local Elections in Crimea

LD0604134795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1330 GMT 6 Apr 95

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Oksana Noskova for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev April 6 TASS—The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has adopted today a law on specific features concerning the participation of Ukrainian citizens who were deported from the Crimea, in elections of deputies to local councils in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.

This law determines the order of ensuring representation of Ukrainian citizens who were deported from the Crimea in 1941-1944 and their descendants in local councils in the Crimea.

According to the law, within the limits of the administrative and territorial districts of the Crimea where deported citizens live, in addition to constituencies for elections of deputies to local councils, additional constituencies may be set up for elections of deputies from deported citizens representing Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks and Germans.

If the number of representatives of some nationality on the territory of a local council constitutes a majority of the total population there, additional constituencies for them should not be established, the law says.

Meshkov Supports Reunification of Crimea With Russia

LD0604140895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1025 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, April 6 (Interfax)—Yuriy Meshkov, who has occupied the post of president of the Republic of Crimea, addressed the morning sitting of Crimea's Supreme Soviet Thursday [6 April].

He sharply criticized the last decision of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet and the decree of the Ukrainian president on the situation in Crimea. "Only the Crimean people can solve their fate and the Crimean parliament should ensure the right for a free will to the citizens of the Republic of Crimea," Meshkov declared.

Meshkov spoke in favor of "restoration of a fraternal Slavic union and successive and gradual reunification of Crimea and Russia."

Meshkov Still Sees Himself as Crimean President

LD0604194095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, April 6 (Interfax - Ukraine)—Yuriy Meshkov, whose powers as the Crimean President were suspended by the Ukrainian parliament on March 17, told a press conference in Simferopol today that he "still feels himself to be the Crimean President."

"This feeling has been dictated by the will of the Crimean people," he added.

Meshkov said that his meetings with Crimean residents proved that voters had "a lot of confidence" in him.

When asked about his attitude to the notification that he must leave the president's office after the annulment of the Crimean presidency sent to him by the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office, Meshkov said he had never received such notification.

Commenting on the decision of the Ukrainian parliament on bringing him to criminal accountability, Meshkov said, "None of the regimes which I know have ever made such decisions towards a leading official."

An Interfax - Ukraine correspondent reports that during the press conference the Crimean president's Press Secretary Aleksandr Spakhov said journalists representing the Russian media would be given priority in asking Meshkov questions. Representatives of the Crimean and Ukrainian media left the hall after this announcement.

Crimean Parliament Chairman Assails Kuchma's Edict

MK0604121595 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 14/90, 6-12 Apr 95 (Signed to press 5 Apr 95) p 2

[Interview with Sergey Tsekov, chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, by Svetlana Tumanova under the "Standoff" rubric: "Wife's Dad in Kiev, Colony in Crimea?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leonid Kuchma's edict subordinating the Crimean government directly to Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers was received by the Supreme Soviet of Crimea on 1 April, a day when everyone makes merry and laughs. But it did not amuse the deputies: Never before in world practice have there been legislative bodies without executive ones. Even at the local level. "The establishment of what is in effect presidential rule in Crimea creates prerequisites for a transition to an authoritarian regime throughout Ukraine," stated the Civic Congress Party of Ukraine in a document which it circulated. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA correspondent Svetlana Tumanova asked the chairman of the Crimean parliament, Sergey Tsekov, if he goes along with such a sharp assessment.

[Tsekov] The presidential edict is an act of total arbitrariness, the crudest violation of Ukraine's Constitution by the man who describes himself as its guarantor. The forming of bodies of state power on the territory of an autonomous entity is the exclusive right of the entity itself. As for Kuchma, he has ignored the Constitution in arrogating to himself the exclusive right to organize the Crimean government and appoint its leaders. Moreover, he has subordinated to himself all the bodies of our local power. The Republic of Crimea has been turned into what can no longer be called an oblast. He has turned it into a colony on Ukrainian territory.

[Tumanova] You did have a confidential discussion with Leonid Danilovich [Kuchma] literally the day before the edict appeared, following which you vouched that its consequences for Crimea would be very favorable. What did the president promise you at that time, and why are the results are the opposite?

[Tsekov] Kuchma guaranteed that both the question of government and all Crimea's other problems would be resolved legally, taking account of mutual state interests. Now the presidium of the Crimean parliament has come to the unanimous conclusion: The edict was not so much drafted by the Ukraine leader as by his family council. Many people know that the Supreme Soviet of Crimea dismissed Anatoliy Franchuk, who is married to Kuchma's daughter, as head of the government of the republic. The Ukrainian president's edict reinstated Franchuk, erasing the painful "ex" prefix.

[Tumanova] Was his dismissal perhaps caused by political motives, Kiev's revenge on the Crimean parliament?

[Tsekov] We had been facing the problem of a government crisis for some time. The executive body acted contrary to the legislative body, it was completely out of control, and it refused to report to parliament. And it is no accident that the prime minister used his position for his own well-being. As a result, together with Vice Premier Andrey Senchenko, he deserved a no-confidence vote.

[Tumanova] Abuses allegedly involving the use of colossal sums from the budget for other than the designated purposes sparked meetings on the peninsula. One side claimed something, the other denied it without furnishing any evidence. Can you explain this and offer documentary proof?

[Tsekov] We tried to avoid the undignified course of action where incriminating evidence is made public. Statesmen faced with a no-confidence vote in a civilized society resign voluntarily. However, when someone persists in clinging to his position despite everything, there is no choice. We will have to make the incriminating documents public. What matters is not Franchuk himself. Using him as a proxy, the Ukrainian leadership intends to take possession of Crimea's property. A special interest is being shown in the health-resort complexes on its southern coast. Depriving parliament of the possibility of influencing the executive branch, they are trying to make us sit down and hammer out what would clearly be a stage-prop constitution. As a result, Crimea would finally turn into a colony.

[Tumanova] Should such a thing happen after all, what do you think would happen next?

[Tsekov] The outward calm of the people will not last long. An explosion is inevitable.... Besides, acting as it is, Kiev demonstrates more than disregard of the will of the Crimeans. It is clearly spitting at the Russian state whose duty it is to protect its fellow countrymen abroad; indeed, the majority of the peninsula's population are ethnic Russians. As a result, there will be a destabilization of the Crimean situation and worsened relations between Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine's international prestige will take a beating.

We will no longer respond with compromises to Kiev's highhandedness. This without doubt. We will ask Ukraine's Supreme Council to veto the president's unlawful edict, and ask the leadership of Russia, CIS states, and international organizations to assess Ukraine's legislative acts affecting Crimea from the point of view of international law. I also think it necessary to ask what the people think about all the present issues. The questions on reinstating Crimea's Constitution, the powers of Crimea's president, and the principles of federal relations with Ukraine will be put to a referendum. It is not ruled out that the deputies would decide on lifting the moratorium on the republic's independence referendum. May I remind you that more than 90 percent of Crimeans favored independence in 1991.

Crimea Supports Ukrainian Decree on Subordination to Kiev

LD0604203795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1823 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, April 6 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The government of Crimea remains a supporter of the idea of Crimea being an autonomous republic within Ukraine as well as of the principle of separation of powers. It does not intend to assume political leadership in Crimea, according to a statement of the government press service received by Interfax-Ukraine Thursday [6 April].

The statement says the presidential decree on subordinating the government in Simferopol to the government in Kiev is justified from the viewpoint of sorting out the business of executive power in the peninsula.

The social crisis in Crimea has become permanent, the statement says. It has been caused by the parliament's unconstructive activities aiming to destabilize the situation and its reluctance to adjust Crimean legislation to the laws of Ukraine.

The work of the Crimean cabinet is now led by Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Demidenko. Anatoliy Franchuk, dismissed by the local parliament but actually reinstated by a decree of the Ukrainian president, is in hospital. Anatoliy Drobotov, appointed prime minister by the Crimean parliament, did not begin his duties. He went on vacation.

Economic Issues

Donbass Miners Strike, Demand Higher Wages

LD0604202095 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1515 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhdanovka, Donetsk Region, 6 Apr—Out of the 789 miners of the third and fourth shifts at the "Zhdanivska" coal mine of the "Oktyabrvuhillya" production association, 405 refused to go to work and went on strike on 5 April. They are demanding that the management of the mine be dismissed and miners' wages increased.

Gas Supplies Cut Off to 2,500 Companies

LD0604195495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1618 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 6 (Interfax-Ukraine)— A total of 2,500 Ukrainian enterprises have their gas supplies cut off due to their chronic failure to promptly pay for them. Gas supplies to another 1,500 enterprises were considerably restricted, the chairman of the corporation Ukrgas, Mikhail Matsyalko, told a briefing in Kiev Thursday [6 April].

Matsyalko said the a gas debt of 135 trillion karbovantsy had been run up, the main debtors being state-run bodies and enterprises.

According to Matsyalko, nine Ukrainian plants will manufacture about 260,000 new gas counters in 1995, given the demand of 400,000- 500,000 a year.

The installation of gas counters all over Ukraine may last until 2003-2005, Matsyalko said.

Gas Company Chief Opposes Terms of World Bank Loan

WS0704091595 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0708 GMT 7 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At least 83 trillion karbovantsi are needed for the renovation of the Ukrainian gas industry, said Bohdan Klyuk, the CEO of the UKRHAZPROM industrial concern, at a news briefing held at the Cabinet of Ministers on April 6. Mr. Klyuk maintained that such tremendous needs notwithstanding, Ukraine will not agree with the proposed terms of a World Bank loan aimed at modernizing the Ukrainian gas-supplying and gas-distributing facilities. According to Mr. Klyuk, the World Bank is pressing for exclusive procurement of Western equipment for the implementation of these projects, while UKRHAZPROM believes that at least half of the equipment may be procured in Ukraine. The fourth-generation gas pumps manufactured by the Mykolayiv and Sumy machine-building factories are not inferior to their Western analogues, said the CEO of UKRHAZPROM. The next round of negotiations with the World Bank will start in April.

"In the current year Ukrainian debt for gas supplies from the Russian Federation constitutes $450 million," said Bohdan Klyuk at the same briefing. "Due to mutual inter-enterprise debts, it may surge up to $2 billion by the end of the year." According to Mr. Klyuk, fees for the transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory to Western Europe will be risen next year. It is planned to create a Ukrainian-Russian joint venture with the participation of UKRHAZPROM and GASPROM Co. of Russia in order to increase this transit flow. Today, about 110 billion cubic metres of Russian gas are going through Ukrainian pipeline network. According to the UKRHAZPROM estimations, with the creation of the joint venture the gas flow may be increased to 140 billion cubic metres by the end of 1995. The Ukrainian party is planning to contribute the Bohorodchansk and the Bilche-Volytsko-Uhersk gas-holding facilities as a capital investment for this project. The net worth of the facilities is estimated at $6-7 billion by Ukrainian experts.

Belarus

Hryb Visits Vilnius, Discusses Klaipeda Port

WS0704101195 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Supreme Soviet Chairman Myacheslaw Hryb and an accompanying delegation, arrived for an official two-day visit in Vilnius on 6 April, and went directly to a Lithuanian Seimas [parliament] plenary session, where [words indistinct] they were met by Lithuanian parliamentarians. Following this, the speakers of both parliaments held talks. According to Seimas speaker Ceslovas Jursenas, since Belarus is a landlocked country, Hryb said that his country would like to use the port of Klaipeda on the Baltic Sea for exporting Belarusian products to the West. Lithuania supports this idea, and is willing to meet Minsk halfway in this respect. The sides also exchanged opinions on relations between the speakers and parliaments of both countries and the heads of states.

In the afternoon, the (?high) Belarusian visitor met with members of the Seimas committee for foreign relations, and with faction representatives of both the ruling and opposition parties in the Lithuanian parliament.

Scope of Cabinet of Ministers' Powers Detailed

WS0704103095 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Henrykh Kumpitski, deputy chief of the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers Administration: "The Cabinet of Ministers: Scope of Powers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The foundation of our country's constitutional system has been determined by the new Belarusian Constitution adopted on 15 March, 1994, Article 6 of which says that the "state is based on the system of division of legislative, executive, and judicial powers." In compliance with the basic law, the laws on the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, the president, and the Cabinet of Ministers have been adopted, and the creation of the legal groundwork, defining and dividing powers wielded by the legislative and executive powers, has been basically completed.

The Constitution says that the president is head of the state and the executive power, while the Cabinet of Ministers, subordinated and answerable directly to the president, executes powers, as does the executive branch, in the spheres of economics, foreign policy, defense, national security, and protection of public order, and other fields of state governing. At the same time, Article 1 of the Belarusian Constitution specifies that the Cabinet of Ministers—the Belarusian Government—is the Republic's central body of executive power. It is authorized to single-handedly resolve all issues pertaining to state governing that lie within its competence. It is a collective executive and administrative body in charge of coordinating, overseeing, and ensuring the organizational coherence and concerted activities of the system of Belarusian central government institutions, and local and executive bodies. Ministries and other central government institutions report to it on results of their work.

According to the law, Cabinet of Ministers' decisions are obligatory to all the ministries and other central government bodies, local executive and administrative bodies, enterprises, organizations, official institutions, and citizens throughout Belarusian territory.

Proceeding from this fact, the Cabinet of Ministers' competence has been determined in the spheres of economics, finances, labor, education, health care, culture, social protection, science, environmental protection, protection of law and order, and the security and defense potential of our state.

Also, new procedures for forming the Cabinet of Ministers have been legally established. The government structure was approved by the president's edict issued on 3 August 1994. It was later detailed by other edicts. From now on, the Cabinet of Ministers will consist of the prime minister, his deputies, 27 ministers, and the KGB chairman. Compared with the personnel lineup of the previous Cabinet of Ministers, the reduction is visible: Instead of eight deputies, the Cabinet of Ministers chairman now has only five. Also reduced was the number of other central government institutions: As of 25 March, there are only 28 of them. The Ministries of Construction and Use of Automobile Roads, Industry, Construction Materials, and Bakery, as well as the Committee for Sports, and 20 independent committees at the Cabinet of Ministers have been eliminated.

The president, his deputies, ministers of foreign affairs, finance, defense, and internal affairs, and the KGB chairman are appointed and discharged by the president upon permission given by the Supreme Soviet. Other Cabinet of Ministers members, deputy ministers of foreign affairs, finance, defense, and internal affairs, and the KGB deputy chairman are appointed and discharged by the Belarusian president. Other deputy ministers and their deputies are appointed and discharged by the Cabinet of Ministers with permission from the Belarusian president. The Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers has been basically completed. Its collegium, comprising the prime minister, his deputies, and the ministers of finance, foreign affairs, and internal affairs, has already been approved.

The new law has substantially expanded the article about powers granted to the ministries and other central government institutions and their heads, but it also provided for more responsibility for the condition of the institutions they manage. Normative acts adopted by ministries and other Belarusian central government institutions within their competence and concerning enterprises, organizations, and institutions of a different type of ownership are mandatory for them, provided that these acts were registered by the Justice Ministry.

Ministers and heads of other central government bodies have the right to single- handedly approve a structure and the staffing of their organizations. Also approved were the guarantees for legal and social protection of the prime minister, Cabinet of Ministers members, their status, and procedures for their resignation. In spite of certain social and legal protection guarantees, Cabinet of Ministers members have no right to be elected legislative deputy, engage in business, and perform paid work other than teaching and creative activities. This is a generally accepted norm in international legislation. In our country, however, this approach has been applied for the first time. The perception is that the situation where an individual, an official, feels that he is protected by the law should bring positive results.

Since the new Belarusian Constitution has installed a presidential system of government, the Cabinet of Ministers does not have the right to legislative initiative (the former Cabinet of Ministers did have this right). In the present situation, the right to legislative initiative has been granted to the president as head of the executive power.

By law, work on draft laws requested by the Supreme Soviet or the president should be organized by the Cabinet of Ministers. Relevant articles specify relations among the Cabinet of Ministers, the Supreme Soviet, and the president. The Supreme Soviet has the right to hear a report by any member of the government concerning only implementation of Belarusian laws. The head of the president's administration has the right to participate in meetings held by the Cabinet of Ministers and institutions subordinated to it, but the government is not subordinated to the president's administration. Thus, such an arrangement ensures necessary interaction, availability of information, and openness in the Cabinet of Ministers' activities. At the same time, the law eliminates unnecessary duplication and bureaucracy in governing the state.

Compared with the previous law on the Cabinet of Ministers, the present government has practically retained its rights in its relations with local executive and administrative institutions. Being the Belarusian Government, the Cabinet of Ministers has the right to coordinate and provide guidelines for the activities of local executive and administrative bodies and control their work, and its other responsibility is to regulate issues pertaining to its relations with ministries and other central government institutions.

The law provides for the creation of a government administration to support activities conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers, which approves the statute regulating its operations.

Summing up, one can say that the adopted law grants the Cabinet of Ministers all the powers that the Belarusian Government should have, regulates its activities in strict compliance with the Constitution, and is intended to improve executive power, discipline, and accountability at all levels of government.

Moldova

President To Maintain Talks With Tiraspol

LD0604214295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1847 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHISINAU, April 6 (Interfax)—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur told a Chinese official delegation of his firm intention to maintain the dialogue with the Tiraspol authorities on the Dniester settlement. He said the experience gained while solving the Gagauz issue could well be used for this purpose. "The only condition is to preserve Moldova's territorial integrity, single constitution, borders, foreign policy and currency," he added.

Snegur remarked that "many issues emerged in the negotiation process, because the Tiraspol leaders do not want to compromise." However, Snegur said "we stake primarily on the region's population."

Commenting on mass students' rallies which have been going on for three weeks now, Snegur assured the guests that all issues will be solved according to the republic's law.

Political Motives for Street Riots Seen

MM0704101295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 First Edition p 6

[Report by Lyudmila Feliksova: "Street Blackmail; People's Front Again Trying To 'Blow Up' Situation in Moldova"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chisinau—Chisinau's central square before the government building has for many years been filled with students and even grade school schoolchildren. As was the case two years ago there are many Romanian flags. And the slogans were also the old ones, whose thrust expresses one thing fully enough: "We are Romanians." And the leaders are the same—former and present members of the People's Front in the role of apostles.

The primary formal pretext for the many days' strike is the protest against the possible decision of the national education minister to switch to the teaching of Moldovan history in educational establishments instead of the history of the Romanians, which was introduced in the past by the government headed by M. Druk, now trying to make a political career in Bucharest. And the second demand in this direction is that in the new Constitution the name of the state language be changed from Moldavian to Romanian, with economic motives relegated to second place.

But the true nature of the main reasons for the student riots cannot mislead even politically unsophisticated people. The scenario which is being played out is painfully familiar. It has all happened before.

Nor are the other side's arguments new.

"Those who want further to politicize society should know the consequences: destruction, hatred of each other, confrontation, the absence of foreign investments, and the opinion that our country is a wild state," Parliament speaker P. Luchinskiy said, assessing what is happening. He also expressed himself against "the use of the street as a means of resolving problems in a democratic state."

And that has already happened. The street as an instrument of political pressure, blackmail, and intimidation has repeatedly been used with success by the People's Front and related political organizations at critical moments. On the wave of street extremism it once came to power. And whenever the political scales began to tilt against it young people were used as an additional strike force. There was no difficulty in recruiting and organizing them since the People's Front's main social base has always been and remains a large proportion of higher educational establishment teacher and instructors. In their hands students and schoolchildren easily become a convenient instrument of political struggle easy to manipulate.

The very first riots back in the period of perestroyka—the attack on the Internal Affairs Ministry building in the very center of Chisinau—began with a student picket, which played the part of a detonator. After a while one of the fiery pickets admitted to me that she clearly felt that they were simply being used as a spring for developing the situation in the necessary direction.

And the famous campaign against the Gagauz also began with fiery speeches on the central square of the Moldovan capital filled with students and schoolchildren for whom solicitous and respectable inciters with official powers laid on buses to take them south, overtly calling for war. At the time bloodshed was avoided. It began later—on the left bank of the Dniester to the accompaniment of the same inflammatory meetings where young people brought in and ready for everything made up the majority. And died later for who knows what on both banks of the Dniester while the organizers, who had safely weathered the political storm were again sailing in a somewhat different capacity.

The claim by Chisinau's officials that the present student riots are not spontaneous but were clearly planned in advance is undoubted.

The People's Front, having suffered defeat at last year's parliamentary elections, could not but try to wreak revenge. This is perhaps its last chance.

And indeed the People's Front had quite a good gift in the form of agitation for Tiraspol on the eve of the elections to the local organs of power. Official Chisinau does not tire of repeating to Tiraspol that it is building an autonomous independent state and there is no threat of unification with Romania—the will of the people voiced at the sociological poll a year ago unequivocally does away with that scenario. But meanwhile thousands of people on the Chisinau square are chanting: "We are Romanians" and asserting the thesis of the opposition forces: There is not such thing as the Moldavian people, nor does the Moldavian language exist.

Meanwhile

The Gagauz leadership has denounced the student riots which have been continuing in Chisinau for two weeks now. In a published statement it notes that the students' action is "a cynical attempt to activate the slogans of unification with Romania that are unpopular among the people." Behind the students stand those politicians who "playing on difficulties of a socioeconomic nature, want to earn political capital in order to regain the power they have lost in the country," the document notes.

Kazakhstan

Perry News Conference in Almaty Reported

LD0604151795 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] REUTER reports that the United States has allocated a total of about $170 million for the dismantling of the nuclear arsenal in Kazakhstan.

[Correspondent A. Kondrashov] We are deeply satisfied with the results of the talks with Kazakhstan, William Perry stated at the end of his visit to Almaty. In his opinion the withdrawal of strategic nuclear missiles being carried out by the Kazakhstan side together with Russia is not giving rise to any fears. One of the results of the visit to Kazakhstan by the U.S. Defense Secretary was the allocation by the United States of four grants for the conversion of defense facilities located here. With the same aim, joint enterprises are being set up; the total investment in them from the United States will be about $37 million.

There was a sensation for the journalists. Replying to one of the questions, William Perry let slip that during the talks there was discussion of the possibility of transfering Kazakhstan's plutonium to the United States, even though Kazakhstan's leadership has always resolutely denied reports that new nuclear deals were being prepared.

Speaking about differences with the positions adopted by President Nazarbayev who, as is known, has announced a referendum on extending his own period in office, William Perry spoke about the need for elections to a new republican parliament to be held as soon as possible.

Indonesian President Arrives on Official Visit

LD0604204595 Almaty Kazakhstan Television Network in Russian 1400 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A state delegation headed by President Suharto of Indonesia arrived on an official visit from Southeast Asia today, about two hours ago.

[Correspondent] This is the first official visit to our country by the head of a leading Southeast Asian state. The delegation consists of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Ambassador (Nana Sutriona), (Sumadi Brotoginegrad), head of the coordination office of the Non-Aligned Movement; the director general for foreign economic relations, officials from the ministry of foreign affairs, and journalists.

At the airport, which was decorated with the state flags of the two countries, they were met by Kazakh Vice President Yerik Asanbayev and his spouse, Foreign Minister Qasymzhomart Toqayev, and other officials. Indonesian President Suharto is 73. Under the constitution of his country he is also head of government and supreme commander of the armed forces.

The main aim of President Suharto's trip is to promote the development of trade and economic relations with Kazakhstan, and in particular to expand Indonesian exports.

Commercial relations between Kazakhstan and Indonesia are not yet at a high level, but major Indonesian companies hope to establish more active contacts with our republic as a result of Suharto's visit to Almaty.

After an official welcoming ceremony at the Kazakh presidential palace, talks will take place between the leaders of the two countries tomorrow. These will continue in an expanded format, after which joint documents are expected to be signed.

[Announcer] I may add that Indonesia regards relations with Kazakhstan as an important area of its foreign political and economic activity. This once more confirms the view that our independent state possesses a fair amount of authority in the world community.

Security Services on Discovery of Foreign 'Spies'

LD0604103395 Almaty Kazakhstan Television Network in Russian 0600 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As the National Security Committee of the republic has announced that even though the international climate has substantially thawed and processes of integration have expanded, the intelligence services of certain states are making attempts to use our society's openness for reconnaissance purposes.

This was confirmed by the fact that this year the republic's national security bodies discovered spies from the far abroad [beyond the former Soviet Union's territory] who had specific tasks, the implementation of which might have done political and economic damage to Kazakhstan. As officials of the National Security Committee said an investigation is now being conducted into the facts uncovered about this activity.

Russian Official on Idea of Eurasian Union

954F1951A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Panov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, by Irina Bektiyarova of INTERFAX specially for KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA; place and date not given: "Strengthening the Commonwealth and Moving Toward the Eurasian Union Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bektiyarova] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, on the day of your visit one Kazakhstan newspaper declared with reference to the foreign policy department that on the Kazakhstan side the "idea of the EAS [Eurasian Union] is a preemptive step aimed at neutralizing the neo-imperial aspirations of Russia." Although both President Nazarbayev and other officials of Kazakhstan have always maintained the opposite. How did you view this statement? And how do you evaluate the idea of the Eurasian Union and Russian-Kazakhstani relations?

[Panov] Our Kazakhstani negotiating partners, including First Vice Premier N. Isingarin, told us immediately that this publication has nothing to do either with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or government circles. They were astonished by the references to the Foreign Ministry. It was emphasized that Kazakhstan's policy remains invariable and that it has been confirmed repeatedly by both the president and at other levels. The dissociation from this observation was total. We consider the incident closed, therefore. We were satisfied with this.

As far as the Eurasian Union is concerned, our position is well known, it has been set forth by the president of the Russian Federation repeatedly. This concept could be viable in the future. But now it is essential that we first of all strengthen the Commonwealth as it is. There is every reason for the integration processes to be operating more quickly. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia are moving toward this with great speed here. They have created a customs union presupposing the solution also of other questions, which will "bind" all three countries more tightly. This means not only customs but also economics, education, culture. Uzbekistan is already prepared to affiliate to the union. These processes are in the field of our vision in the present period, therefore. In the future, the EAS.

[Bektiyarova] What is the purpose of your visit, how successful has the work been?

[Panov] We are engaged in the practice of inter-Foreign Ministry consultations with all countries of the CIS on a regular basis. We have a mass of questions which should be discussed: bilateral relations, international problems of concern to both parties, and an exchange of information, confidential included. We have conducted such discussions quite thoroughly. We are very satisfied with the state of bilateral relations. They have a substantial contractual basis—47 agreements have been signed, and one more has now been added to them. But it is not only a question of the quantity but of the fact that they are regulating many problems. We are with Kazakhstan moving ahead of the other countries of the CIS in a number of areas. Two agreements on citizenship were signed on 20 January. Interest in them is now being displayed in Kyrgyzstan, in Ukraine, and in a number of other Commonwealth countries.

But it is not only a matter of the contractual and legal base but of the fundamental frame of mind, which was confirmed in the course of the consultations on the part of the Kazakhstani leadership: Relations with Russia are a priority. And for Russia relations with Kazakhstan are undoubtedly also a priority—considering Kazakhstan's geopolitical position and the fact that a large number of ethnic Russians resides here.

The next point that we dealt with was the fact that the question of our president's visit to Kazakhstan is on the agenda. He has been invited. We have exchanged preliminary outlines, and some important documents could be prepared. They could be agreements in the sphere of the cooperation of radio and television—we consider it very important. In addition, many joint documents have been generated at this time, and a body that would monitor their execution is needed, perhaps.

[Bektiyarova] You highlighted particularly among the 48 documents two concerning citizenship. Both countries place a high value on them. Nonetheless, I know that some people in Kazakhstan are maintaining that the agreements will not contribute to the consolidation of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan but, on the contrary, will prompt them to leave. Why have they not been ratified in Russia, incidentally?

[Panov] As far as ratification is concerned, this is a question for the Federal Assembly. They have quite a lengthy procedure of the passage of documents. It is dragged out at times not only for several months but for up to a year. We know that they have been ratified in Kazakhstan.

We do not believe that these documents could stimulate an outflow of the population from Kazakhstan.

Today I met with the leaders of four grassroots organizations of Russians in Kazakhstan. They have no misgivings or doubts in respect to these documents.

What is the essence of the agreement on the simplified adoption of citizenship? The subject at the meeting with representatives of the organizations of Russians at this time was the fact that there have been instances of people coming to Russia (there are those who want to leave in any event) and encountering difficulties in the adoption of Russian citizenship. The agreement that has been signed provides, however, for a procedure of the simplified adoption of citizenship by Kazakhstanis. There is a step forward on the part of Kazakhstan also here—because there is a more complicated procedure of the adoption of citizenship in this country, even compared with Russia.

It will be simplified in Kazakhstan also with the implementation of the agreement. And the people who want to return to Kazakhstan (there are instances of this also) will not run into difficulties.

The second agreement is very important. A period when a person will have to opt for citizenship is coming. He will see in the document signed by the president the specific rights and obligations of those people who will be permanent residents in Kazakhstan while retaining Russian citizenship. The rights will be quite extensive compared with those of other foreigners.

The theme of dual citizenship continues to be an active topic. It would most likely be better to have such a system in principle. But sometimes it also is not entirely clearly understood. We discussed this matter at the meeting today, and the leaders of the grassroots organizations agreed that dual citizenship does not afford a person any advantages. It would seem that in this case a person has the protection of Russia also. But even a person with dual citizenship must live according to the laws of Kazakhstan. He would not have any exclusive rights. That, coming to Russia, he would not have to undergo the citizenship-adoption procedure is another matter. But he can avoid having to do this even now in accordance with the agreement on the simplified adoption of citizenship.

We understand that dual citizenship is a moral support. But, on the other hand, many questions arise. People who insist on it think that they will obtain the right to vote at the time of elections in Russia....

On the other hand, counting on dual citizenship conferring some advantages on a person living in the near abroad and on his being able to look for some assistance, in legal form, let us say—this is not the case, this is impossible. How could our small embassy participate in such proceedings?

[Bektiyarova] What is the reason for the delay in the opening of consulates?

[Panov] We have raised this matter. We would like to open two general consulates—in Akmola and Uralsk. But the Kazakhstani side has yet to give a positive response. It maintains that only a small number of citizens of Russia live in these regions. But general consulates do not necessarily open precisely where our citizens live. We have in the CIS opened them in Odessa, Lvov, Brest, and other cities. The consulates decide a mass of questions. They are, in fact, political missions—mini-embassies. It does not mean that they perform merely consular functions.

[Bektiyarova] What difficulties are you having in fixing up those who come to Russia from Kazakhstan? Where do they prefer to settle?

[Panov] There are no problems here, economically either. Particularly if these people settle in compact fashion, obtain land, build, and engage in economic activity.

There are problems elsewhere. People try to settle in three regions, in the main—the Central-Chernozem area, Krasnodar Kray, and the Volga region. This applies not only to those coming from Kazakhstan. This is the general trend of the immigrants. This is a particular burden for these three regions, of course. It is necessary to support the people and provide them with jobs and schools and so forth.

And there are areas that are considered unattractive. Although in terms of work and living conditions, they are quite good. These are Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays. Practically no one goes there. Understandably, people consider that they are a long way off and unfamiliar. The support of the Federal Migration Service is needed, therefore. The travel allowances which the immigrants receive are currently identical, regardless of where they are going—to the Moscow area or the Far East. Differentiation is needed.

[Bektiyarova] And are there many who have been unable to get acclimatized and who have returned to Kazakhstan?

[Panov] The first stage is quite difficult, of course, you have to fend for yourself in a new location, and there is little money. Not all can overcome the difficulties, and they return. Not only to Kazakhstan, incidentally, but also to Belarus and other countries from which they have come.

[Bektiyarova] You said that an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of radio and television will be prepared. Not only Russians now but all of us in Kazakhstan are experiencing a certain information famine. How will these problems be resolved?

[Panov] They are mainly of an economic nature. Mayak is not being relayed—there are no funds for the transmitters. Journals are not being delivered—there is not enough money for the transportation. We need to find other approaches, of course, and overcome these difficulties.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Intends To Seek Reelection in 1996

LD0604201295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek, April 6 (Interfax)—Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev intends to seek reelection in 1996. His foreign policy adviser Ishenbay Abdyrazakov expressed confidence that Akayev, who started democratic change and a radical economic reform, will win the elections but did not rule out "surprises and the arrival of opposition figures, populists, demagogues and dilettantes in power."

Abdyrazakov believed that running for reelection would be ideal for Akayev but new elections involve risks and waste of time and funds and are likely to split the country.

Abdyrazakov said that a group of MPs called for a referendum on extending Akayev's term until the year 2000, as was done in Uzbekistan.

Abdyrazakov believes that the public should convince Akayev of the need to hold such a referendum for the sake of stability in the country.

Defense Minister Cleared in Corruption Inquiry

LD0604092395 Bishkek VECHERNIY BISHKEK in Russian 4 Apr 95 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister has announced an amnesty for ministers.

A black spot has been expunged from the clear conscience of Lieutenant General Myrzakan Subanov, the head of the defense department of the republic [defense minister].

After the military prosecutor's office failed to find any crime in the Defense Ministry's activities in the "Kanat" business project (the question was one of extending preferential credits to commercial structures), the head of government has decided to rescind a severe reprimand imposed on him [Subanov].

Zafar Khakimov, the minister of labor and social welfare, can also lift his head up high. He in his time received a severe reprimand for credit operations, which somewhat undermined the state budget. Since the money has now been returned, so has his right to a clean service record.

Media Public Chamber Warns Paper Over Akayev Insults

LD0604120895 Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian 1 Apr 95 p5

[Article: "When the Brakes Fail"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Public Chamber [for Mass Media] has held a meeting because there has been another breach of the Law on the Mass Media by the RES PUBLICA newspaper. It published an article entitled "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back" signed by Zarlyk Dyykanbayev (RES PUBLICA, 14 March 1995).

The article contains unfounded accusations and insulting attacks against President Askar Akayev of the Kyrgyz Republic. Here are some excerpts: "In just three and half years, Akayev has managed to ruin everything that has built up with much effort over 70 years;" "Kyrgyzstan has undergone a historical collapse;" "the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents are fundamentally different from this apology for a Kyrgyz president;" "Askar Akayev will stick in the memory of the people as a two-faced person who was able to deceive, ignore his conscience, and so on;" "He is trying to increase the number of people in the Supreme Council who are like himself by recruiting the heads of mafio organizations and corrupt officials;" "Akayev's stupid approach which has ruined Kyrgyzstan;" "Kyrgyzstan will never find its way out of the dead end given Akayev's dubious nature," and so on.

As can be seen from the above quotations, Article 23 of the Law on the Mass Media, which states that the honor of a citizen must not be insulted and the honor and dignity of the individual must not be infringed, has been violated.

The column-heading "Unabridged Letters," which the newspaper has cited as covering it in this case, does not exempt it from responsibility.

In the opinion of the Public Chamber's members, the newspaper's editor, Zamira Sydykova, has sought to defame the president in a number of issues of the newspaper, and has crossed the boundaries of law and the generally accepted ethics of journalism.

On 14 October 1994 the Public Chamber warned Z.Sydykova against insulting the people of Kyrgyzstan in her newspapers. She later apologized in the press for what she had done. The editor has not, however, drawn practical conclusions from her mistakes.

In view of these circumstances, the Public Chamber has decided:

—to issue a second warning to RES PUBLICA editor Z.Sydykova over the publication of the article "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," which contravenes Article 23 of the Law on the Mass Media;

—to consider it expedient for a court to examine the breach of the Law on the Mass Media by the editorial staff of RES PUBLICA and the author, Z. Dyykanbayev.

The members of the Public Chamber have also voiced the opinion that the media does not disseminate much material which objectively reflects the causes of economic, social and other crisis, which have to do with the collapse of the socialist system all over the world. In consequence, there are demagogic articles and a wholesale disparagement of everything, and this is disruptive of constructive work by the republic's workforce and citizens.

The Public Chamber, which represent five republic-level organizations, calls on the whole of the media to make objective assessments of the activities of the power structures, and to avoid publishing criticism that is defamatory of anyone. Criticism only achieves its goal when it is true and well intentioned.

New Company Begins Mining Quartz

LD0704083095 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 0500 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Asia-Invest investment corporation has announced its birth: It has started mining mineral quartz on the outskirts of the mining town of Suluksi, for use in making car windows, porcelain, and earthenware. Enterprises from Suluksi and the neighboring Leninabad region of Tajikistan founded the corporation. Orders for this unique mineral are already coming in from enterprises in the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, and Russia. According to geologists' estimates, the mineral deposits total about 2 million tonnes.

Tajikistan

President Views Peacekeepers' Exercise

MM0604114895 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 31 Mar 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report from Tajikistan by I. Nurziyev, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[FBIS Translated Text] [100345] [Nurziyev] Taking part in joint tactical exercises held in the Republic of Tajikistan's Shaartuzskiy Rayon, bordering Afghanistan, were subunits of the Armed Forces of Russia and Uzbekistan forming part of the collective peacekeeping forces and Tajik units—1,500 servicemen in all, plus 140 items of military hardware, including 60 tanks and armored carriers, around 50 aircraft and helicopters, artillery pieces, and missile launchers. All this awe-inspiring might offered a truly impressive spectacle in the notional theater of military operations. The notional enemy, putting up fierce resistance, nonetheless suffered defeat—as envisaged by the scenario.

[V. Semenov, commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces Ground Forces speaking to journalists] We rehearsed all the actions to a good standard. In my opinion the set task has been implemented.

President Emomali Rahmanov of Tajikistan assessed the military exercises as follows:

[E. Rahmanov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan] A great deal remains to be done in rebuilding our armies and training staff. However, this joint exercise also counts as training for us; it represents practical assistance to us in training our cadres. [100455]

Rajabov Elected Parliament Speaker

LD0604122895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1154 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe April 6 TASS—Lawyer Safarali Rajabov [name as received], 40, representing the mountain Faizabad region of Tajikistan, was elected chairman of the new legislature of the Central Asian republic Thursday [6 April].

159 out of 174 lawmakers voted for him.

Rajabov was chairman of the parliamentary commission on legislation in the former Tajik Supreme Soviet.

Former head of the Supreme Soviet Abdumajid Dostiyev was elected first deputy speaker.

Local observers noted that the election of Rajabov, a representative of Faizabad, signals the balance of clan and regional interests in the national leadership as president Emomali Rakhmanov comes from the southern Khatloan region, while Prime Minister Dzhamshed Karimov is from the northern Leninabad region.

Further on Supreme Council Elections

LD0604182895 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1100 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first session of the Supreme Council began work at 1000 today. [passage omitted] At Kholmurod Sharipov's request the session agenda, containing 13 issues, was presented to those assembled. They include:

—election of a chairman of the Supreme Council;
—election of the first deputy chairman and deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan;
—the organization of committees and standing commissions;
—election of chairmen for the above committees and commissions;
—election of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Economic Court;
—implementation of the president's edicts on the format of the government;
—the appointment of the prosecutor general and the chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan;
—debate on the issue of a national currency for the Republic of Tajikistan;
—other matters.

The people's deputies elected People's Deputy Safarali Rajabov chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan by a majority vote in a secret ballot.

Then the first deputy chairman and deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council were elected. Abdumajid Dostiyev was elected first deputy chairman; and Qozidavlat Qoimdodov and Toshtemir Juraboyev were elected deputy chairmen of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The first session of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan continues.

Appointment of New Defense Minister Approved

LD0704095595 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0600 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first session of the National Assembly resumed at 1000 sharp this morning. National Assembly Chairman Safarali Rajabov presided over the meeting. [passage omitted]

The people's deputies confirmed the president's decree appointing Major General Sherali Khayrulloyev as minister of defense.

President Emomali Rakhmanov made a speech at the session, in which he drew the attention of the people's deputies to the importance of developing the national economy.

Parliament Confirms Prime Minister, Deputies

LD0704100795 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 0500 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first convocation of the first session of the Supreme Assembly is continuing its work today.

Yesterday, the people's deputies discussed five issues proposed in the agenda, and adopted the appropriate resolutions. After the election of the chairman of the Supreme Assembly and his deputies, the organization of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Assembly was deemed necessary and important. According to the resolution of the Supreme Assembly, eight committees and two commissions were organized. The people's delegates confirmed Muzaffar Ashurov, Narzullo Qarnishev, Ibrohim Usmonov, Mahmadshoh Bilolov, Khujaahmad Khidiraliyev and Neman Bakhti as chairmen of the committees and commissions.

In the evening session, the people's delegates confirmed the president's edicts on the formation of the government. The legislative bodies and executive bodies have worked in harmony from the first day of their activities. Jamshed Karimov, the prime minister of the republic, was unanimously confirmed. His deputies, Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev, Oqil Oqilov, Qadriddin Ghiyasov, Bozgul Dodkhudoyeva, Jamoliddin Mansurov and Holisjon Temurjonov were unanimously supported by the people's deputies. The people's delegates confirmed the ministers of the republic, who are members of the government. [passage omitted]

Internal Official Report on Economy Cited

954F1970A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Mar 95 p 2

[Oleg Rish report]

[FBIS Translated Text] As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has already reported, the government newspaper NARODNAYA GAZETA published on 18 February a survey of the state of the Tajikistan economy for 1994 [for a translation of this article see pp 56-63 of the FBIS DAILY REPORT SUPPLEMENT: CENTRAL EURASIA, FBIS-SOV-95-058-S dated 27 March 1995]. But aside from the information that has been offered the public, the Government of Tajikistan's State Statistical Agency has prepared a report on the republic's socioeconomic position stamped "Not for Publication."

The figures adduced in the report (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has a copy) testify to the catastrophic situation in industry and agriculture, which determines the living standard of society, the debt to which in terms of the disbursement of pay in 1994 constituted 71 percent, and in terms of pensions, allowances, and insurance compensation, 74 percent. This is connected primarily with the cash-circulation crisis. By the fourth quarter of 1994 industrial production had declined 44 percent compared with 1993, and in September-November, 52 percent. There was altogether 31 percent less output than in the previous year. The operation of heat and power plants declined more than 50 percent, and the manufacture of ammonia and mineral fertilizer fell 50-60 percent. Even in the traditional sphere—cotton-ginning—the production of cotton fiber declined 8.5 percent, including a 13.5 percent decline from the fine-fiber cotton plant. Shipments by all types of transport declined by one-fourth.

From 50 percent to 64 percent of tractors, motor vehicles, and other equipment employed in agriculture remained unserviced. The procurement of fodder declined 51 percent, in which connection there was a 10 percent reduction in the head of cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry. Purchases of farm products declined by 50 percent and more (for example, only 24 percent of the requisite quantity of wool was purchased, and of potatoes, 6 percent). The food situation will get worse because, according to the data of the report, only 68 percent of the soil was plowed for the winter crops.

The construction of clinics has practically come to a halt, and investment intentions in regard to the construction of preschools were fulfilled only 36 percent, hospitals, 42 percent, and general schools, 54 percent. As far as housing construction is concerned, the report observes that "in previous years it has been undertaken thanks to the funds of the populace" (the private residences of Minister of Foreign Affairs Yakub Salimov and President Emomali Rakhmonov in Dushanbe were built fastest of all, incidentally). In 1994 the introduction of housing thanks to the efforts of the public and the housing-construction cooperatives came to a complete halt. This was caused primarily by the fact that average pay in the national economy in November 1994 was determined at the level of 37,805 rubles. In agriculture and education it was even less—by 40 and 37 percent.

The production of footwear, cloth, and other products of light industry declined 70-50 percent, and of foodstuffs, 39 percent. Supplies from the CIS of basic foods—meat, poultry, flour, and cereals—declined 58-72 percent. The report notes as an achievement the fact that the republic had by the end of 1994 some 900 (!) cooperatives and private and small enterprises, almost half of which are in Leninabad Oblast, and 38 percent, in Dushanbe.

Cotton and aluminum, which were sold to the extent of $637.8 million, remain for Tajikistan the main types of export product. Tajikistan's main trading partners last year were the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Britain, and the United States, which purchased 91 percent of the exported cotton and aluminum. Imports consisted mainly of supplies of grain, flour, and sugar. In addition, raw material and intermediate goods for the Tajik Aluminum Plant constitute 60 percent of all imported supplies.

As A. Sufiyev, leader of the Statistical Agency, observes, the data of the report are incomplete owing to the fact that hundreds of organizations and enterprises did not present their reports—they had been provided with accounting document forms only to the extent of 15 percent.

Turkmenistan

Niyazov, Iranian Minister Discuss Communications

LD0604185995 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following discussions between Mohammad Gharazi, Iran's minister of post, telegraph and telephone, and Turkmen officials, it was decided that experts from the two countries will examine Iran's role in expanding the communication system in the city of Merv.

According to the Central News Bureau, Mr. Gharazi, who is visiting Turkmenistan at the head of a delegation, also met this country's president.

At the meeting, Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov proposed that Iran should construct communication systems for Turkmenistan. In reply Mr. Gharazi said Iran was prepared to cooperate in constructing an intercity communication system between Ashgabat and the north and the south, expanding the telephone system in the Turkman capital, and improving the country's communication system.

Further on Meeting

LD0604192395 Tehran IRNA in English 1905 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 6, IRNA—Turkmen president, Saparmurad Niyazov, in a meeting in Ashgabat Thursday [6 April] with Iranian Minister of Post and Telegraph, Mohammad Gharazi, referred to American attempts to abort the Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation and said achieving atomic energy for peaceful purposes is Iran's right.

Taking note of the important geographical situation of Turkmenistan and Iran, Niyazov said there were ample areas of cooperation between the two countries as well as trilateral cooperation of the two sides with other regional countries such as Russia, Ukraine, India and Pakistan.

He also emphasized on the importance of Iran's role in the expansion of bilateral ties and cooperation.

Gharazi elaborating on Iran's abilities in the area of telecommunications suggested cooperation with Turkmenistan in this vital field.

Welcoming the proposal, Niyazov instructed Turkmen telecommunication officials to provide necessary conditions for Iranian experts.

Gharazi also met with Turkmen Vice President for Energy and Industry, Hakim Ishanov on Thursday.

Ishanov proposing transfer of Turkmenistan's electricity to third countries via Iranian soil, called for dispatch of Iranian experts to Ashgabat for reviewing ways of implementing the project.

Gharazi is visiting Turkmenistan in order to review ways of expanding bilateral cooperation in the area of telecommiunications.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Receives U.S. Defense Secretary Perry

LD0604134595 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The visit by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry to our country is continuing.

Today, Uzbek President Islam Karimov received the U.S. defense secretary. During a candid conversation, the role of the Republic of Uzbekistan in assuring security in the region of Central Asia was especially noted. Perry and President Karimov had an exchange of opinions on cooperation in the defense and military fields between the two countries and on other questions. [passage omitted]

After the meetings and talks, Perry met American journalists and media representatives of our republic and answered questions. During the meeting with journalists, the U.S. defense secretary noted in particular that the visit to Tashkent was successful, and that he had fruitful talks with President Karimov and Defense Minister Rustam Ahmedov.

Uzbekistan is playing a great role in assuring security in Central Asia. We support the economic reforms being carried out in the republic. Thanks to the stability in the country, more than 100 American firms are investing their money in your republic, said Perry.

Henry Lee Clarke, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States to Uzbekistan, was present during the meeting with journalists. Perry visited the large city of Samarkand to see the historic and ancient parts of the city. Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov and Defense Minister Ahmedov are accompanying the guest.

Karimov: U.S. Presence Guarantees Stability

LD0604120795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1025 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TASHKENT, April 6 (Interfax)—U.S. presence in Central Asia "is a guarantee of stability", declared Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov, meeting with U.S. defence Secretary William Perry in Tashkent Thursday [6 April].

"This will allow not only to localize conflicts in volatile spots but also to prevent Islamic fundamentalism from spreading in the region," he noted.

Karimov voiced concern at "high power sentiments" gathering strength in Russia and at "mounting nostalgia for the past times of the Union."

"Uzbekistan will never turn back, he stressed. We have chosen our path of development and are not going to copy other countries."

"For this reason, we are interested in close cooperation with U.S. and have actively joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program," Karimov said.

Leaders, Perry Hold News Conference

LD0704092995 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Uzbek 1630 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] As was announced on 5 April, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry has arrived in Uzbekistan. Rustam Ahmedov, minister of defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and his wife, Abdulaziz Komilov, minister of foreign affairs of the republic, as well as other officials met the U.S. defense secretary and his wife. Henry Lee Clark, U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Uzbekistan, was present at the ceremony.

Today, Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, received the members the delegation, headed by William Perry, who are guests in our country. The Uzbekistan leader greeted the guest and the people accompanying him on their visit to our country, and he noted that the visit is an important event for Uzbekistan. Our president noted that he highly values relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan, and is satisfied with their overall development. We have been satisfied with the relations between our countries, especially since the second half of last year, the president said. I think that such a highly developed country as America can help young states such as Uzbekistan, which are boldly following the path of independence in terms of the all-round implementation of economic and political reform.

After this, Islam Karimov noted that the guest will visit and learn about the independent countries of Central Asia during his visit, which will be of great importance in making a correct estimate of the real situation here.

The American guest expressed thanks to our president for the respect and attention shown to him by Uzbekistan, and gave an assurance that he will fruitfully use all possibilities to reinforce relations between the two countries. There was an all-round exchange of opinions on questions of defense in the region, on ensuring political stability, and other questions connected with the bordering countries.

From the Uzbek side, Bakhtiyor Gulomov, state advisor to the president of the republic, deputy prime ministers Utkur Sultanov and Bakhtiyor Hamidov, Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov, Defense Minister Rustam Ahmedov, and other officials participated in the discussion, and from the U.S. side the people accompanying the secretary of defense, and U.S. Ambassador Henry Lee Clark took part.

Also today there was a briefing by President Islam Karimov for mass media representatives of the United States registered in the countries of Central Asia, and for correspondents from our country. William Perry, members the delegation accompanying him, and other officials took part. Our president made a short announcement to the mass media at the beginning of the meeting.

[Begin recording] [Karimov, in Russian] Gentlemen, I am happy to greet you, and if you have questions for me, I am ready to use this opportunity to answer them. But, before answering your questions, I would like to make a short announcement.

I was impressed by the meeting with Mr. Perry, which has just taken place. We exchanged opinions on the most important questions of securing the stability of our region; the state and progress of the democratic reforms taking place in Uzbekistan; relations and cooperation between the United States of America and Uzbekistan in the fields of military and technical cooperation and defense; Uzbekistan's participation in the "Partnership for Peace" program; and on the processes taking place in Uzbekistan in this context.

I would like—maybe I am straying a little from the program, so to speak—but I would like to say that Mr. Perry has made a very great impression on me. And, in your presence, I would like once more to express my gratitude to him and the members of the American deleagtion for having considered it possible to visit Uzbekistan. Thank you.

[Charles Aldinger, REUTER correspondent, in English, with superimposed translation in Uzbek] What is the potential for the two sides, the United States and Uzbekistan, to cooperate in ensuring security in this region?

[Karimov, in Russian] Let me start with the second part of your question, because we see U.S. help as lying in the maintenance of stability and the prevention of any threats that Uzbekistan might face.

I see three issues which deserve to be looked at. In the post-Soviet region we primarily see the following obstacles, what I would call threats, which could halt the development process of Uzbek independence, which could threaten Uzbekistan's independence and the democratic processes taking place in Uzbekistan.

First, there are the imperialist ambitions rearing up in Russia. I mean the chauvinist attitudes which are intensifying daily in Russia. As you can clearly note, all the political parties and movements are daily seeking to exploit the slogan of "statehood," all the more so in the run-up to the elections. Mr. Rutskoy's recent statement saying that he wants to bring you all to your knees and bring back Russia's old borders was no chance remark. It may be that he and the likes of Zhirinovskiy are saying out loud something that is in the minds of many, many people, including Russia's leaders.

Second, there is the threat from the South, the threat of fundamentalism. This involves events in Afghanistan, the continuing war there, the instability in Tajikistan, the continuing military clashes on the Afghan-Tajik border. Since there is no border between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this is also a direct threat to Uzbekistan.

A third problem is how to ensure Uzbekistan's accelerated, forced advance along the road of political and economic reform. The most important thing is to change people's way of thinking, to change their mentality and the attitude of dependency which was fostered here during 70 years of Soviet power.

And of course we need the help of the United States in all these issues. I mean in solving all three problems.

I want to inform you that there are already more than 10 different U.S. missions and organizations, and more than 100 joint ventures here. We are experiencing the concrete assistance which the United States is giving us concerning ecological, economic, and educational matters—and we hope now in the sphere of military technology.

I wish to tell you that we attach immense importance, priority importance, to the establishment of close relations with the United States. And we attach priority importance to strengthening and expanding these relations. Thank you.

[William Garth, WASHINGTON TIMES correspondent, in English, with superimposed translation in Uzbek] Mr. President, some of the Western press occasionally report human rights violations in Uzbekistan. We would like your views on this in order to clarify this question.

[Karimov, in Russian] Uzbekistan has chosen its own path of development, and the principal substance of this is that the primacy of economics over politics must be ensured above all, as the most important thing.

We are convinced that political reforms must be founded on economic reforms. So we admit that political reforms are lagging behind economic reforms in Uzbekistan. And we understand the critical attitude of the United States to the political reforms taking place here. We really do think that we need to work on this, and force these processes forward. We have no question marks over this.

Yet at the same time I wish to take advantage of your question to say this. If someone tells you that certain states in the post-Soviet region have already built democratic societies, please do not believe them.

Indeed, a constitution has been adopted and laws passed. For instance, Uzbekistan has such very important laws as the law on freedom of conscience, the law on civil rights, a law relating to protection of voters' rights, a law on elections and referendums.

In short, if we assess the state of the legal foundations guaranteeing human rights and press freedom with a critical eye, in principle all these laws, the legal foundation, have been created. But implementing them today requires a serious forcing of the pace.

There is one small point. You Americans do not fully understand the system within which we once lived as part of the USSR. With 100 percent state ownership, and with one ideology reigning supreme, people developed into a certain stereotype. When someone is 100 percent dependent on the state—in other words when his wages and his life are entirely dependent on the state—can he feel that he is free and independent?

Consequently, in order to guarantee human rights—freedoms and rights in the full sense of those democratic standards of which you speak—we need to ensure that we have private ownership, that people do not depend on the state, and that people depend on themselves, on their own two hands, and on their own work. What I want to say is that only economic freedom of the individual can ensure his political freedom. Tell me, can human rights in the sense you are asking about exist as long as monopoly state ownership continues to exist in all the CIS countries?

Yes, we give the individual a guarantee of the right to life, a guarantee of legal protection for the individual, a guarantee of social protection, a guarantee of the right of free expression of will, and we are creating the conditions for the elected bodies to be really democratically elected. But I say again that the people's mentality must be changed, and in my view it must be changed via ownership. The individual must be an owner; the individual must own property and be fully independent economically.

In the first years of our independence we found ourselves in a very difficult situation. There were indeed tumultuous events here. Certain excesses were committed. There were as yet no laws. What we might call the legal administrative system had not been fully formed. And in that period events happened which essentially you could not understand.

The questions you are asking about restrictions on rights, and persecution—yes, they did take place. But that is all in the past. Today, I declare that those issues have virtually been resolved here, and that there is no persecution.

A legal foundation is being created for a multiparty system, and the recent elections to parliament are graphic evidence of this. The recent parliamentary elections were supervized by 85 monitors from various international organizations and countries. They took place on a multiparty basis for the first time. No accusations as such were made against us by the international monitors. Thank you. [end recording]

[Announcer] During the discussion, William Perry expressed his thanks for the sincerity shown him in Uzbekistan, and said that he highly valued the great work being done under the leadership of the president of the republic and the activity of President Islam Karimov. He expressed his belief that in the near future Uzbekistan will draw level with the world's developed countries.

Also today, William Perry and the people accompanying him visited the Defense Ministry of the republic. Lt. Gen. Rustam Ahmedov, and Abdulaziz Komilov received the guest. There were talks between the Uzbekistan and U.S. military delegations. They were chaired Rustam Ahmedov and William Perry. Questions of security in the Central Asia region and the prospects of military cooperation between the two countries were discussed during the talks. U.S. ambassador Henry Lee Clark also attended the visit to the Defense Ministry.

A guard of honor was formed for the most high-ranking guest. The head of the honor guard reported, and proposed an inspection of the honor guard, formed from soldiers of different units. The ministers of the two states and the accompanying guests took up the positions designated for them. A military band played the national anthems of the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Later today, William Perry left Tashkent for Samarkand. Before his departure, he held a news conference at the airport, and answered a number of questions of interest. Rustam Ahmedov and Abdulaziz Komilov are accompanying the guest on his visit to Samarkand.

Interest in Close U.S. Cooperation

LD0604172295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1646 GMT 6 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The presence of the United States in Central Asia is a guarantee of stability in that part of the world, President Islam Karimov told the U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry during a Thursday [6 April] meeting in Tashkent. In his opinion this presence will help localize conflicts in hot spots and prevent the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

He described the political and economic situation in Central Asia as quite complicated and hoped that the USA has an idea of what is going on in Uzbekistan and the rest of the region.

Karimov remarked that Uzbekistan's closest neighbors—China, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—increasingly call for forming an Eurasian union but after Uzbekistan won its independence it will never give it up. He drew the attention of the defense secretary to the fact that his country did not sign the treaty on the CIS joint armed forces and joint command of the border force because in the long run it would be an encroachment on Uzbek sovereignty. "Uzbekistan will never turn back. We have chosen our own road and do not intend to mimic other countries," Karimov declared.

Karimov was alarmed by strengthening imperial feelings in Russia and growing nostalgia for Soviet times.

The president stressed that Uzbekistan is interested in close cooperation with the USA and has actively joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program. He expressed his sympathy for the Ukrainian military doctrine and urged the American official to help that country strengthen its independence.

Perry said that the USA views Uzbekistan as well as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan as a strategically strong nation playing an important role not just in Central Asia but Eurasia in general.

He singled out the role Uzbekistan played in preventing conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. That is why, he said, the USA is ready to offer all-round support for democratic reforms and the strengthening of stability there.

The defense secretary said that the active involvement of Uzbekistan in the Partnership for Peace program is regarded as an important contribution to the formation of a zone of peace and security. "Uzbekistan is an island of stability in a stormy sea of instability," the official said.

He wished Karimov to carry out political reforms as fast as possible adding that current economic changes in Uzbekistan have full approval and understanding from America.

Perry told Karimov that his talks with Defense Minister Rustam Akhmedov and Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov resulted in a decision to set up a working group to study the prospects of bilateral cooperation. The talks also worked out a program of joint actions such as the training of Uzbek officers and the organization of joint exercises.

Armenia

Zurabyan Says Armenia Favors Extension of NPT

NC0604174495 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1424 GMT 6 Apr 95

["Armenia Calls For Extension of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"—NOYAN TAPAN headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 06/04/95 NOYAN TAPAN—A conference dedicated to the issue of extension of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] is scheduled to take place in New York in April, 1995. The treaty was signed in 1970 for the period of 25 years. Nuclear powers suggest extending it for more 25 years or for uncertain period of time. However, some of the countries possessing no nuclear weapons oppose this suggestion. Egypt and a number of Muslim countries refuse signing the treaty until Israel puts its signature under it. According to unverified data Israel possesses nuclear weapons. However, it is necessary that at least half of the countries-participants of the treaty (170 countries) were in favor of extension of the treaty.

"Armenia takes positive side on this issue", the Acting President's Press Secretary Levon Zurabyan said.

Foreign Minister Leads Delegation to Iran

NC0604211395 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0823 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN" daily), 04/06/95—Based on the agreements reached during RA [Republic of Armenia] President's visit to Iran, an official delegation, headed by Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan, left for Teheran on April 5.

According to press service of the Foreign Ministry, the Armenian delegation will participate in Iran-Turkmenistan-Armenia three-lateral negotiations to be held on April 6-7, to discuss development of economic collaboration between the three countries, particularly in the spheres of industry, trade, cargo transportation, and in a number of other fields.

The delegation involves Minister of Transportation H. Kochinyan, Deputy Foreign Minister E. Zuloyan, First Deputy Minister of Economy V. Movsesyan, and other officials.

Parliament Passes Economic Programs

954F1973A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[ARMENPRESS report: "'This Year Will Be Decisive'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At its session on 27 March the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia approved a most important package of documents having a bearing on economic policy in the republic in the current year: the state budget of the Republic of Armenia and programs of socioeconomic development and monetary policy. At the request of an ARMENPRESS correspondent the main directions of the above-mentioned documents were presented by Armen Yegiazaryan, minister of economics of the Republic of Armenia:**

The main purpose of the program of socioeconomic development is continuation of the stabilization process. A monthly decrease in inflation to 1 percent and a halving of the budget deficit are contemplated at the end of the year. The complete liberalization of prices is scheduled before the year is out. The privatization process will be intensified, more than 500 "small" facilities have already been privatized, and a further 2,000 approximately will have been privatized by September. The privatization of large-scale facilities will continue: Various types of privatization of 900 enterprises will be proposed. The privatization process will be completed in the next two years.

A most important task in the social sphere is the implementation of reforms concerning pay: The real wages of employees of organizations in the public sector are to have increased fivefold within three years. One direction of the social sphere is the creation of a system of earmarked assistance, and the Paros program is designed to play a big part in this respect.

A growth of production of 13.5 percent in the republic in the sphere of industry is envisaged, structural transformations will begin, and a qualitatively new system of assistance to the private sector will be created this year. The Armenian Private Business Company with a capital of $10 million for the purpose of lending to and assisting private business will commence operation at the end of the year.

Levon Barkhudaryan, minister of finance of the Republic of Armenia:

This year the budget deficit will constitute 12 percent of GNP. The advantage is that the deficit will be financed, on the whole, from noninflationary sources—credit. The process of the contracting of new debt will be suspended, and, in addition, last year's debt of 9.7 billion drams will be covered at the expense of this year's budget. Another feature is that the proportion of current financing is greater than the capital expenditure, which is explained by the appreciable growth of the proportion of capital spending thanks to foreign investments. The 1995 budget has a more clear-cut social focus: In particular, there is an increase in subsidies in the sphere of health care.

A growth of GNP of 5 percent is planned, and inflation over the year will constitute 64.6 percent, and excluding the rise in the state-controlled prices and rates for bread and a number of other commodities and services, 22.4 percent.

Bagrat Asatryan, chairman of the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia:

The main purpose of this year's monetary policy is to ensure the proportionality of macroeconomic stability and the development of the economy and an appreciable reduction in the rate of inflation. In January inflation amounted to 3.9 percent, and in February, to 0.7 percent; the identical indicators for March have yet to be tallied, but they will, I believe, constitute 1 percent. But particular inflation is expected in the very near future in the sphere of the economy also, in connection with the freeing of prices. New market proportions will be created, in any event. The year of 1995 will be the final year in this respect, and guarantees of the normal management of the economy will appear. In the current year the targeted task remains strict monetary and financial policy and also the development of individual components of the financial market: securities, credit, and other markets. The development of a banking system and questions of the regulation and supervision of the activity of the banks will be a priority task of the Central Bank.

In any event, 1995 will be decisive for our economy and state. If the set program questions are solved, we may be firmly confident that serious guarantees of the further growth of the economy and a solution of social questions will be created.

Nagorno-Karabakh Official Demands Clarification

954F2016B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 1 Apr 95 p 1

[SNARK report: "Nagorno-Karabakh Demands Clarification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until such time as the question of status of the delegation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] is fully clarified for all stages of the negotiations process in attempting to secure a settlement to the conflict, including the Minsk Conference of the OSCE, there cannot even be discussion of the possibility of signing any significant political document. NKR Minister of Foreign Affairs Arkadiy Gukasyan spoke on this matter today with journalists in Stepanakert.

According to him, the question of the format of the negotiations was also a key issue during the latest meeting in Yerevan between the head of the NKR foreign policy department and Vladimir Kazimirov and Anders Bjorner—representatives of the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference, who were never able to visit Stepanakert during their recent trip to the region because of poor flying weather.

Gukasyan noted that the Karabakh side was unambiguously letting it be known that the 24 March 1992 decision of the CSCE Council of Ministers, in which Nagornyy Karabakh figures only as an interested party, constitutes a serious obstacle in the negotiations process and must be reviewed, insofar as it was doomed to failure from the very outset as not reflecting the essence of the conflict and existing realities. In this regard, the minister directed journalists' attention to the fact that decisions of the Budapest OSCE summit on fundamental positions actually supersede the document of three years ago. Thus, he recalled, the meeting of heads of OSCE states in December 1994 in the Hungarian capital introduced significant changes to the issue on negotiations format, virtually enhancing Nagorno-Karabakh's status here to the level of conflicting party, and also introduced the institution of cochairmen of the Minsk OSCE Conference, which was not envisaged in the 24 March 1992 decision.

It is only natural, Gukasyan emphasized, that the necessity arises under such conditions to adopt a new document, which would secure legally and politically the decisions of the Budapest summit with respect to the status of Karabakh in the negotiations process, including at the planned Minsk OSCE Conference. Vladimir Kazimirov and Anders Bjorner were informed of this in Yerevan, as were other members of the Minsk group.

Unemployment Continues To Grow

954F2016A Yerevan VREMYA in Russian 1 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Most of the Unemployed Are Women"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to data of the Armenian Republic State Administration for Statistics, in January 1995 the number of individuals employed in the republic economy was 1,475. This represents a decrease of 2.9 percent from last year's level.

According to data of the Armenian Republic Ministry of Labor and Social Security, as of 1 February 1995, 88,000 people were entered on the rolls of the Employment Directorate. Some 79,100 people (52,000 of whom are women) acquired the status of unemployed. The number of unemployed who are receiving compensation came to 24,700. The average amount of unemployment compensation was 960.6 drams.

The unemployment level in the republic (percentage of unemployed among the total number of economically active population) in January 1995 was 5.1 percent. This is a 0.7 percent drop from the previous month's level, and a 1.3 percent drop from the level of January 1994.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Views Russia's Ambitions in Azerbaijan

MS0604154495

[FBIS Editorial Report] The London BBC Television Network "Newsnight" program at 2130 GMT on 4 April carries a 14-minute report by Gordon Brewer from the series "Back in the USSR" on Russian ambitions toward Azerbaijan's oil fields in the Caspian sea. The report includes an interview with Azeri President Geydar Aliyev.

The report opens with aerial footage of Russian-built oil installations in the Caspian sea interconnected with roads suspended over the sea, cutting to show oil workers in a bus, then showing apartment blocks build on an outcrop of rocks in the middle of the oil field. The report then includes an interview with Museib Babayev, oil engineer.

Babayev says: "After the collapse of the Soviet Union our economy was in a very bad way. We have very little capital and oil drilling in the Caspian involves big money, and we used to buy Soviet equipment. But if we are to overhaul our oil fields and expand into foreign markets, we need western technology, and at the moment we don't have it."

The report then shows railroad installations north of Baku which was Azerbaijan's economic link with Russia, and where locomotives and rolling stock stand idle because Russia has closed the lines because of the war in Chechnya, however Azeri's see it as an deliberate economic blockade. The report then shows library pictures of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the territorial dispute of Nagorno Karabakh. The report continues with footage of celebrations at a sports center in Baku paying tribute to Azerbaijan's Olympic squad, but where the ceremony takes a turn to the war with Armenia and its Russian supporters, cutting to show President Geydar Aliyev leaving the center. The report then includes an interview with Aliyev.

Aliyev says [with English translation]: "I don't see why Azerbaijan should come under Russian influence. Azerbaijan is an independent state, it is building and is continuing to build relations based on equal rights with other countries of the world, including our neighbors. We share a large border with Russia, and it goes without saying that we have extensive and historical links with that country, but that doesn't mean Azerbaijan should come under Russian influence. No, we are an independent country."

The Report then shows an oil rig which is being refurbished by a consortium of western oil companies led by BP [British Petroleum] and Norway's Statoil. The report describes western investment as Azerbaijan's gateway to winning economic independence from Russia.

The report then shows ships of the Azerbaijan navy, and some naval guns. The report goes on to describe Russia's ambitions to lease military bases in Azerbaijan and to place Russian Border guards on Azerbaijan's border with Iran.

Aliyev continues: "Azerbaijan is quite capable of guarding the border's for itself. True, things are made difficult by the fact that Russian border troops alone guard the Armenian border with Turkey, Georgia's border with Turkey likewise is guarded exclusively by Russians. And in Central Asia, for instance, there are also Russian border guards. Therefore when most, almost all of the countries of the CIS agree to have joint border guards and Azerbaijan does not, it's naturally not easy. Nevertheless we stand by our position, we believe the border is one of the main attributes of sovereignty and independence, and therefore we consider that if we are an independent state we should be the one's to guard our borders."

The report then shows [?Gabala], a top secret long-range radar base which is under Russian control, cutting to show the Gateway into the base and a Russian armed guard on duty. The report goes on to show the offices of an independent newspaper which has to submit it's reports to a censor before publication, cutting to show an rundown textile mill in Baku which is suffering from lack of investment and loss of Russia as it's main export market. The report then interviews Sabutay Gajiyev, Chairman, Workers' Party.

Gajeyev says: "Azerbaijan's economic potential is not being fulfilled at all. Our economy was once integrated with the Soviet republics, including Russia. I doubt the west will help us get our factories operating again. The west would have more to gain by building new factories than helping to resurrect existing factories with the antiquated technology. What Azerbaijan needs now as a transition stage are economic links, not just with Russia, but with all the former republics of the Soviet Union."

The report then shows library footage of factions of the army rebelling in mid-March accusing the Government of corruption.

Turkish, Azerbaijani Stances on Turks' Role in Unrest

NC0604144095 Baku TURAN in English 1310 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 5) TURAN—A scandal due to condemn the Turkish diplomats, on their participation in the events taking place in Baku on March 13-17 runs high. As it was reported, on March 31 the police conducted a search in the department of the Turkish education representation, which has a diplomatic status. According to Interior Minister Ramil Usubov, the police had an information that Mahir Javadov, the brother of the leader of OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment] Rovshan Javadov, hid in that region. But the search was not successful. Neither Foreign Ministry nor the Turkish Embassy made any statement on that issue. At the same time, the information that "some Turkish diplomats have the relation to the attempt of coup" still appear in the local press. Though there is not an official refutation by the Turkish Embassy on the matter, some high ranking employees of the Embassy has already left Azerbaijan, among them is the Ambassador Altan Karamanoglu.

The official Baku, without making any statements, hints at its attitude to the situation. Thus, the press-secretary of the Turkish Embassy Turgur Er was not admitted to the presidential office, where he went together with the Deputy Ambassador and Vice President of the Turkey's State Oil company.

But the opinion on the participation the Turkish Embassy in the events taking place Baku in March was repeated in the reports of Azeri correspondent on the Russian TV. It is unbelievable that the information which does not suit the authorities of Azerbaijan can be spread under the condition of such a strict censorship.

Summarising all that one can suppose that the official Baku expresses its distrust to the present Ambassador of Turkey. Judging by all the official Baku was indignant with the fact that Altan Karamanoglu was too "diligent" trying to settle the conflict between Rovshan Javadov and the Azeri authorities without bloodshed. It should also be noted that not any trustworthy documents proving the participation of the foreign citizens or states in March events were published. First that opinion was expressed by Geydar Aliyev himself and then by Abbasov, the Ministry of National Security.

It became known from the reliable sources that during the seizure the head-quarter of OPON in Baku on March 17, six employees of Russian special services were killed. They had the documents proving that. Nevertheless, there are charges addressed to the representatives of the other states.

The last actions of Azeri authorities concerning Turkish diplomats in Baku were sharply criticised in today's issues of Turkish newspapers.

Kazakh, Tauz Regional Heads Relieved of Posts

NC0604141495 Baku TURAN in English 2000 GMT 5 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, April 5 (TURAN)—By the Presidential decree the heads of two western regions of Azerbaijan, Akstafa and Kazakh, are relieved of their posts. Asad Orujev is appointed the head of the Kazakh region and Gasanali Gadimov is appointed the head of the Akstafa region.

As the decree reads, the former heads of these regions are relieved for "bad management".

According to unofficial data, the heads of the abovementioned regions are relieved for indecision during the events on March 13, when the OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment] groups seized the power in Kazakh and Akstafa. Earlier the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic initiated criminal proceedings against the Chief of the police of the Kazakh region, who supported the mutinies during those events.

Justice Ministry To Monitor Activity of Parties

NC0604142595 Baku TURAN in English 1310 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 4) TURAN—"We are going to check the activity of some political parties of the Republic," TURAN was told by the acting first deputy of Justice Ministry Sudaba Gasanova. According to her, the Ministry of Justice has not enough facilities for checking all parties, "but the activity of five or six parties will be checked," noted she.

"They mean the Party of Leyla Yunusova (Independent Democratic Party), Musavat, the Party of Zardusht Alizade (Social Democratic Party), Azerbaijan's Popular Front is not a Party, that is why we cannot check them," noted Gasanova.

All these parties sharply criticizes the actions of authorities on the settlement the crisis in March caused by actions of OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment].

A week ago The Ministry of Justice adopted a decision on the liquidation "Boz Gurd" [Gray Wolf] Party which, according to officials, participated in the armed actions of OPON.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Issues Mass Privatization Edict

AU0704113495 Tbilisi KAVKASIONI in Georgian 22 Mar 95 p 1

[Edict issued by Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze on organizational and economic measures to ensure the implementation of mass privatization; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The accomplishment of tasks pertaining to the distribution of privatization vouchers to Republic of Georgia citizens, the regulation of organizational measures concerning their circulation and coverage, and the organizational, methodical, and information provision necessary for the establishment, equipping, and functioning of the republican privatization voucher auction and application processing center and regional voucher auction centers has very great importance for the formation of a massive stratum of private owners among the broad sections of the republic's population. It directly concerns the interests of the individual citizen and his involvement in market economic relations and is, on account of its scale, not only an important economic but also political phenomenon in the country's history; to all intents and purposes, this is becoming an important stage in the implementation of economic reform in the forthcoming period.

In this connection:

1. The Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers, ministries and departments, and local bodies of administration are to view the political, economic, financial, and information provision for the implementation of mass privatization in Georgia as a task that is of utmost importance.

To establish that local bodies of administration should present information to the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers and the Georgian head of state once every two weeks on work being carried out on the distribution of privatization vouchers in the corresponding regions.

2. To create a commission to direct mass privatization. It is to be composed of the following people:
Temur Basilia—commission chairman, Republic of Georgia deputy prime minister;
Avtandil Silagadze—deputy chairman, Republic of Georgia minister for the management of state property;
Vladimer Papava—Republic of Georgia minister of economy;
Davit Iakobidze—Republic of Georgia minister of finance;
Pridion Injia—Republic of Georgia minister of communications;
Archil Gogelia—chairman of the Television and Radio Corporation;
Petre Bakradze—deputy chief of the apparatus of the head of state;
Vano Chkhartishvili—chairman of the New Georgian Bank;
Leri Gigineishvili—chairman of the Socioeconomic Information Committee;
Jimi Mikeladze—Republic of Georgia first deputy minister of internal affairs;
Emir Jugheli—Republic of Georgia first deputy minister for the management of state property;
Vladimer Karseladze—Republic of Georgia deputy minister for the management of state property;
Martin Ronsholt [name as transliterated]—World Bank manager of the mass privatization project in Georgia;
Shota Kokhreidze—head of the executive service of the Council for Coordinating the Implementation of the Privatization Voucher System Attached to the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers.

3. The Council for Coordinating the Implementation of the Privatization Voucher System Attached to the Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers and its executive service are to ensure within two weeks the start of the campaign to distribute privatization vouchers in those regions in which the preparatory work has been carried out satisfactorily.

The Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers is to discuss specially the information from the local boards of administration of those towns and rayons that are not ready to distribute privatization vouchers and are to adopt the appropriate measures to ensure that the preparatory work is completed within the shortest period of time so that the campaign to distribute privatization vouchers throughout the country ends by 1 July 1996.

4. To create a republican voucher auction and application processing center and subordinate it to the republic's Ministry for the Management of State Property; the following regional voucher auction centers are to be subordinated to the center: In Tbilisi—eastern zone; in Kutaisi—western zone; in Batumi—the Ajarian Autonomous Republic zone. To create within two weeks in all towns and rayons in the Republic of Georgia privatization voucher reception points and to bring them up to full strength with the appropriate number of cadres. To instruct the regional voucher auction centers in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Batumi to fulfill the functions of privatization voucher reception points.

5. To entrust the Ministry for the Management of State Property:

To confirm within two weeks the head of the Republican Voucher Auction and Application Processing Center and its rules. To establish that the head of the Republican Voucher Auction and Application Processing Center is a member of the Commission Directing Mass Privatization.

To ensure that the republican and regional centers are supplied with the appropriate equipment.

6. To entrust the leadership of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic, the head of state's plenipotentiaries in the regions, and the chairmen of town and rayon administrative boards (mayors) to ensure the establishment of voucher auction regional centers and privatization voucher reception points and to inform without delay the Commission Directing Mass Privatization about this.

7. The Commission Directing Mass Privatization, the Council for Coordinating the Implementation of the Privatization Voucher System attached to the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Committee for Refugees and Resettlement, along with local bodies of administration, are to pay particular attention to the question of temporarily issuing forcibly displaced persons with privatization vouchers in those towns and rayons where they are registered. At the same time, in accordance with the real situation, they are to carry out preparatory work on the creation of regional voucher auction centers in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

8. To entrust the Republic of Georgia Ministry for the Management of State Property, along with branch ministries and departments, to discuss the question of the expediency of leaving in their posts the directors of those joint stock companies in which the printing of shares is being hindered.

9. To entrust the Republic of Georgia Ministry for the Management of State Property, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Bank, the New Georgian Bank (Savings Bank), the Ministry of Communications, and the Council for Coordinating the Implementation of the Privatization Voucher System Attached to the Cabinet of Ministers to ensure the implementation of organizational and procedural measures that are necessary to safeguard the distribution and circulation of privatization vouchers among Republic of Georgia citizens and their coverage.

10. The Republic of Georgia Ministry of Internal Affairs, along with other competent bodies, is to ensure the

protection of facilities connected with the operation of the privatization voucher system and implement measures to prevent the possible printing and circulation of false vouchers, the procurement of several vouchers by one person, and general expected negative occurrences.

11. The Republic of Georgia Cabinet of Ministers is to devise a mechanism and determine sources for the material stimulation of those actively participating in the mass privatization campaign within two weeks.

12. To instruct the Republic of Georgia Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation and SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA, SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA, and TBILISI and request private television companies and newspapers to devote maximum attention to questions concerning the progress of the process of mass privatization in the Republic of Georgia and to give systematic coverage to it in their publications and programs.

[Signed] E. Shevardnadze

'Supreme Body of Power' Established in Abkhazia

AU0704070995 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 22 Mar 95 p 2

["Georgian Parliament Decree on the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Supreme Body of Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 10 March 1994, the Georgian Parliament dissolved the Supreme Council of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR].

This zero option was creating the conditions so that, following the return of hundreds of thousands of persecuted people who had been banished as a result of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, the political status of Abkhazia would have been determined within the boundaries of the Georgian state that have been repeatedly confirmed by UN resolutions and recognized by the world and the foundation would have been laid for holding democratic elections in Abkhazia.

In spite of this, the Gudauta separatist grouping that is devoid of any legitimacy and that was elected to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Council in 1991 by a minority of the population, with the seal of national approval and with the prior guarantee of a majority in Parliament, has again continued to function illegally as the supreme body of power and, furthermore, has adopted a so-called constitution, elected a president, and declared the Abkhazian region an independent republic and a subject of international law.

Those deputies in the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Council who, in reality, express the interests of the majority of the multinational Abkhazian population halted their activities in the supreme body of power even before the start of the armed conflict in protest against the anticonstitutional activities of the Gudauta separatist grouping. Taking into account the aforementioned, they resumed their work in January 1995 and asked the Georgian Parliament to confirm their competence.

The Georgian Parliament believes that the existing power vacuum in Abkhazia enables the Gudauta grouping to prolong its criminal activities and usurp power and not to permit the return of the persecuted population, the holding of free elections, and the de facto restoration of Georgian jurisdiction in the Abkhazian region.

In accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Republic of Georgia Law "on State Power," the Republic of Georgia Parliament decrees:

1. To recognize those deputies elected to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Council in 1991 who, in reality, express the interests of the majority of the Abkhazian population and who have not taken part in anticonstitutional activities along with the Gudauta separatist grouping as the supreme representation and legislative body—Supreme Council—of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic (see attached list).

2. The Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Supreme Council is to conduct its activities in accordance with the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Constitution of 1978 and those legislative acts that do not contradict Georgian legislation; to create the necessary legislative base that will ensure the normal functioning of all structures in the autonomous republic and to create the corresponding normative base so that democratic elections can be held in Abkhazia.

3. To empower the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Supreme Council to participate in all talks concerning the Abkhazian question.

To consider as null and void any treaty, agreement, and statement concerning the Abkhazian question that does not have the consent of the delegation appointed by the Abkhazian Supreme Council.

4. To request that UN-member states and international organizations refrain from entering into any relations with an aggressive and separatist regime (the Guduata grouping) that is guilty of ethnic cleansing and genocide, except for officials, intermediaries, and observers participating in the peace process who should create all conditions for peaceful activities aimed at settling the conflict.

5. The decree comes into force upon publication.

[Signed] Georgian Parliament Speaker Vakhtang Goguadze.

Tbilisi, 24 February 1995.

List of Abkhazian Autonomous Republic Deputies Elected in October 1991

1. Astemirova Eteri Gasanis asuli [daughter of Gasani]—Sukhumi electoral district no. 4

2. Gvadzabia Davit Davitis dze [son of David]—Pshavi electoral district no. 50, Gulripshi rayon
3. Gvazava Elguja Anatolis dze [son of Anatoli]—Sukhumi electoral district no. 2
4. Gasviani Akaki Ipolites dze [son of Ipolite)—Kolkhida electoral district no. 13, Gagra
5. Gamakharia Jemal Orestis dze [son of Oresti]—Nabakevi electoral district no. 37, Gali rayon
6. Gogokhia Temur Nuris dze [son of Nuri]—Ochamchire second electoral district no. 61
7. Dgebuadze Renald Egnates dze [son of Egnate]—Saberio electoral district no. 34, Gali rayon
8. Zukhbaia Otar Giorgis dze [son of Giorgi]—Gali second electoral district no. 30
9. Kalandia Temur Aleksandres dze [son of Aleksandre]—electoral district no. 64, Sukhumi rayon
10. Kacharava Vakhtang Mikheilis dze [son of Mikheil]—Babushara electoral district no. 52, Gulripshi rayon
11. Kvaratskhelia Murman Sardionis dze [son of Sardioni]—Ilori electoral district no. 59, Ochamchire rayon
12. Lortkipanidze Temur Sergos dze [son of Sergo]—Sukhumi electoral district no. 1
13. Mgaloblishvili Nugzar Petres dze [son of Petre]—Machari electoral district no. 48, Gulripshi rayon
14. Meskhia Napoleon Shalvas dze [son of Shalva]—Achigvari electoral district no. 31, Gali rayon
15. Mzhavia Temur Valerianis dze [son of Valeriani]—electoral district no. 65, Sukhumi rayon
16. Nadareishvili Tamaz Vladimeris dze [son of Vladimer]—electoral district no. 17, Gagra
17. Nagarnina Olga Simonis asuli [daughter of Simoni]—Drandi electoral district no. 51, Gulripshi rayon
18. Ubilava Raisa Orestis asuli [daughter of Oresti]—Leselidze electoral district no. 20, Gagra
19. Karaia Raisa Konstantines asuli [daughter of Konstantine]—Gulrupshi electoral district no. 49
20. Khetsuriani Shota Giorgis dze [son of Giorgi]—Kochari electoral district no. 56, Ochamchire rayon
21. Khubua Tamaz Terentis dze [son of Terenti]—electoral district no. 29, Gali
22. Qolbaia Vakhtang Gabrielis dze [son of Gabriel]—Chuburkhinji electoral district no. 35, Gali rayon
23. Tsatava Rudik Dzikas dze [son of Dzika]—Gali first village electoral district no. 33, Gali rayon
24. Jachvliani Kimi Varlamis dze [son of Varlami]—Tsebeldi electoral district no. 47, Gulripshi rayon
25. Jguburia Zurab Grigolis dze [son of Grigol]—Okumi electoral district no. 32, Gali rayon
26. Shamugia Rostom Vladimeris dze [son of Vladimer]—Z emobarghebi electoral district no. 36, Gali rayon

Defense Minister on Situation in Gali District

LD0604180095 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Video report by K. Bzhaniya; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in Abkhazia remains tense, so we tried to learn the opinion of a professional military man about this. Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nabidaidze comments on the situation in and around Gali District in an exclusive interview for our program:

[Begin recording] [Nabidaidze] At about 1600 several Icarus buses carrying Abkhazian armed militants arrived in Gali District, in the security zone, and the resolute actions of the peacekeeping forces under the leadership of General (Kozlov), chief of staff of the peacekeeping forces, prevented the bloodshed which unfortunately could have occurred.

It must be understood that we have done and will continue to do everything to prevent such occurrences. In this respect, we have good cooperation with Russia's peacekeeping forces. [end recording]

The government of Abkhazia has issued a statement on the exacerbation of the situation in Gali District. The statement expresses a protest to the Government of Georgia which, it asserts, is supporting the actions of Georgian sabotage and terrorist groups in the security zone. The increasingly frequent comments by high officials in the Georgian Government on the need to resolve by force the problem of territorial claims on Abkhazia are arousing serious concern among the leadership and population of the republic. The Abkhaz authorities call on Russia and the United Nations to ensure that Georgia returns to implementing strictly the multilateral agreements.

In spite of the obviously complicated nature of the situation in the Gali border district, the president of Abkhazia has not yet made a decision to declare a heightened level of combat alert in the republican army.

The presidential commission on the exchange of prisoners of war and citizens protested to the Georgian side today about Georgia's demand that a ransom be paid for the return of Abkhaz citizens who are being held prisoner after being kidnapped a few days ago in Gali. The commission demands that the prisoners be handed over without any conditions.

Latvia

German Foreign Minister Kinkel Arrives

LD0604141095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has arrived in Riga. The aim of his visit is to deepen relations between Germany and the Baltic states. Meetings with Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs, Prime Minister Maris Gailis, and State President Guntis Ulmanis have been scheduled for Kinkel. The talks will focus on issues of bilateral relations, support for Latvia's progress toward the European Union and the Western European Union, the NATO program Partnership for Peace, Latvia's relations with neighboring states, and participation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in ensuring stability in the (?aftermath) of the Paris Pact.

Tomorrow morning, the German foreign minister will go to Vilnius.

Local Authorities Protest Refugee Placement

LD0604220495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1729 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The local authority has appealed against the placement of refugees at Olaine and the possibility of expressions of dissatisfaction from the local residents. The Ministry of Internal Affairs predicts that this event could exacerbate the already relatively tense criminal situation in the town. The ministry is now deeply alarmed at the problems relating to illegal immigrants. It is possible that drug shipments and the threat of terrorism will increase. There could be complications arising from the strange foreigners' mentality and expressions of religious feeling. World practice shows that wherever such camps are set up, acts of terrorism are committed after a while, said the head of the press center. Meanwhile, Gunars (Dabolins), an officer of the border guard brigade headquarters, reported today that in the future the Latvian and Lithuanian border guards will intensify checks on trains in transit on the Kaliningrad-St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg-Kaliningrad route, to limit and avert the illegal transit of refugees through the Baltic countries. It is planned that in the future the Latvian border guards will accompany trains traveling from St. Petersburg to the Lithuanian railway border post at Turmanta, and from there hand over to the Lithuanian border guards. The same will apply to Lithuanian border guards on trains from Kaliningrad entering Lithuania and then Latvia.

Lithuania

Swedish Prime Minister Arrives, Reassures on Defense

LD0604144095 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sweden promises to support Lithuania in every possible way in the face of any kind of threat in spite of the policy of neutrality of many years standing. We will never remain passive or indifferent in the event of danger to Lithuania, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Karlsson assured. Ingvar Carlsson arrived on a one-day official visit to Vilnius today.

Security, Russian Ties Discussed

LD0604200195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, April 6 (Interfax)—Sweden will not remain indifferent if Lithuania's security is threatened, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson told a press conference in Vilnius today after meeting with his Lithuanian counterpart Adolfas Slezevicius.

The Swedish prime minister arrived in Lithuania on an official visit today.

Carlsson declined to say from where a threat to Lithuania could come. He stressed that if there was a danger to Lithuania, Sweden "will apply to a number of measures in order to express its position towards the aggressor on both the bilateral level and the level of such international organizations as the European Union, the OSCE and the UN." "We will never fail to display our decisive support for Lithuania's democracy and independence," the Swedish prime minister added.

He said Sweden supported the integration of Lithuania and other Baltic countries into the EU. Carlsson said that after the treaty on Lithuania's associated membership in the EU was signed Sweden would contribute to enlarging the EU and granting to Lithuania the status of a fully-fledged member of the European Union.

When an Interfax correspondent asked Carlsson to be more specific on the two prime ministers' discussion of relations with Russia, Carlsson said he was interested in the development of democratic processes in Russia. At the same time, he criticized the methods used by Russian leaders for resolving the Chechen conflict. He said Russia did not have the right to veto the admission of willing countries to NATO.

The Lithuanian prime minister told an Interfax correspondent at the same press conference that "nothing is more important than the development of democratic processes in Russia which are necessary for stability and security in the Baltic region" as well as in other regions. Slezevicius said Lithuania was seeking to achieve friendly relations with Russia. He added that, however, the principal position of Lithuania stated during the talks with Carlsson remained the same, "Lithuania is oriented towards European defense and economic structures." "Only cooperation in this area can guarantee the security and stability of our country and region," the Lithuanian prime minister concluded.

Slezevicius on Ignalina Nuclear Plant Shutdown

LD0604203895 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1335 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A delegation headed by Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson is on an official visit in Vilnius today. Our correspondent Zenonas Miksys reports.

[Miksys] Following the talks held by the delegations of both countries, the meeting between the prime ministers, Ingvar Carlsson and Adolfas Slezevicius, began. After the signing of the agreement on setting up a joint committee for economic issues, journalists from Sweden, Lithuania, and other countries, accredited in Vilnius, were invited to a news conference. [passage omitted]

At the news conference, Ingvar Carlsson, prime minister of the Kingdom of Sweden, said:

[Begin Carlsson recording in Swedish fading into superimposed Lithuanian translation] I am very proud to be invited to Lithuania, the more so that Sweden was the first country to open its embassy in Vilnius.

I think that our visit to your country is taking place at the time which is very important to Europe from the political point of view. Bilateral relations between Lithuania and Sweden are developing in a due manner and there are no problems to this effect.

Although, from the military point of view, Sweden is not related to any country, it is always ready to help Lithuania and other Baltic states. We will not remain passive on the issues related to the joining of the European Union by your country, either. [end recording]

[Miksys] [passage omitted] And here is the opinion of Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius about the visit of Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and his delegation to Lithuania and the issues which were discussed during this visit.

[Begin Slezevicius recording] I am very pleased that Ingvar Karlsson has found an opportunity to visit our country. [passage omitted]

We discussed very many issues today, and both delegations share the opinion that essentially there are no issues on which our opinions would differ. The same can be said about the issues related to the process of European integration and about our aspiration to sign the European treaty, which we discussed. [passage omitted]

We are glad that Sweden will support us by consulting us because it has vast experience in this area after recently becoming a full member of the European Union.

The prime minister spoke about the areas where Sweden renders us significant support—environmental protection and nuclear power engineering. Today we discussed the possibility of Swedish experts rendering us support in the area of power engineering by carrying out various expert examinations, including for the possible—inevitable, rather than possible—shutting down of the Ignalina nuclear power plant in the future. A process of preparation and international experience is required for this, since it is a complicated process in all aspects.

We also discussed an issue which is very important to us and which is very much supported by the Swedish Government, and that is a project to strengthen border protection and technical assistance in this area.

We also discussed yet another project in which Sweden supports us—preparation of the database and legal base for the introduction of the mortgage system.

Some of our joint efforts in the Partnership for Peace program and the support to the Baltic peacekeeping battalion were discussed. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Brazauskas on Division of Power, Cooperation

WS0604114595 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 28 Mar 95 pp 2, 16

[Interview with President Algirdas Brazauskas by Valentyna Pysanska in Vilnius on 24 March: "How Much Power Does the President Have?"—first five paragraphs are HOLOS UKRAYINY introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] It will probably not be a revelation to say that when we carefully observe the post-Soviet republics whenever we visit them: How is life there now? This is particularly the case in the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, which was the first to gain independence. Frankly speaking, in the former times as well, the situation in those republics was better, or at least different. At present, when someone observes the clean streets of Vilnius filled with big and small stores, yet—unlike in our state—not overflowing with kiosks; when someone hears the phrase "We only accept litai here"; when someone watches how almost every other building—privatized building—is being renovated (some 70 percent of state property has already been privatized in Lithuania); that person will acknowledge with a shade of sadness—the comparison [between Lithuania and Ukraine] is to our disadvantage.

Beyond any doubt, Lithuania has enough problems: Not everyone can use the services offered by luxury stores (although the fact that the latter are functioning means that they have customers). The state cannot provide everyone with housing, and by far not all the people can afford private homes. At the same time, nobody is running along the streets with red flags or asking to be admitted back in the USSR. I asked them why there were no discussions of that kind, despite the fact that the Lithuanians do protest against low wages, the government's unpopular decisions, and the like.

Very different people, including Ukraine's charge d'affaires in Lithuania, a reception clerk in the hotel, or common passers-by on the street said: People know that the road to the market will be hard and full of problems.

The government of the state explained everything in detail at the very start and did not promise a lot of advantages.

Neither did Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, still deemed as a communist and a red by the opposition, allow himself to promise "beautiful" lives to his electorate. Everyone knew what was in store for them. Perhaps that is why the disappointment was not that dramatic.

Last Friday [24 March], Ukrainian reporters, including HOLOS UKRAYINY correspondent Valentyna Pysanska, interviewed Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas on the eve of his official visit to Kiev.

[Pysanska] Mr. President, what are the specific features of reform carried out in Lithuania? How would you assess its results?

[Brazauskas] We spent a lot of time within the five years of reform looking for an optimal path which would lead us to a free- market economy. I used to advocate—and I still do—such approaches under which reform would do as little damage as possible to the people, the economy, and the state. To my regret, there have been losses.

However, there have indubitably been positive results, too. First and foremost, I am referring to the fact that we managed to transform the litas into a hard national currency within three to four months. It was not easy, because not all the citizens supported this move, including industrialists and entrepreneurs. However, we undertook that measure and that was a correct decision: Annual inflation [in Lithuania] stood at 1,000 percent in 1992; the corresponding figure was 45 percent in 1994, while in 1995, we are planning to reduce it to 25 percent. This is not bad, but this is a complicated process.

I believe that the introduction of the national currency is the groundwork of our reform. Had it not been for that, we would not be able to control the destabilizing factors affecting the state.

Second, we managed to carry out privatization quite successfully, although we did not avoid bruises and bumps. That happened primarily due to the fact that we neglected the transitional stage and tried to win everything in one fell swoop and get where we wanted in one leap. Such processes do not go without losses, particularly since we had enough funds. [sentence as published]

At the same time, there are unquestionable positive results along with negative ones: Our GNP increased in 1994, although the increase was insignificant. This is a good symptom indicating economic revival.

Social policy remains the most complex problem. We have a lot of pensioners, and an average pension is 140 litai ($1 equals 4 litai). Of course, this is not enough. However, a law on social protection is currently being drafted which would take into account every citizen's contribution to the development of the state.

The incomes of people employed in the unsubsidized sector remain our other problem, given that less than one-third of the state budget is earmarked to support that sector. Although the wages of that category of citizens are still low, the rate of pay increases is higher than the rate of price increases.

[Pysanska] All the post-Soviet states are currently experiencing very similar problems in the relations between their presidents and parliaments. Do you have those kinds of problems? If so, how do you resolve them?

[Brazauskas] Those kinds of problems also crop up in other states, not necessarily in the post-Soviet ones, where the question is raised: Does the president have much or little authority? I believe that no matter how much authority the presidents have, their powers should be precisely delineated.

I recently returned from an international conference devoted to the activities of constitutional courts. I listened to lectures and reports which analyzed a lot of conflicts, and I felt happy: There has not been a single conflict in Lithuania within the two years of the Constitutional Court's existence. This is because the division of authority stipulated by the Lithuanian Constitution provides a basis for the normal functioning of all branches of authority—parliamentarian, presidential, governmental, and judicial. Each of those branches adheres to constitutional norms. This is where statehood starts.

The president also works within the limits envisioned by the constitution. I also have an urge sometimes to sign a resolution which, so to speak, does not quite correspond to certain laws. Yet I do not do that, because I know that the parliament will undoubtedly reject that resolution. The powers of each branch of authority are precisely delineated by the Constitution. Our Constitution was passed after two and a half years of our existence as an independent state, when we did not have proper experience. At present, we feel that certain amendments should be introduced to it, but the corresponding law is so rigid that this is not easy to do: Two-thirds of lawmakers have to vote for an amendment and either confirm their decision three months later or hold a referendum.

Relations between a president and a parliament are an eternal problem, including for me, despite the fact that a majority of the Lithuanian Seimas [parliament] deputies are members of the Democratic Labor Party, of which I used to be chairman. I cannot be chairman now, for this is prohibited by law. Nevertheless, I do have debates even with that native party of mine. For instance, I did not sign several laws passed by a majority of votes. Although decisions to send laws for redrafting should be very carefully prepared.

I try to meet with the representatives of all factions—and we have eight of those—and discuss problems as they emerge. At present, for instance, we are discussing a possible amendment to the Constitution which would provide for trading in land as a commodity available to foreign citizens, which is a condition for joining the EU. This is a very complex process.

[Pysanska] Despite the fact that your activities are delineated by the Constitution, the opposition finds pretexts to criticize you. This is good, because under those circumstances people are forced to look for optimal solutions and their mistakes are noticed by everyone immediately after they are made. Do you find criticism useful?

[Brazauskas] My views regarding foreign policy priorities, as well as the resolutions that I suggest, are completely different from those advocated by the opposition headed by Vytautas Landsbergis. This is especially true regarding our relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other former USSR republics.

The point is that we have an organized opposition which used to be in power in the past. They have the right to criticize, given that they once restored Lithuania's independence and did that very resolutely and courageously. I cannot deny that. However, there is another evident thing: Those people failed to carry out reform. Meanwhile, their policy did a lot of damage. Take, for instance, the hasty dissolution of kolkhozes carried out without offering any alternative. As a result, we now have to buy animal husbandry products.

Of course, I listen to criticism, but there are a lot of problems which cannot be resolved by unanimous opinions. One has to display resoluteness and make decisions. We hold discussions with our opponents. Our relations happen to be tense at times, but it never comes down to fist fights.

[Pysanska] Mr. President, which fields do the Lithuanian leadership see as promising in terms of cooperation with Ukraine?

[Brazauskas] Lithuania is very interested in cooperation with Ukraine and I believe that this is reciprocal. Of course, we are not equal partners, given that Ukraine is a state with a population of 52 million people, while only around 4 million people live in Lithuania. Still, there are a lot of [common] interests.

Take, for instance, our states' geographic location: On the one hand, we have Ukraine, which has access to the Black Sea and lies on the routes to the south and the Near East. On the other hand, there is Lithuania, which is close to West Europe and Scandinavia. We should take advantage of this situation, but we are still in the reconnaissance stage. Meanwhile, a lot of Ukrainian products are already being shipped to the West through the port of Klaipeda. Entrepreneurs, too, have great opportunities once they have coordinated the system of mutual payments which, instead of hampering cooperation, would encourage its development.

We live in different climate zones and thus, Lithuania has an interest in Ukraine's agricultural products. Briefly speaking, there is much room for joint activities.

[Pysanska] What is your attitude toward the Ukrainian parliament's decision to abolish the Crimean presidency and other enforceable acts of that autonomous republic?

[Brazauskas] This is Ukraine's internal affair. In essence, I support the unity of the state. I never advocated—and I never will advocate—spontaneous decisions that jeopardize such unity. Everything should be resolved on the basis of the Constitution, laws, and other legal norms accepted in the state. We already know the consequences of other approaches. Those include bloodshed, chaos, and casualties.

I am sure that Ukraine has wise and experienced leaders who will be able to find a decent resolution to that problem.

[Pysanska] What are the prospects for our states' joint actions in the international arena?

[Brazauskas] Such prospects exist in many fields. We are trying to accede to European political and economic structures and we understand Ukraine's aspirations to the same effect. We will always support Ukraine.

It may seem strange, but Ukraine was mentioned in the documents approved by the Baltic states, concerning their admission to Europe.

Of course, there are different motives for joining the European structures, but economic motivation is probably the primary one. To do that, however, both Lithuania and Ukraine should compare their legal bases to the European ones and bring them in line with the latter. This is a complex process.

[Pysanska] Mr. President, what about Ukrainians living in Lithuania?

[Brazauskas] The Lithuanian law on national minorities is very progressive. That is why we do not have problems with any community residing in our state. I carefully observe their activities and sentiments. As for the Ukrainians, they are hard-working people who are very active in sociopolitical life. Incidentally, some of them have already been decorated with [Lithuanian] state awards.

[Pysanska] People say that you have friendly relations with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Ukrainian Ambassador to Lithuania Rostyslav Bilodid. They say that you all but meet Bilodid every day.

[Brazauskas] We do not meet with President Kuchma very often—we only see each other at various international meetings. I enjoy those meetings because Leonid Kuchma has a record of working in the economic sector, and this is something I have been doing all my life. Therefore, we understand each other very well. As for Mr. Bilodid, we meet more often—in the morning when we jog in the forest in which both the Lithuanian president's residence and Ukraine's temporary embassy to Lithuania are situated. Rostyslav Bilodid is a master of sports in swimming, while I used to take up field and track activities and sailing. We both are good runners.